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This thesis investigates the factors involved in the processes of health policy change. It 
questions the validity of path dependency theory in the context of changes observed within 
the United Kingdom health system under the Conservatives between 1979 and 1997.  The 
development of the National Health Service (NHS) ‘internal market’  reforms  is considered 
together with five specific cases of change affecting public-private  boundaries. The research 
combines literature research, including biographical and archival sources,  with  a selection of 
interviews with important actors from  the health policy arena of the time. The cases are 
mapped using an adapted version of the three policy streams developed by Kingdon for the 
analysis of agenda-setting processes, as a  structured basis for comparison.  
The research finds little evidence of the self-reinforcing processes that are required to 
generate path dependency, or that a change of path can take place only at a critical juncture.  
It shows that small changes can produce  substantive and enduring changes of path. It also 
identifies that the factors involved appear to go beyond Kingdon’s  three streams, and attaches 
importance to the potential for disloyalty to the status quo.  Cultural or technical change, as 
well as policy change, can generate disloyalty amongst those who deliver services. The 
presence of the potential for disloyalty is, therefore, an important factor in the achievement of 
a change of path.  
Taken together the changes between 1979 and 1997 show a notable consistency of purpose in 
pursuit of a dual agenda of consumerism and public spending control. Whilst analysis of 
individual cases of change can suggest an absence of strategy,  each case plays a part within a 
remarkable consistent Conservative programme of change the roots of which predate the 
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Background to the research 
This study grew from the author's personal involvement in the policy process. Shortly 
before the 1987 General Election, whilst still a student of economics,  I became 
involved in policymaking for the then Social Democratic Party (SDP), whilst it was in a 
formal alliance with the Liberal Party. When the SDP split following the election I 
remained with the independent SDP, under the leadership of Dr David Owen MP, 
and following my graduation in 1990 went to work for Owen in the House of 
Commons.  
As Owen was both a former Labour Foreign Secretary, Minister of Health, and a 
doctor, his interests, and therefore my work, covered the range of policy. Major 
changes were underway. Internationally the Berlin Wall had fallen, the Soviet 
economy and society were changing, the first Gulf War was fought, and the 
European Community was working towards completion of the Single Market and 
taking the first steps towards monetary union through an Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM). At home, Conservative divisions over the United Kingdom's relationship to 
the European Union and the unpopularity of the Community Charge, known as a 
"Poll Tax", led to John Major replacing Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister, and 
then winning the 1992 General Election against most expectations.   
Following the fall of Thatcher there appeared to be a centre-right political 
convergence on market-based social policies. Anticipating the inevitable demise of 
the SDP, I assisted Lord Kilmarnock in forming the Social Market Foundation (SMF) 
think tank in 1990, with financial backing from David Sainsbury1. The SMF was 
created to continue the development of a distinctive social market approach to 
policy, which was gaining attention across the political spectrum. In February 1991, 
for example, I highlighted to Owen speeches by both the Conservative Party 
                                                     
1 A Trustee of the SDP, Deputy Chairman of Sainsburys PLC. Funding came through the Gatsby 
Foundation charity. David Sainsbury became a Labour Peer in 1997. 
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Chairman2 and the Chancellor of the Exchequer3  describing themselves as adherents 
to a social market approach4. The focus was shifting towards concern with the goals 
of social policy, and away from state ownership of the means of delivery. In the SDP 
we would find ourselves in policy and political discussions with the Conservatives: 
Owen with the Prime Minister and Conservative Chairman5(Owen 1991:790, 802), 
and myself with the head of the Conservative Research Department6. The case that 
there was a convergence underway upon a new paradigm for public policy seemed 
strong.  The internal market reforms of the NHS, which the SDP had been promoting 
before the 1987 General Election, were an example of a new approach. 
After the 1992 General Election I joined the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) to assist in 
the development of new consumer-based policies within the process of market 
liberalisation, advising both the CAA  and the European Commission.. Different 
modes of policy change seen in Europe and America demonstrated that the process 
of change can take several  forms which are nonetheless transformative.  
In America the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 was a dramatic and complete 
reversal of preceding policy. It was implemented quickly despite the opposition of 
the air transport sector, and overseen by Alfred Kahn, who had shortly beforehand 
been appointed by President Carter to head the Civil Aeronautics Board(Susan 2011). 
In Europe an incremental process was followed, with piecemeal changes in bilateral 
agreements between individual countries7 and three "packages" towards air 
transport liberalisation that were agreed between 1987 and 1992, and taken in 
increasingly significant steps. In the European case this change was achieved despite 
the opposition of the state-owned airlines and airports which dominated the 
European market, and of the governments which owned them.  
In 1995 I returned to Westminster, as a Special Adviser,  to assist a beleaguered 
Secretary of State for Health in the implementation of policies developed whilst I had 
                                                     
2 Chris Patten MP 
3 Norman Lamont MP 
4 Private memorandum "The Social Market", 14 February 1991 
5 John Major and Chris Patten; 24 February 1991 
6 Andrew Lansley 
7 Led by the United Kingdom and The Netherlands in 1984 
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been working for Owen and the SDP. The political battle over the internal market 
reforms was still in full flow some five years on, heightened by its inevitable impact 
on hospital configuration in London. Despite the headline politics, however, the NHS 
continued to move towards a mixed market of supply, and in several  areas towards 
a predominantly private supply. The Labour Party too, under a new Leader was 
beginning to adopt a new market-based approach. The surprise was how far they 
subsequently developed this approach in Government. 
Looking back over these experiences it seemed that the biggest parliamentary 
battles might be fought over policies that touch a political nerve, but that 
fundamental changes can take place away from these battles, incrementally and 
often quietly.  Taken individually these incremental steps might appear to be little 
more than politicians muddling along a largely pre-determined path within the 
political constraints of the day. Over time, however, a transformation might have 
taken place.  
The selection of a research methodology also grew out of my own experiences 
within the policy process. Not only did I work closely with the leader of an opposition 
party, but also with several health ministers. It was clear that each of their individual 
personalities and their relationships with their peers had a significant effect on the 
policies that were pursued, how they were pursued, and their effectiveness.  I have, 
therefore, sought to gather and analyse the roles that particular  individuals played 
in policymaking. A strong reliance on unstructured interviews and political 
biographies and autobiographies reflects this belief that personalities matter at least 
as much as policies. The Italian sociologist Franco Ferrarotti  argues that: "The 
biographical and autobiographical approach, rooted in time, allows the eliciting of 
problematic human situations and distinguishes radically between the technical 
problem – resolvable through the exact application of a given, ideally indifferent, and 
so interchangeable formula – and the human problem"(Ferrarotti 1990:2). However, 
such an approach focused on the "human problem", if followed in isolation 
introduces a serious risk of bias and other errors, reflecting subjective accounts of 
past events: I undertook the research for David Owen's memoirs(Owen 1991) whilst 
he was still a Member of Parliament. Two insights came from this painstaking work 
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that would influence my approach to policy analysis. Firstly, the production of 
autobiographies, and perhaps to a lesser degree, authorised biographies involves 
recourse to a wealth of documentation that might otherwise never be accessed by 
researchers, or if they are accessible 8 might not be fully understood without the 
subject's own recollections. The Owen papers, for example, included short notes 
passed between Government ministers during Parliamentary debates. Secondly, the 
desire to portray oneself in the best way can impose a heavy bias, and set out an 
incomplete account of events. In the Owen case, for example, his autobiography 
makes no mention of his part in arranging  the 1978  state visit to London and 
knighthood for  the Romanian dictator, Nikolai Ceausescu. This major event whilst 
Owen was Foreign Secretary was raised during our work on the Owen book, as 
Edward Behr9 was simultaneously researching his own book on Ceausescu(Behr 
1991).  In order to compensate for such biases and omissions, the interviews for the 
research, therefore, extend beyond the policy elite of ministers, to include those 
behind the scenes in the policy arena at the time of the events under investigations. 
This, of course, is also enhanced by the usual  recourse to the wider, objective 
literature. 
Research Questions 
My aim for the research is to test an assumption that health policy exhibits self-
reinforcing processes that maintain it on a path established in 1948, and to 
investigate how specific changes came about in areas that appear to have 
experienced a change of path. My aim is an  improved understanding of a policy 
process that demonstrates aspects of continuity but also frequent and substantive 
change.  
The research questions that I intend to address are: 
i.Does path dependency adequately explain health policy under Conservative 
governments? 
                                                     
8 Owen's papers are, for example, now held at the University of Liverpool 
http://sca.lib.liv.ac.uk/collections/colldescs/owen/index.html Accessed online 19 September 2012 
9 Journalist and historian http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/1552862/Edward-Behr.html# 
Accessed 19 September 2012 
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ii.What are the common factors in the processes of change? 
iii.How can theory better explain the NHS policy process? 
 
Scope of the Research 
The research aims to determine the forces enabling and limiting policy change. It 
also seeks to identify the acorns from which new oak trees might have grown, rather 
than focus on the most obvious features of the policy landscape. Were these acorns 
planted knowing or hoping for a particular end result, or merely accidental events, 
and what prepared the environment that they might flourish and last? 
This line of inquiry requires both a macro and micro approach. The political and 
social environment both over time and at the specific points of change is relevant to 
the analysis. The changes that will be considered are, therefore, set within their 
context, so that the Conservative approach is traced from the beginnings of the NHS 
to the 1990s, so that reforms that took place in the Thatcher and Major years are set 
within their wider context. 
This study does not seek to analyse the impact on equity or standards of care, as it is 
an analysis of the processes of continuity and change and not the outcomes of these 
processes. The latter topic is, anyway, the subject of considerable and ongoing 
analysis and debate. 
Although the genesis of the research lies in my observations of policy processes in 
two very different policy areas, as discussed above, the research itself is solely of 
United Kingdom (largely English) health policy. A similar approach could, of course, 
be followed in other policy arenas if this might prove to be useful.  
Context of the Research 
The thesis was completed shortly after the latest major piece of NHS reform 
legislation had passed into law10. If it succeeds this will  take the NHS  another step 
along the way towards a focus on the local purchasing of care, rather than its 
                                                     
10 Health and Social Care Act 2012 
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provision through centralised state agencies. All hospitals will be given managerial 
independence from government and be subject to the risks of the marketplace. My 
hope is that this thesis will assist with an understanding of how health policy had 
reached this point, through an analysis of its past, and provide a framework for 





2. Conceptual Framework 
Path Dependent or Muddling with a Purpose? Continuity and Change in the NHS 
 
Introduction 
The research questions set out in the introduction make it clear that the purpose of 
the research is to investigate whether the theory of path dependency provides a 
useful basis for health policy analysis. In this chapter I set out to explain how path 
dependency has been adapted from economics for social policy analysis, and to 
consider existing critiques of this adaptation. Whilst path dependency focuses on the 
self-reinforcing processes that prevent change, I also investigate current 
understanding of the factors that might generate windows of opportunity (or critical 
junctures) for a change of path, and the processes that might put particular policies 
on the agenda when these opportunities occur. The research itself is a study of 
episodes of change, thus the capacity of the theory to accommodate and explain 
change, as well as continuity, is of considerable importance. 
 
From Continuity to Change 
The Welfare State in England has been subject to constant incremental reform. 
Change may be taking place in small steps but the scope and nature of the welfare 
system has nevertheless changed substantially as a result. This raises a range of 
questions as to why change takes place in this way,  whether the path followed is in 
some way predetermined by history or selected from a menu of options by 
policymakers at each step, and whether the future shape of the welfare system is 
predictable. These questions are fundamental to understanding the role of the 
modern policy process in shaping the future provision of welfare. Policymakers are 
either constrained to a set path by the exogenous forces of history or are able to 
engage in transformative changes, whether by large or small steps.   
If transformative change has taken place over a period of time, without the major 
external forces of war or a great depression then a different lens is required.  In the 
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literature there is a tendency to contrast health with other areas of social policy that 
underwent dramatic changes during the Conservative years, with private sector and 
quasi-market solutions being adopted in housing, pensions, social care, and education. 
Pearson, for example, describes the NHS as the one "untouchable" in Thatcher's 
mission to role back the state(Cloke 1992:215). This contrast with change in other 
areas can lead to an assumption of continuity in health policy going back to the 1948 
creation of the NHS as a tax-funded universal and comprehensive service.  
Despite persistent debate over NHS funding and significant administrative reform, 
particularly those of the Conservative Government in 1974, the unique UK post-war 
model survived largely unchallenged until the economic crisis that emerged in the mid-
1970s. Since then, however, the nature of the UK health system has changed 
dramatically. This  crisis led  the Labour Government to create a Royal Commission to 
investigate the NHS. The probability of change by the end of the 1970s seemed high, 
but by no means inevitable. The election of a Conservative government in 1979 further 
increased this probability. The extent of the change that was to take place over the 
next 30 years turned out to be substantial. In his review of health policy, and drawing 
on his 18 years as an Economic Adviser in the Department of Health, Smee concludes 
that: "If the NHS in 2005 is compared with the NHS in the early 1980s, one cannot help 
but be impressed by the scale and radicalism of the policy changes" (Smee 2005:191). 
In this chapter I question the value of path dependency theory adapted to describe the 
policy process in the modern state. At a time of rather dramatic change in welfare 
provision, involving widespread retrenchment of state provision and the development 
of mixed markets of service supply, achieved through processes of constant reform, an 
approach focused on resilience and continuity struggles to describe current events or 
provide a basis for analysis. Indeed, by focusing research on institutional resilience and 
policy continuity  a framework of  path dependency appears to lead researchers to 
miss the many smaller changes that take place which, when considered together,  
present a significant change of direction(Streeck and Thelen 2005). In seeking a 
conceptual framework for my research I start with the requirement that it must be 
able to encompass the consistent processes of controversial reforms that have 
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transformed social policy since the 1980s, beginning with a consideration of how 
change as well as continuity might be understood within path dependency theory. 
Path Dependency: A (False) Dominant Paradigm?  
In 1989 the economist Brian Arthur argued that processes of increasing returns played 
a significant role in determining long-term outcomes between rival technologies, so 
that economies might be: "locked-in to inferior technology paths"(Arthur 1989: :126). 
This contrasts starkly with the usual processes of decreasing returns, which allows 
technological improvements to be adopted and an optimal outcome to be maintained. 
In his dynamic model "chance" or "historical" events can affect decisions to adopt a 
certain technology rather than the intrinsic values of the technology. Once adopted, 
increasing returns strengthen a market position with regard to competitor technology.  
Whilst most technologies are subject to constant or diminishing returns, where this is 
not the case and increasing returns for an existing technology are experienced, laissez-
faire policies cannot be expected to produce an efficient outcome given the reliance 
upon timing and chance events rather than technical advantage. It is important to 
note, however, that path dependency is not broadly applicable, but appropriate  only  
to cases where increasing returns to a relatively sub-optimal technology prevail.  This 
situation cannot be assumed to exist without evidence showing that increasing returns 
from chance events are leading to sub-optimal outcomes. Many other factors may be 
at play including, for example, an incumbent's "sunk costs" that limit opportunities for 
new entrants and market contestability(Baumol et al. 1982). These can simply be a 
feature of a particular sector, where market entry costs and risks are high, rather than 
the result of the timing of past events. The distinction is an important one. In the 
context of welfare policy the disentangling of feedback effects due to historical  
legacies, from  the current factors and future risks that affect policy reform is essential 
in order to understand the policy process. Voter opposition to welfare retrenchment 
appears to be prevalent within all countries, making it difficult to argue that this is a 
demonstration of increasing returns, given that it is applicable whatever the historical 
legacy of a welfare state, regardless of the timing and sequencing of events. Indeed,  
research in behavioural economics has demonstrated systematic "loss-
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aversion"(Kahneman 1990), in which significantly higher utilities are attached to losses 
than to gains of the same magnitude, and an associated "endowment effect"(Thaler 
1980) that items are more highly valued once possessed than prior to their possession. 
Separating the many effects that might limit opportunities for reform and generate 
apparent path dependency is important to an understanding of the policy process.  
Many terms have been adopted into political science from other fields, often with 
substantive changes to their semantic meanings(Goodin and Klingemann 1996:103). 
These borrowed concepts include path dependency. The increasing returns that 
determine path dependency in economics have been interpreted as "self-reinforcing 
processes" that might be perceived in historical institutional analysis.(Pierson 2001:12)  
The adoption of the theory of path dependency has been rapid within international 
comparative health policy analysis, to explain the retention of diverse systems in 
different countries . This has been  despite the presence of a long series of strongly 
contested structural reforms in many systems. Rico and Costa-Font argue that path 
dependency has become entrenched in social policy analysis largely due to its 
"intuitive appeal" despite its "dubious conceptual consistency and predictive 
power"(2005:232-3). Path dependency theory within  political science emerged from 
an increasing interest in historical approaches to the study of political institutions.  
Krasner noted in 1984 that there had been a linguistic shift in the literature from 
Government-based analysis to "statist" analyses, in which government is one of many 
actors within the policy process in which all actors are constrained by history: "…once 
an historical choice is made it both precludes and facilitates alternative future choices. 
Political change follows a branching model. Once a particular fork is chosen, it is very 
difficult to get back onto a rejected path." (Krasner 1984:225). Pierson argues that this 
is because path dependent processes affect the preferences of the actors involved in 
policymaking and the political plausibility of particular reforms.(Pierson 2001:12)  
In England,  market-based reforms since the 1980s and significant shifts in the public-
private boundaries of NHS care mean that the assumption of path dependency can be 
called into question and explanations sought that may better explain the changes that 
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have taken place and which may offer some predictive capability for future NHS 
reforms.  
Path dependency theory has provided a useful explanation of policy continuity, but 
relies on the concept of major and rare “critical junctures” due to exogenous forces to 
allow for any change of direction. Its apparent strength in the context of policy 
continuity, based on the role of history and the sequencing of events,  is undermined 
by its inability to provide for major changes to occur through incremental processes. 
Critical junctures are, therefore, of central importance in fitting analytical approaches 
based on path dependency to modern accounts of welfare state reform. 
Opportunities for change 
Drawing on the economic language of “increasing returns”, which can render change 
ever more costly over time whilst a certain path is pursued, Pierson has explained that: 
“Knowledge of the dynamics of increasing returns processes can greatly sharpen our 
understanding of why particular junctures (and which aspects of them) are critical and 
why timing often counts for so much in politics” (Pierson 2000).  
In an analysis of welfare state development Esping-Andersen  has commented that 
current theory allows for policy change not through “mutation” or the sudden arrival 
of a completely new solution, but through the “recombination of old 
elements”(1990:124). This recombination takes place at a critical juncture in time, 
creating a temporary opportunity for a change of direction. It is exogenous forces, 
therefore, rather than endogenous forces that create these moments in time. 
Even when such junctures arise the policy process relies on policy entrepreneurs to 
seize the moment. These occasions may be predictable, when programmes 
systematically come up for review, but they may also be unpredictable and arise 
unexpectedly. Pierson argues that they present opportunities for the interested actors 
that constantly surround governments, to draw attention to the particular problems in 
which they have an interest and thus promote their own ideas for solutions. As 
Kingdon also notes these policy entrepreneurs lie in wait for: “ problems to float by to 
which they can attach their solutions, waiting for a development in the political stream 
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they can use to their advantage.” (Kingdon 1995). According to Kingdon the policy 
entrepreneurs must be prepared for policy windows to open, if they are not to miss 
these “windows of opportunity”. It is important in the context of the analysis that  
follows  to understand that the Kingdon model of a "policy primeval soup" assumes 
that the elements for change are constant features in the policy soup, waiting for their 
moment to come.  
Hacker has used a path dependent approach to explain the historical logic of the 
health care systems in Britain, Canada and the United States (Hacker 1998), and to 
argue against a focus on single variables, whether economic forces, political cultures, 
or interest groups, which he says has failed to explain long-term divergence across 
countries in which these forces are very similar. A similar approach was used by Tuohy 
to demonstrate that the “accidental logics” of a system can act as a restraint on both 
the development and implementation of reform agendas, with very rare windows of 
opportunity to break with the logic(Tuohy 1999a).  
It could be argued that the election of an ideologically-driven Conservative 
government, led by Mrs Thatcher, in 1979 itself presented such a “policy window”, as 
might any significant election outcome(Garrett 1995). Yet the internal market reforms 
of the NHS reform were delayed until 1988, still then the ideology  applied seemed 
more linked to efficiency than to any “Thatcherite” concept of privatisation. Similarly 
the election of a Labour government, after 18 years of Conservative rule, in 1997, with 
an election campaign largely based on “saving” the NHS, might too have presented a 
window of opportunity for radical change. Once again any serious attempt at reform 
was delayed for several years, by which time the window may have closed. These may, 
however, emphasise the degree to which timing matters. A change of government will 
present  opportunities for change across the policy spectrum, but political priorities 
will dictate which are pursued.  A "critical juncture" is, perhaps, rather more than just 
a window of opportunity for change, but a decision point when a choice must be 





The elusive "critical juncture" 
In social policy analysis there are significant challenges in attempting to identify 
"critical junctures" within the path dependency model, even with the benefit of 
hindsight. Furthermore, it cannot be assumed that a critical juncture, even if it is 
successfully located, is associated thereafter with the increasing returns processes that 
are at the heart of path dependency. Pierson has argued, therefore, that critical 
junctures and path dependence require quite separate consideration(Pierson 2004)..  
Hogan has attempted to give the critical juncture approach "a rigour it previously 
lacked"(2006:657) by seeking to develop a framework of analysis. He argues that first a 
"generative cleavage" must be evident from examination of the tensions that led to 
change, and that the subsequent change must be "significant, swift and 
encompassing".  It is notable that in seeking to identify path dependency from the 
starting point of a path rather than the processes that entrench it, the adaptation to 
social policy analysis bears no relation to any economic concept of path dependency. 
The significance and speed of the adoption of a new technology have no direct 
relationship with the mechanism that generates a situation of path dependency and a 
sub-optimal yet stable outcome. Even the degree to which it might be encompassing, 
affecting most actors within the relevant market, may only emerge over time. Whilst 
the framework proposed by Hogan may prove useful in categorising individual 
episodes of sudden change, it adds little to an understanding of the processes that 
generate or entrench change. The research to follow will investigate cases where 
change might not have been swift or even particularly significant and encompassing at 
the outset, but nonetheless represents a cleavage from the past. 
Social policy critiques of path dependency 
Ross makes a very strong critique of the adaptation of path dependency to social 
policy analysis, describing its widespread use as a "parsimonious model of returns" 
(Ross 2007:592). Crouch and Farrell call  it "the new determinism" because it: "takes its 
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fundamental inspiration from mathematical processes (Polya urn models)11 in which 
initial conditions may have a determinative effect on subsequent paths of 
development" (Crouch C 2002), with little allowance for responses to changing 
circumstances. They note that: "By far the greater preponderance of work in the social 
sciences has emphasized how institutions may involve 'lock in' – i.e. how they hamper 
actors in their attempts to respond to changed environmental circumstances, not only 
including the literature on path dependence, but also some of the sociological 
literature on embeddedness. When applied too simplistically these accounts 
underestimate the possibilities for change and innovation."(ibid:5-6). They endeavour 
to describe institutional change processes within a path dependent environment, but 
conclude that in the context of complex macro-social phenomena researchers may 
have to limit themselves to explanation.  The "surprising combinations of institional 
resources" that policy actors might deploy in order to effect change put prediction out 
of the reach of researchers(ibid:31).  
Bridges argues that the adoption of path dependence from economics for social policy 
analysis is mistaken because the central mechanism that it relates to in economics, the 
market, has no equivalent in this different arena. Institutions do not persist simply 
because of individual decisions to support them, as is the case in economics; when 
1980s consumers continued to purchase VHS video format, for example, in preference 
to the  technically superior Betamax. Path dependency in economics is an explanation 
of an exceptional phenomenon, in which the market appears to allow a stable but 
suboptimal equilibrium. In social policy, however, it is taken to explain the role of 
history in institutional stability.(Bridges A 2000)  
Peters et al identify an underlying dissensus in apparently path dependent  
policymaking and identify a role for political conflict in producing policy change over 
time(Peters et al. 2005), and Glennerster and Lieberman point to elements of UK and 
US convergence upon a mixed-market solution(Glennerster and Lieberman 2011), 
which is in direct conflict to Pierson's claim a decade earlier that evidence of radical 
                                                     
11 A statistical process involving the repeated taking of coloured balls from an urn: with two colours,  
if a ball of one colour is removed (at random) but then replaced with an additional ball of the same 
colour, this would begin a process of self-reinforcement over time.  
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change and convergence is limited, due to the existence of path dependency in 
welfare systems.(Pierson 2001:13) 
Critical junctures, which present the only opportunities for significant change within 
path dependency rely intrinsically upon policymakers opportunities at these rare 
points in time to select a particular route from those available within Kingdon's 
"primeval soup" of ideas(Kingdon 1995). In the period of the current research, for 
example, it might be that the economic crisis of 1976  represented just such a 
juncture: The end of an era, and the adoption of a new approach to welfare. The 
response then, however, was to appoint a Royal Commission rather than embark upon 
a course of enforced, radical change.  
Institutional and Incremental Models of the Policy Process 
Incrementalism 
Understanding how and why specific opportunities for reform arise at particular points 
in time is important in the analysis of policy systems.  Competing models of the policy 
process accommodate such opportunities to very differing degrees. The traditional 
rational model for example, provides an ideal type of policy making, which assumes an 
orderly linear process. In such a model new policies superior to those already in place 
would be found amongst all of the alternatives available and would be readily adopted 
as part of the routine policy process. As Sutton has commented in an overview of 
theories of policy process the evidence suggests that this is: “far from reality” (Sutton 
1999:9). Even the mixed scanning model (Etzioni 1967) which involves policy makers 
in a systematic initial search for all possible policy options before making a more 
manageable selection of options for more detailed analysis, and from which a final 
choice will be made, would appear to differ from the reality of decisions taken either 
under pressure or apparently on the spur of the moment in response to events. 
Alternatives that are more accommodating to the complexity of modern political life 
have, therefore, been developed, seeking to explain policy continuity and change.  
Incrementalist theories suggest that policy makers find it safer to move forward in 
small steps, in a process of trial and error in which the political risks are limited, which 
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might also been seen as a process of simply “muddling through”. Much of the 
experience of British health policy could indeed be described as muddling through, 
with very little short-term threat to the status quo. 
Lindblom and Woodhouse have explained this approach on the basis that politicians 
and their policy staff limit themselves to politically-acceptable small changes, knowing 
that major change would not be supported, and that their own expertise is rooted in 
the existing system. As a result they naturally restrict their analysis to incremental 
proposals rather than waste resources on ideas that are deemed to be beyond the 
bounds of political feasibility, and of which they have little understanding. They also 
benefit from an incremental approach that minimises the risks from policy mistakes (C. 
E. Lindblom and Woodhouse 1993).   
Whilst this observation might offer a credible explanation of day-to-day health policy 
making, it cannot provide a useful tool for the analysis of significant policy shifts over 
time and critical junctures for policy change.  In an overview of incremental models, 
placing them in the context on non-incremental changes, Rajagolan and Rasheed, have 
traced the development of incrementalism from Lindblom’s original 1959 theory on 
“The Science of Muddling Through”(C. Lindblom 1959) to the “never-ending 
bargaining” of “disjointed incrementalism” that he devised with Braybrooke four years 
later(Rajagopalan 1995). 
Institutional Analysis 
Path dependency theory is rooted in the analytical tradition of how institutional 
frameworks  over time reinforce past policy choices, thus  constraining the policy 
reform agenda. Proponents of institutionalism argue that the health policy 
environment is characterised by a particularly strong set of institutions and 
institutional arrangements that are predisposed to defence of the status quo, and 
present particularly high and dangerous hurdles for politicians in pursuit of reform. 
Not only, for example, does the NHS have widespread public support, despite constant 
public criticism, but its services are provided by professional groups with both 
considerable political influence and considerable income security. As these forces 
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might strengthen over time, this might generate an increasingly strong status quo bias 
and increasing costs associated with radical change.  
Developing  the institutionalist approach within the context of German health reform 
Altenstetter and Busse point to a surprisingly consistent path taken by the German 
social health insurance over a period lasting 120 years. This path was maintained 
despite dramatic political upheavals with transitions from an imperial regime, to the 
Weimer Republic, to fascism and war, to national division, and reunification.  They 
argue that the lesson  from this is that the German constitution, particularly its 
federalist provisions, mitigates against dramatic reform. Nevertheless, the authors 
identify changes in 1993 as a critical juncture because they shifted the balance of 
power between the institutions within the health system, and that this was reinforced 
by subsequent legislative measures. The changes were therefore of historical 
significance (Altenstetter and Busse 2005). By setting changes within their historic 
context the authors are able to take a view on the significance of an institutional 
change, assessing both the factors that made the 1993 change possible and its effects 
over time. This historical approach may overcome a tendency to overstate the 
importance of recent events and to understate historic events. This may be 
particularly relevant to the analysis of highly contested policy changes, for which the 
level of debate might lead to an assumption of importance that is not borne out by its 
subsequent legacy.   
Over time the institutionalist approach has itself been developed and branched.  Peter 
Hall and Rosemary Taylor(1996), for example, identified three “new institutionalisms”: 
historical, rational choice, and sociological, yet concluded that the three still need to 
be linked in order to better explain the policy process. Historical institutionalism, offers 
a cultural analysis, in which the institutional environment sets a “world view” that 
limits policy actors, but which Hall and Taylor claim offers little explanation of what 
precipitates critical junctures. Within historical institutionalism the state is not a 
“neutral broker”  but is itself composed of a complex mix of institutions with 
competing interests. This reinforces policy path dependence and can lead to 
unintended consequences. Rational choice institutionalism they describe as a “calculus 
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rational choice approach”. They put Immergut (1992) within this school, as she seeks 
to explain European health systems on the basis of physicians rationally choosing to 
strike compromises with reformers. Nevertheless, Immergut herself argues that 
institutionalism, whilst able to offer generalisations “cannot produce a science of 
interest-group influence”, because the factors involved are too complex. She argues 
that health system histories are replete with “unexpected events, sudden about faces 
and new strategies”.  Immergut says that major events and everyday problems set the 
constraints on policy, whilst also serving to generate “the junctures that extend the 
limits of the possible”, and thus rejects any view of policy reform that relies upon a 
single set of factors (Immergut 1992: xiv:xiv). Tsebelis too, emphasises the variety of 
factors at play, and the many “nested games” within which decisions must be taken. 
Nevertheless, as will be discussed later, he claims that; “political context and political 
institutions matter in predictable ways”(Tsebelis 1990:17) if the analyst is alert to the 
fact that actors may be playing games in multiple arenas, and if many of the potential 
complexities of a calculus approach are removed by making a number of initial 
simplifying assumptions. Sociological  institutionalists offer a wide definition of 
institutions, to include moral templates that guide actions, so that: “Institutions 
influence behaviour not simply by specifying what one should do but also by specifying 
what one can imagine oneself doing in a context” (Hall and Taylor 1996). They thus 
combine culture and institutions, and argue that individual perspectives of rationality 
are, in fact, “socially constituted” (1996:949). For the sociological institutionalists 
change comes about when actors and organisations seek to enhance their social 
legitimacy, leading Hall and Taylor to comment that they see reform as a reality-
defying “bloodless” process. It would be difficult, however, to consider that the 
ideological battles over welfare reform during the 1980s and 1990s fit well with such a 
concept of socially-driven change. 
 The theoretical models compared 
Whilst the incrementalist and institutionalist approaches offer useful insights for 
public policy analysis, each has its own limitations with regard to this research. The 
incrementalist approach fails to provide a predictive capability with regard to non-
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incremental policy change and, without adaptation, institutionalism can rarely 
encompass the important role of individual policy entrepreneurs and the changing 
relationships between them. Yet the current research concerns changes that might 
constitute a radical change of direction, regardless of whether they were perceived as 
such at the time.  It uses a focus on the policy elite to investigate the role that 
individuals might play in producing change.  
 
In its attempt to better reflect reality path dependency introduces a high degree of 
complexity, particularly through the explicit inclusion of timing and sequencing. These 
temporal factors are in addition to those identified in the other models, and a path 
dependent analysis, for example, needs to be constructed upon a foundation that 
incorporates the roles of institutions,  and policymakers’ concerns for political 
feasibility and risk-minimisation that might lead to change pursued in incremental 
steps. Whilst challenging, this is very much the ambition of this research.  
As Wilsford has observed policy paths are, at least in part, determined by the 
structures that constrain them, by politics, and by existing technology(1994:256). Path 
dependency in its analysis of increasing returns processes could provide a useful 
context for mapping and explaining the continuity of apparently sub-optimal policies, 
even though it appears to be limited in its applicability to the analysis of a change of 
path. By understanding the constraints on change the researcher might also be better 
placed to identify and understand the factors that played a part in overcoming these 
constraints.  
Incrementalism may accurately describe the steady state of muddling through, 
including purposeful muddling with a strategic goal in mind, and institutionalism may 
offer a useful framework for analysis of the forces promoting and resisting change, but 
both only develop a capacity to analyse non-incremental change when adapted to 
incorporate the time and sequence-sensitive elements that are central to path 
dependency analysis. Events need to be set within their historical and social context if 
analysis is to present more than a static snapshot of change. 
Understanding Continuity and Change 
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Greif and Laitin make a strong case for the linking of the historical insitutionalist and 
rational choice institutionalist accounts through the use of a game-theoretic approach 
to explain both continuity and change. (Greif and Laitin 2004). Institutions they say, 
can be self-enforcing, when the actors involved have no incentive to provoke 
(endogenous) change. However, "quasi parameters" that are not visible to these 
actors may work gradually behind the scenes to produce change that would eventually 
appear abrupt. They draw, for example, on a historical comparison of the powerful 
and long-lasting late-medieval maritime city states of Venice and Genoa. In Venice the 
political system embodied in the complex mechanism for the election of a legally-
constrained leader (the Doge) served to create a mutual interest in survival that 
limited clan rivalry, and which made the state self-enforcing, even amidst a decline in 
external threats and rising prosperity. In Genoa such mutual interest declined once the 
external military threat declined. Rising prosperity and the loss of a military threat 
represented positive feedback into the processes of self-reinforcement in Venice, but 
had negative effects in Genoa, because of the way in which each system had limited 
clan rivalry. By using case studies of change and a focus on the main personalities 
involved this research may produce similar comparisons, whereby incentives built into 
the policy arena might engender instability within a changed  external environment. 
Historical analysis may be able to identify these "quasi-parameters". Whilst they may 
have been accorded little relevance in contemporaneous accounts of stability and 
change, a different importance might be visible over a longer time horizon. Indeed, as 
Greif and Laitin note, the quasi-parameters that led to change in their study were 
taking effect long before a seemingly-abrupt change became visible. 
Streeck and Thalen note a tendency in political analysis to understate the extent of 
change and stress continuity, largely  due to a lack of appropriate analytical models, 
and to code all changes as "minor adaptive adjustments" within a punctuated 
equilibrium model.(Streeck and Thelen 2005:1-2). At a time of incremental but 
potentially transformative change such models of analysis are too limiting to the 
researcher, and a focus on "lock-in" effects can miss common types of change. Whilst 
institutional structures may persist, what they do may change dramatically. Mahoney 
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and Thalen (drawing on earlier work by Streeck and Thalen) identify four modes of 
change12: displacement, layering, drift, and conversion. 
Table 1 Modes of Change 
Modes of Change 
 Displacement Layering Drift Conversion 
Removal of Old Rules Yes No No No 
Neglect of Old Rules - No Yes No 
Changed Impact/Enactment 
of Old Rules 
-  No Yes Yes 
Introduction of New Rules Yes Yes No No 
(Mahoney and Thelen 2010:16) 
Having created this template of four modes of change Mahoney and Thalen  suggest a 
framework of the contexts within which each of these four types of change might be 
enabled, delineated by the level of veto power for potential defenders of the status 
quo within the political context, and by the degree to which the targetted institution 
provides actors with discretion over the interpretation or enforcement of the formal 
or informal institutional "rules". I shall return to these frameworks when it comes to 
comparing the case studies of change. 
                                                     
12 Streeck and Thalen (2005) included a fifth mode of change, of "exhaustion", for circumstances 
within which a "time-expired" institution is allowed to collapse. 
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Table 2 Sources of Change 
Contextual and Institutional Sources of Institutional Change 
 Characteristics of the Targetted Institution 
Low Level of Discretion in 
Interpretation/Enforcement 
High Level of Discretion in 
Interpretation/Enforcement 
Characteristics 









(Mahoney and Thelen 2010:19 ) 
 
Muddling with a Purpose 
It may be, of course, be the case that seemingly  erratic and incremental reform 
trajectories are in fact the result of some strategic purpose. In 1980 Quinn described a 
process of “logical incrementalism”; a conscious and proactive process within major 
corporations (Rajagopalan 1995). Summer has alternatively described Quinn’s 
approach as “muddling with a purpose”(Summer 1980). 
Looking at changes to the welfare state since the 1980s, the consistency of the 
direction of change from a comprehensive state monopoly to a more limited mixed-
market is striking, under both Conservative, Labour and Coalition governments. The 
pace of change has varied, or even stalled for brief periods, but there does appear to 
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have been an overarching logic to it. If governments are muddling through, it does 
appear that there has been some purpose in their decisions. It may be that, in contrast 
to the processes of welfare system development, the processes of welfare 
retrenchment or market-based reform are better suited to gradual change than to 
major cleavages(Streeck and Thelen 2005:33). 
Rajagolan and Rasheed concluded their overview with a call for policy process 
research to be set within a contextual, longitudinal perspective, in order to reveal the 
“complex interplay between the forces of incrementalism and non-incrementalism” 
(Rajagopalan 1995). In doing so they refer to work by Ferrarotti (Ferrarotti 1990) in 
which he argues that change does not emerge from nothing, and that understanding 
the present can only come from understanding of the past including human factors. To 
this end Ferrarotti recommends historical research based on autobiography, which is 
broadly the approach of this research. 
Significant shifts can and do occur over time, but it may be that these are often slow 
because the process is a conservative one, with policy makers moving forward with 
many small steps rather than sudden leaps and bounds, towards their eventual goal. It 
may be the case, for example, that the successive NHS management changes of the 
1980s, which sought to mimic market disciplines within the public sector NHS were 
seen by some as essential first, incremental steps towards the development of a mixed 
market in healthcare. If so, viewed as a whole they may form part of a much larger 
story of change.  
It would appear from this overview of the period that incrementalist and 
institutionalist perspectives may be able to explain some, but not all, of the experience 
of health policy under the Conservatives. And it is, perhaps, in the exceptional cases 
that path dependency becomes more pertinent, setting a context for the various 
policy streams to merge in order to produce the “right time” for a particular policy to 
be pursued. From his own case studies involving policy in the USA Kingdon(1995), for 
example, concluded that it is a “complex combination of factors” that move an item 
onto the policy agenda for action, in a process in which even the President himself 
might not be particularly powerful.  
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Kingdon adopts Cohen and Olsen’s description of an “organized anarchy” (Cohen MMJ 
& Olsen 1972:68). Although originally applied to describe university management, 
Kingdon argues that it is equally applicable with some adaptations to government, 
given its often unclear objectives and constantly changing cast of actors. In such 
organisations choice opportunities come and go, in which the contemporary range of 
participants become involved with their own haphazard contributions of problems and 
solutions, which all go into the communal “garbage can” to form a unique mix. It is 
necessary, however, to build on this in order to provide a more firm conceptual 
framework for analysis of the specific interactions that take within the garbage can to 
produce a particular change of path. 
The “garbage can” is, perhaps, given more structured analysis in Tsebelis’ “nested 
games” (Tsebelis 1990) rational choice approach, drawing on game theory. Tsebelis 
assumes rationality on the part of the policy actors, and seeks to explain seemingly 
irrational outcomes by seeking to identify the “multiple arenas” in which the actors 
must play simultaneously. 
The many games in which the actors are playing may not be readily apparent to the 
analyst. Sartori for example, referred to both visible and invisible politics, the latter of 
which may be no more than: “deals and words for mouth-to-ear consumption” (Sartori 
1976:143), and related this to Downs (Downs 1957) assertion that parties devise 
policies to win elections, rather than vice versa. Politicians must, therefore, constantly 
seek to square the circle between their ideological commitments, which they might 
share with their active supporters, and the potentially differing views of the electorate. 
The timing of politically dangerous policies is of crucial importance: many 
commentators, for example, have noted that Mrs Thatcher’s review of the NHS was 
announced following the 1987 general election rather than before or during the re-
election campaign, and the subsequent reforms were rushed in order that they would 





Problems, Politics & Policies 
Kingdon identifies three streams in the agenda-setting process, that can combine to 
present opportunities for change: problems, politics, and policies. In this model, 
therefore, the institutions that generate pressure for and against change may be 
placed within the policies and politics streams, but share these streams with other 
influences on the agenda-setting process. He argues that the streams need first to be 
understood individually, which then allows for analysis of policy change when the 
streams come together to create a “policy window”. Tuohy also attempts to isolate the 
forces leading to episodes that might break from the historical logics of a health 
system, arguing that willing and able actors for change must be present and that there 
must also be a widely established priority for reform (Tuohy 1999). These are similar to 
the roles that Kingdon gives to policy entrepreneurs awaiting the convergence of the 
three streams to generate a window of opportunity for a new policy to be put on the 
agenda for decision.  
 In the case studies I have adapted Kingdon's concept of streams to map the forces 
leading to specific policy decisions, although these individual decision points do not fit 
the standard description of a critical juncture, as they each relate to just one small 
aspect of the overall health system. My approach to the research is focused on the 
actions of the policy elite and for my purposes, therefore, Kingdon's "politics" stream 
is concentrated to focus on the political actors in power, which I refer to as "People". 
The broader political environment involved in agenda setting is captured in the 
narrative around each case.  
Hacker has argued that it is important to understand that path dependency and critical 
junctures are not synonymous terms: “path dependence is best suited to explaining the 
reproduction of a critical juncture’s legacy rather than the production of the critical 
juncture itself” (Hacker 1998:78). As mentioned earlier, many social policy researchers 




In testing the applicability of path dependency to English health policy there may also 
be some value in looking again at its origins in economics. As the concept has moved 
further from its original base for adaptation to social policy it may also have lost 
aspects of its analytic value. Health system expenditure is a significant aspect of fiscal 
policy, and in looking at micro and mezzo-level policy changes it would be worthwhile 
incorporating economic factors as variables for analysis. Sunk costs, opportunity costs, 
and barriers to entry, may play an important part in the formation and outcomes of 
any windows of opportunity for reform.  
Using three streams of people, problems, and policies across a diverse range of  
developments in UK health policy under the Conservatives may assist in bringing 
comparability and structure to the cases. In doing so it may be possible to determine, 
for example, whether changes in dentistry and long-term care were simply 
incremental, or whether the emergence of specific policy windows, due to an 
identifiable merging of the three streams, enabled an observable and determined 
change of path.  
From very different starting points health systems may be converging steadily towards 
a common format, equivalent to economic convergence, on the equilibrium of a mixed 
market model. In a comparison of changes in the US and UK health systems 
Glennerster and Lieberman warn against excessive reliance on path dependence and 
in favour of a more detailed analysis of “micro- or mezzo-level mechanisms of policy 
change” (Glennerster & Lieberman 2011) which may overtake longstanding historical 
logics. Tuohy attempts to allow for such convergence between healthcare systems 
that nevertheless have their own "accidental logics", the incorporation of which are 
crucial to successful policy change. She argues that whilst path dependence may 
emphasise national differences, broader technological changes and other micro- and 
macro-economic developments, may generate "some broad cross-national similarities 
in the interactions of actors" within the logics of the local environment, and the 





Path dependency and the modern NHS 
Griffin recommends counter-factual interrogation of history as an analytical 
tool(Griffin 1993). If 1948 or 1976  might have been critical junctures for English social 
policy then it may be useful to interrogate the possible alternative scenarios. Can it be 
assumed that if a Conservative government had been elected in 1948  that a 
continental social insurance model would have been developed? Or that if a Labour 
government had been re-elected in 1979 that the NHS would not have taken the path 
of retrenchment and towards a mixed market?  
After September 1976, the economic and industrial crisis in which Britain was engulfed 
and the terms placed on the country in return for a $2.3bn loan from the the 
International Monetary Fund left no scope for welfare expansion. Indeed, the then 
Labour Chancellor told his party conference that the country  may have been living on 
borrowed time since the war. Timmins describes this moment as "the first great fissure 
in Britain's welfare state" (Timmins 2001:313). 
At that time the major ideological divide on the NHS was between the continued 
phasing out or the maintenance of private beds ("pay beds") within NHS hospitals. It 
was not until the 1980s that experiments with market-based social policy reforms 
began to be developed. Harrison identifies the management reforms of the mid-1980s 
as the possible turning point for UK health policy, as they: "led to important structural, 
political, and interpretive changes within the NHS and laid the foundations for the 
formulation and implementation of the more radical, market reforms a few years 
later"(M. Harrison 2004:32). 
In 1992 Pinker described these social policy experiments as: "a fundamental 
reappraisal of the ends and means of social service provision" in which "all the political 
parties continue to revise their basic policies in a climate of changing needs and 
expectations dogged by an economic crisis which seems likely to persist well into the 
1990s"(Pinker 1992). Almost a decade later Pierson wrote of a "new era of austerity", 
to which research into the "golden age" of welfare growth bears little relevance 
(Pierson 2001:2)  
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If there has been no critical juncture for the welfare state since 1976, how then can its 
transformation from a comprehensive state monopoly to restrictive provision within a 
mixed market be explained? This conundrum lies at the heart of the research. If the 
NHS at the time of writing is so fundamentally different to the NHS of the 1970s there 
must have been points in between at which significant new directions were taken.  
 Whilst the research is framed within the theory of path dependency it should prove 
useful to also possess an understanding of the most relevant alternative explanations 
of the policy process. 
Theoretical Models and the NHS under Thatcher and Major 
One example of the importance of history and timing that will be explored is the way 
in which the perceived failures of the Heath government of 1970-74, within which 
Thatcher was a minister, drove the "No Turning Back" agenda under Thatcher; a 
determination that affected a wide range of policies. Similarly, the Conservatives' 
strong support for the British  Medical  Association in opposition to Bevan's NHS Bill 
cast lasting seeds of distrust over the  Conservatives' handling of health policy, perhaps 
generating some degree of self-reinforcement for the Bevan model. Both examples 
emphasise  how  the sequencing of events matters, as does the timing of change: The 
NHS “internal market” emerged from the 1980s as a possible solution to a perceived 
problem in the operation of the NHS, the solution was not timely until Mrs Thatcher 
unexpectedly announced a review of the NHS during a BBC  interview in 1988. Until 
then the solution had largely been floating in what Kingdon refers to as the “policy 
primeval soup”(1995:116). In 1988 it was an idea whose time had come. If, however, 
the review had taken place before general management had been developed in the 
NHS the outcome might have been very different. Timing and sequencing may indeed 
have been crucial to the policies that emerged.  
The role of a large majority in the House of Commons, and implicitly therefore the 
British “first past the post” electoral system that provides such majorities on a minority 
vote, is accorded an important role by Ham, who argues that Mrs Thatcher’s 
parliamentary majority was essential in order to “drive through” the internal market 
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reforms. Walt(Walt 1994:226) applies a similar logic of government strength to the 
sudden introduction in 1984  of a “Limited List” of pharmaceutical products to be 
removed from NHS reimbursement. Whereas Walt does not specify the source of 
government power at the time, Ham argues that even the most powerful of pressure 
groups are unable to defeat the proposals of a strong-willed government in such 
circumstances(1999:49), although the veracity of this claim will be tested in the case 
studies that follow. Hill comments that in such an ideologically-driven situation as 
existed in 1980s Britain the debate between rationalism and incrementalism is “beside 
the point”(1997: 108) as traditional processes are set aside.  
In contrast to his claim of governmental determination on the internal market 
reforms, Ham also states that the Conservatives allowed NHS dentistry simply to 
wither away, by failing to respond to dentists’ own decisions to withdraw from NHS 
service, and that long-term care was withdrawn “through a series of incremental 
decisions” (1999:94). According to Ham, therefore, the Conservatives maintained a 
traditional incremental approach in most areas of health policy, based on negotiations 
between the administrators and service providers, in a process of “partisan mutual 
adjustment”, as identified by Lindblom, and that even in the introduction of the 
internal market the change may have been organic, having been based on the earlier 
Griffiths management reforms of the 1980s, and then significantly diluted to become a 
“managed market”. 
Incrementalist approaches give helpful insights into specific incidents of gradual 
changes and movements along a path, but appear to be less helpful in the analysis of 
small changes that cumulatively result in a change of path. A process of incremental 
but significant change seen over a period of years and decades cannot be explained by 
power-based theories  if parliamentary majorities and government authority are seen 
to fluctuate over the full period of observation. These theoretical models appear 
insufficiently flexible to deal with the changed circumstances of the 1980s, which 





Whilst analytical approaches focused on continuity may be appropriate in times of 
welfare system development, with major changes taking place at major junctures 
followed by incremental change along a predetermined path, processes of change 
through piecemeal retrenchment and reform may require a different conceptual 
framework. The changed environment following the financial crisis of the 1970s has 
received renewed emphasis in policy analysis following another crisis in the first 
decade of the 21st century. This had led to widespread questioning of longstanding 
theories of the policy process given an apparent increase in the frequency of radical 
change, against the focus on continuity of incrementalist and institutionalist 
theories(Cairney 2012).   
An interaction of levels of analysis may be required. Ham argues that; "studies of 
specific policy issues need to be related to the action and inaction of structural 
interests and the changing role and functions of the state if a complete 
understanding of the complexities of health policy is to be obtained" (Ham 1999:217). 
The approach taken in this research aims to integrate data from specific incidents of 
change with data on the wider policy arena in order to better understand the 
process of transformation. 
In the context of transformative institutional change outside of circumstances that 
might ordinarily be considered to be  "critical junctures" a clear analysis of the 
relative roles, if any, of institutional self-reinforcing processes and endogenous 
forces for change is required. At present the tools for analysis lack predictive 
capability with regard to institutional change given the reliance upon unexpected 
and unpredictable exogenous forces. Current research into broad aspects of change 
by Streeck, Thalen, and Mahoney, for example, particularly into the characterisation 
of forms and circumstances of change provide a strong starting point. Tuohy's 
comparative analysis of health system reforms also offers some specific 
consideration of the factors that may provoke or enable change within the complex 
and sensitive context of health policy. This body of work provides a useful framework 
37 
 
for my analysis, towards an improved understanding of why and when change might 
happen. 
Using an adaptation of Kingdon’s three streams as a basis of analysis will enable 
comparisons to be made between the reinforcing processes of historical logics that 
keep a health system upon a particular path and the micro and mezzo-level forces for 
change in specific aspects of the health system. It will also enable the approaches 
taken by Kingdon and Tuohy to be tested against quite detailed changes in the English 
health system, rather than simply addressing the health system at the macro level. 
Tracking the changes of the 1980s and 1990s, by tracing their origins back through the 
preceding decades may also assist in identifying consistent trends, and perhaps 
intentions, in pursuit of reform.  
Importantly, the conceptual framework for the research seeks to identify the role that 
ideology played in the process of change. Taken together, was the process of the 
change under the Conservatives a form of purposive muddling or simply disjointed 
incrementalism? Is there an identifiable and logical series of steps towards an end 
goal, or simply a set of individual policy responses to individual problems? An element 
of purpose and strategy would undermine the depiction of path dependency as a self-
reinforcing process which only a significant exogenous shock can halt. As in Greif and 
Laitin's research it might even be the case that the actors who produce change are not 
themselves even aware of the quasi-parameters that incentivise their actions, thus 
evidence of strategic intent might need to be drawn from actions rather than words.  
The research takes as its starting point the observation that since the 1980s financial 
responsibility for a wide range of aspects of healthcare has fallen onto individual 
households. In some cases the boundary in the provision of care has shifted as well 
as the boundary of its  finance. Increasingly market mechanisms were being used to 
deliver services that had been the exclusive domain of the state for the previous 40 
years. These are dramatic changes that break with the original conception of the 
NHS, furthermore they mimic "quasi market" approaches taken in other policy 
areas(Le Grand 1991), which highlights the importance of using a framework of 
analysis that sets each detailed change within its wider context. The subsequent 
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analysis does not attempt to address the welfare impact of these changes, nor the 
ethical questions that relate to any redrawing of the scope of the welfare state. The 
focal point of the research is the identification of the factors that have produced 
dramatic changes within such a totemic part of British social policy, described by a 
Conservative  Chancellor of the Exchequer of the period as: "the closest thing the 
English have to a religion, with those who practice in it regarding themselves as a 





3. Research Methodology 
The research employs a qualitative approach. Using  contemporary accounts, later 
autobiographical material, official publications and Hansard, and peer-reviewed 
literature. These are supplemented with a series of interviews with important actors 
from the policy arena, and five case studies of change.  It seeks to build a  
comprehensive narrative that combines macro and micro perspectives. In doing so 
across both a general depiction of the contemporary scene and a selection of 
individual cases of change the intention is to achieve Griffin's aspiration for 
narrative-event structure analysis; to develop a coherent "story" that unifies a range 
of happenings (Griffin 1993:1098).  
Searches of peer-reviewed literature, therefore, cover analysis of the Conservative 
approach to health policy in general between 1979 and 1997, the development of 
the NHS "internal market" reforms announced in 1989, and the five case studies. In 
order to capture the wider context and the role of individuals in the policy elite peer-
review literature is substantially supplemented by recourse to grey sources, 
particularly biographical sources where these are available.    
A series of 15 loosely structured interviews were undertaken13, in which the 
interviewer sought only to prompt relevant narratives from the interviewees. These 
prompts included an introduction to the topic and a request to identify key events in 
the case study topics. Narrative interviewing can be particularly valuable in research 
that seek to combine life histories with socio-historical context(Schutze 1992) 
(Jovchelovich 2000). In order to better understand motivations and the multiple 
arenas within which policy is made socio-historical context is important to the 
research. If policy is formed by rational choices amongst the policy elite then an 
understanding of the "nested" games within games that politicians must play, and 
the roles of some of them as "veto players" in the policy process is essential(Tsebelis 
1990). 
                                                     
13 An additional interview that has not been included here was undertaken in October 2004. This was 
specific to the case study on NHS dentistry and is, therefore, cited only in that chapter. 
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The overall approach taken in this study is similar to that of Horowitz et al., in their 
study of policies to tackle health disparities. They used a combination of literature 
reviews and informal interviews (Horowitz et al. 2000). It is also similar to the 
methodology adopted for Kendall's study of agenda-setting processes related to the 
voluntary sector, in which the author combined the literature, "including a wide 
range of low-visibility grey literature from the third sector itself", with a small 
number of interviews to address the broad themes of his inquiry but tailored to each 
interviewee (Kendall 2000). Kendall was thus able to incorporate data on the 
working relationships between those involved in the policy process to obtain an 
improved understanding of the factors involved in a process of change.  
The Literature 
The relevant literature for the research encompasses both the political environment, 
the Conservative approach to health policy, and the background to specific cases of 
change. The research relies heavily upon archival, autobiographical, and biographical 
sources; an approach recommended by Ferrarotti in order to better understand the 
human elements of the  historical environment (Ferrarotti 1990). The use of a range 
of grey sources in addition to peer-reviewed and official data should enable accounts 
to be cross-checked and discrepancies addressed. Although the release of official 
documents through  National Archives is currently limited to those from 1981 and 
earlier, some useful additional documents were available from the Thatcher 
Foundation archive. Official sources used included the Hansard records of 
Parliamentary Debates, government policy documents and press releases. Histories 
of the NHS and the welfare state by Glennerster(1995), Klein(2001), Rivett(1998), 
Timmins(2001), and Webster(Webster 1998) provided important accounts, as did 
Raison's history of the Conservative Party and the welfare state(1990). 
Case Studies 
In order to investigate the specific factors involved in episodes of health policy 
change the research includes five case studies in which there was either a shift of the 
public-private boundary or an attempt at such a shift. The purpose is not to provide a 
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comprehensive account of each case, but to understand the environment within 
which the change happened, the factors involved, and to be in a position to compare 
these micro-level accounts of change with the mezzo-level perspectives from the 
interviews and background material. The mechanisms used to achieve change are 
important as well as the factors that make it possible, as the mechanisms used may 
further our understanding of how any forces for continuity are overcome in practice. 
According to Little an approach based on "causal realism" in which causal 
mechanisms are identified enables the researcher to investigate the external validity 
of the causal factors involved: If A leads to B within a case study, an understanding of 
the causal mechanisms involved provides some insight into whether the relationship 
between A and B will hold in other situations(Little 1996:34). The use of multiple 
cases should also enhance the external validity of the research findings, at least 
within the health policy arena. 
Gerring commends the use of case studies for exploratory work, for example when 
some or all of the factors involved in a phenomenon might be unknown. Study of a 
single or several cases may produce factors that might not be otherwise identified, 
making the quantitative analysis of known factors within a large-scale cross-case 
analysis inappropriate. In this situation case study allows the researcher to "peer into 
the box of causality" (Gerring 2007:45). 
The first stage of the research was to search the literature for accounts of health 
policy development across the 18 years of Conservative government from 1979 to 
1997. Whilst much of this commentary focuses on the internal market reforms 
introduced from 1990, it also yields a selection of specific areas in which there were 
significant shifts towards individuals paying for their own care, and the development 
of market mechanisms in the delivery of state-funded care. The shift of long-term 
care of the elderly from the NHS to means-tested social care, and the burden of 
charges for dentistry, sight tests and medicines are cited most frequently as 
examples of areas in which costs have shifted to users. Further investigation into 
these areas of policy reveals additional evidence of shifts in both finance and 
provision. Dentistry, general ophthalmic services, and medicines were all subject to 
radical policies that set boundaries on the responsibilities of the NHS, often for the 
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first time in an otherwise comprehensive service. They conform with Gerring’s 
definition of “crucial” cases, because they are the examples that seem initially at 
least unlikely to fit within the conventional view of a health system that is seen by 
many to be locked into a path-dependent policy process (Gerring 2007:89).  
The use of case studies, of course, has its own pitfalls.  In particular, there is 
considerable ambiguity in the definition of a case study(Mitchell 1983). This lack of 
clarity is addressed by Verschuren in his advocacy of case studies not as a defined 
research method but a complete research approach with its own methods, 
techniques and procedures and complementary to other approaches (Verschuren 
2003). Determination of the spatial or temporal boundaries of a case is rarely simple, 
and relies upon a degree of judgment on the part of the researcher. 
Use of a range of cases addresses the most significant concern related to case 
studies, that it is unwise to generalise from a single case with an assumption of 
"typicality" (Mitchell 1983:189). A single and isolated case of an aspect of the NHS 
that breaks from an historic policy path would add little to our understanding of the 
policy process. If, however, a range of crucial cases shows some commonality in the 
mechanism of change, this may well offer insights into factors relevant to the wider 
policy environment.   
The case studies are selected from those that appear to be the best examples 
available that show, over time and with the benefit of hindsight, instances of a 
significant change of direction. This might be despite the degree of significance not 
always being apparent at the time. Indeed, as mentioned above, in several of the 
cases more attention in the literature is given to NHS charges than to new limits on 
NHS responsibilities that might have an increasing effect over time.  
In order to fulfill the research objective to identify the factors and mechanisms 
involved in episodes of change the focus is on the time at which the change of 
direction appears to have been made, rather than produce a detailed commentary 
on its subsequent implementation and effects. Gerring highlights the fact that it is 
often the situation that either the temporal or spatial limits of a case may be difficult 
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to define, yet needs to be assumed for the purposes of research.(Gerring 2007:19-
20). In each case, therefore, the author has attempted to identify the period over 
which the process of an actual change of direction is achieved, and to separate this 
from the continuous processes thereafter by which it is reinforced. This is necessarily 
a subjective judgement. Just when an idea originates, with whom, is difficult to 
determine hence what constitutes the "beginning" of any such account is 
problematic. 
A fifth case study, not mentioned in the list above is also included in order to provide 
analysis of a change that had little effect in practice and which ultimately proved to 
be a temporary phenomenon rather than a lasting new direction. This was the 
introduction of tax relief on individual purchases of private medical insurance by 
people aged over 60 years. The inclusion of this policy change further maximises the 
heterogeneity of the cases, and enables a comparison to be made between those 
changes that became entrenched and one that was readily curtailed and reversed. In 
summary the five cases and the reasons for their potential significance are listed 
below:   
1. A  market for general ophthalmic services. The introduction of free 
eye tests and spectacles had been a notable, popular and controversial 
feature of the 1946 NHS Act. (Webster 1988:369-75). In 1983 the 
Government not only restricted the right to NHS spectacles, but removed 
a ban on advertising  and thus enabled competition between opticians. 
The NHS subsequently withdrew from the market for spectacles with the 
introduction of a  voucher scheme for the private purchase of 
spectacles, and restricted access to NHS sight tests. In the light of the 
debates in the first five years of the NHS this was a highly significant 
set of changes. 
2. The development of private long-term care of the elderly. Until  the 
1980s long-term care of the elderly had been shared between long-
stay geriatric wards in NHS hospitals and care provided by local 
authority social services department. The 1983 change in 
44 
 
Supplementary Benefit regulations put public funds into a rapid 
expansion of private sector care. What had been a rare exception 
quickly developed to be a much more common option, and cost limits 
had to be imposed in order to contain the situation, but it was not until 
the Griffiths Report of 1988 that the Government developed a 
concerted strategy for “community care”. By the late 1990s residential 
care for the elderly had moved from being primarily provided by local 
authority owned and staffed institutions to privately owned and 
staffed ones(Glennerster 2009). 
3. The creation of a "Limited List" of non-reimbursed Medicines. Until 
the 1980s the principal and most visible policy to contain the public 
cost of prescription medicines had been the flat-rate prescription 
charge. Once more, it had been highly controversial in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s. The charge was more than doubled by the 
Conservatives in 1979, from 20p per prescription to 45p. Still NHS 
doctors retained clinical freedom in what they prescribed. This 
unexpectedly changed in 1984, with the introduction of a “Limited 
List” of non-prescribable items. This change paved the way for 
subsequent national policies to restrict NHS prescribing on the basis 
of clinical evidence and cost. It can thus be seen in retrospect as a very 
important change.   
4. Tax relief on private medical insurance. Rewarding those who 
purchased private medical insurance has long held a totemic status 
within the Conservative Party. A tax relief for employer-provided 
insurance was re-introduced in 1980 to put it on a par with other 
"perks", but it was the proposed extension of tax relief to individually-
purchased policies that was to reignite the issue as a topic of heated 
debate, both within the Conservative Cabinet and between the 
Government and Opposition following the announcement of the relief 
in 1989. It was abolished in 1997. 
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5. Growth of private adult dentistry. Throughout the 1980s NHS 
dental charges faced by patients rose significantly, but the growth of 
private adult dentistry was concentrated in the 1990s following 
changes to the NHS dental contract and the development of an 
insurance system for private dental care alongside rapidly rising NHS 
costs. The new situation was finally addressed in 1996, when the 
Government and dental profession agreed a contract that would 
concentrate NHS dental funding on children whilst attempting to 
provide a nationwide safety net for adult dentistry.  
These cases have been mostly neglected by academic analysis of the policy process, 
although all were heavily debated at the time(Rivett 1998; Webster 1998). 
Parliamentary discussions and media reports provide most of the historical data for 
this aspect of the research. Where these examples are mentioned in political 
autobiographies then the reporting can be combined with an “insider” account, 
although this is usually very limited given the limited historical profile of some of the 
individual changes involved. This is, therefore, combined with interviews in order to 
obtain additional insights from those who were either involved or followed the 
policy processes of the time. 
 Interview Selection 
The author had himself worked on health policy, first for the Social Democratic Party 
in opposition from 1987 to 1992 and thereafter within Westminster think-tanks, and 
from 1995 to 1997 served as Special Adviser to the Secretary of State for Health. The 
knowledge of  the policy arena that this gave was useful in the selection of potential 
interviewees. These were to be people who possessed a good knowledge of the 
periods of change, and who might provide novel insights into the factors at work in 
decision-making. The interviewees include two former Conservative Secretaries of 
State for Health and two former Conservative ministers. In order to balance any 
potential bias in the account that reliance upon ministers alone might generate, the 
remaining 11 interviewees were drawn from a range of backgrounds.  The approach 
taken contrasts sharply with those of other authors, such as Ham, who have focused 
46 
 
on Secretaries of State for Health to explain health policy of this period(Ham 2000). 
The latter approach can too easily succumb to politicians' tendency to rewrite their 
own role in history, to produce a positive reflection of their time in office. It also 
tends towards a headline-driven analysis, as this represents the bulk of the work of a 
Secretary of State, and much of the underlying detail can be missed. The inclusion of 
a  junior minister and a Minister of State who would have had lead responsibility for 
some of the case studies also assists in overcoming the tendency towards headline-
driven commentary. Both of the Secretaries of State, however, had also served as 
junior health ministers and one had also been a Treasury minister. At the time of the 
interview one was still active in the health policy elite, as Chairman of the House of 
Commons Health Committee, whilst the other was now a member of the House of 
Lords but working principally outside of health policy. The other interviewees are 
drawn from as wide a range of the policy elite as might still fall within that 
description. All of the interviewees are listed below.  
Interviewees 
Professor Nicholas Bosanquet. A founder member of the research staff at the highly 
influential Centre for Health Economics in York, from 1984 to 1988. He later became 
a Professor of Health Policy based in London, and since 1988 has been an advisor the 
the House of Commons Health Committee. His advice on NHS reform has been 
regularly sought by Government ministers and advisers, particularly during the 
development and implementation of the internal market reforms.  
Rt Hon Baroness Bottomley DL. An elected member of the House of Commons from 
1983 to 2005, when she became a Member of the House of Lords. She was a 
Minister of Health from 1989 until she was appointed Secretary of State for Health in 
1992, moving to the Department of National Heritage in 1995. She was, therefore, 
an important decisionmaker throughout the main period of the development and 
implementation of the internal market reforms, with which she is commonly 
associated. In 2007 she joined the Board of the private health care business BUPA. 
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Edwina Currie. A Member of Parliament from 1983 to 1997. She was a health 
minister from 1986 to 1988, spanning the 1987 General Election (including the 
change of Secretary of State from Norman Fowler to John Moore) and the 
development of the Ministerial Review of the NHS. She famously resigned her 
ministerial post following her outspoken comments relating to salmonella in eggs. 
Since 1997 she has pursued a broadcasting and writing career outside of politics. At 
the time of publication of her diaries(Currie 2002) she revealed details of a four year 
affair with John Major, the future Prime Minister, whilst he was a Government Whip.  
Rt Hon Stephen Dorrell MP. An elected member of the House of Commons since 
1979. He was closely associated with the left of the Conservative Party during the 
1980s, and only held junior offices until John Major became Prime Minister. He 
remains Patron of the left-leaning Tory Reform Group (TRG). He was made a health 
minister in 1990, moving to the Treasury in 1992 (responsible for public spending), 
and was Secretary of State for Health from 1995 until the Conservative election 
defeat of 1997. In 2010 he became the first Chairman of the Health Select 
Committee to be elected by his peers.  
Dr Michael Goldsmith. A former General Practitioner, Goldsmith created the Harrow 
Medical Centre, which was  Britain's first private primary care centre working on a 
pre-paid subscription rather than a fee-for-service basis. This reputedly provided an 
important inspiration to policymakers for the market-based reforms of the NHS in 
the 1980s and thereafter. His advice was sought by the Prime Minister, ministers and 
their advisers during the 1980s and 1990s. He now runs a  private-sector 
occupational health consultancy. 
Dr David Green. A former Labour councillor, Green was based at the free-market 
Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) from 1984 to 2000, and for most of this period was 
Director of the IEA Health and Welfare Unit. Since 2000 he has been Director of the 
think tank Civitas. At the IEA he was an important figure behind the consistent 
pressure on the Conservatives to adopt voucher schemes and private market 
solutions in the provision of welfare services.  
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Professor Walter Holland An epidemiologist who, inter alia, served as a Department 
of Health specialist adviser since 1969, including as a member of the Resource 
Allocation Working Party (RAWP) that fundamentally changed the funding 
mechanism of the NHS in the 1970s. Since then he has served on local and national 
NHS bodies covering a wide range of policy challenges. He is now a Visiting Professor 
at the LSE. His is an extraordinary perspective of NHS change over more than 40 
years.   
Melinda Libby A Special Adviser to Rt Hon John Moore MP from 1988 to 1989, when 
he was Secretary of State at the Department of Health and Social Security, which 
included the early stages of the Ministerial Review of the NHS. Moore had previously 
been responsible for privatisation policy, and was widely seen at the time as the 
most likely heir to Mrs Thatcher and her policy approach. Libby, therefore, can be 
expected to have special insight into a very important period of health policy, yet is 
largely independent of Moore and the Conservative Party. As far as the author is 
aware she has never previously commented on her time working closely alongside 
Moore, and it took a degree of research to track her down to the school of which she 
is now a Governor. 
 Warwick Lightfoot. An economist, and former Special Adviser to the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, and later Leader of the London Borough of Kensington and Chelsea. 
John Major says that when he was appointed Chancellor he was keen to retain 
Lightfoot, who had been appointed by his predecessor, describing him as an 
"excellent technician".(Major 1999:135)  
Gerald Malone. The professional life of Malone has encompassed roles ranging  from 
editing two national weekly newspapers, to Minister for Health, a government Whip, 
and Deputy Chairman of the Conservative Party(1992). He was a Member of 
Parliament from 1983-87 and 1992-97, and was the Conservative candidate in the 
1982 Hillhead By-Election against Roy Jenkins. 
Cllr Keith Mans. A former RAF pilot, Mans was a Conservative Member of Parliament 
from 1987 to 1997. He served as a ministerial Parliamentary Private Secretary in the 
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Department of Health from 1990 to 1995, providing an important link between the 
Minister and the Parliamentary Conservative Party during the implementation of the 
NHS "internal market" reforms. After leaving Parliament he became Chief Executive 
of the Royal Aeronautical Society, and is now Chairman of a hospice in Hampshire, 
where he is also a County Councillor. 
Rt Hon Lord Owen CH. A Member of Parliament from 1966 to 1992, during which he 
was a  Labour health minister and foreign secretary. in 1981 David Owen became 
one of the "Gang of Four" who created the Social Democratic Party (SDP), of which 
he later became leader. Owen was heavily influenced by the European "social 
market" approach to policy and became a keen advocate of market-based policies in 
general, and in 1987 was already arguing for an "internal market" for healthcare, 
including the incorporation of private and voluntary providers into the delivery of 
NHS-funded care. In 2012, however, Owen attacked his earlier advocacy of the 
mixed market, in the face of a Health and Social Care Bill that had developed out of 
this earlier change. 
  Clive Smee CB. Chief Economic Adviser in the Department of Health from 1984 to 
2002, encompassing the whole period of the Conservatives' market-based health 
reforms, and the adoption of a similar approach by the Labour Party in 2001. Prior to 
joining the Department of Health he had also worked in HM Treasury and the 
Cabinet Office. His independent insight into the Whitehall policymaking processes 
relevant to this research is probably unmatched. He is the author of a book on the 
changing role of economic advisers in government.(Smee 2005) 
Rt Hon David Willetts MP. He rose to prominence in the early 1980s, initially as an 
official in HM Treasury, before his 1984 appointment to the Prime Minister's Policy 
Unit in 10 Downing Street. He moved out of Government in 1987 to run the Centre 
for Policy Studies, which had been created by Margaret Thatcher and Keith Joseph in 
the 1970s. He was elected as a Member of Parliament in 1992, and has since served 
in several Ministerial roles and played an important part in Conservative Party 




Professor Roger Williams CBE. A liver surgeon, who has been an important figure in 
the Conservative Medical Society (CMS), of which he is President, since its formation 
in the 1980s. His role at the CMS has made him a confidante of Conservative health 
ministers and their advisers over several decades, particularly during the reforms of 
the 1980s. 
Six attributes were used as selection criteria for interviewees, with the intention of 
ensuring the dominance of no single perspective.:  
1. Secretary of State for Health; Virginia Bottomley and Stephen Dorrell.  
In order to obtain the perspective of health policy debate at Cabinet level, 
including of debates and strategies between competing departments and 
between the Department of Health and the Treasury it was essential to 
include at least one Secretary of State in the interviews.  
2. Health Ministers. Ministers outside of the Cabinet would have specific 
departmental responsibilities, including most of the negotiations with the 
health institutions outside of government. This detailed knowledge of 
health policy is useful to dual level research including case studies of 
specific changes. Virginia Bottomley, Edwina Currie, Stephen Dorrell, and 
Gerald Malone all served as Conservative health ministers. Additionally, 
David Owen was the Minister of Health in the Labour Government of 
1974-79 
3. Strategy Advisers. Those who advise ministers, whether in an official 
capacity or not, can provide a useful source of knowledgeable 
commentary on policy development and the people involved, with unique 
"behind the scenes" insights, and operating as "policy entrepreneurs". As 
well as the author of this research, Melinda Libby served as a special 
adviser to John Moore, the Secretary of State at the Department of 
Health and Social Security during 1987-88, when the ministerial review of 
the NHS began. Keith Mans served as Parliamentary Private Secretary to 
Virginia Bottomley throughout her time as Secretary of State for Health, 
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providing an important link between the Department and the 
Conservative party in Parliament. Additionally, David Willetts was an 
adviser at 10 Downing Street and Warwick Lightfoot at the Treasury. 
Michael Goldsmith acted  as an unofficial adviser to 10 Downing Street, 
and to several Secretaries of State for Health, as did Roger Williams as 
Chairman of the Conservative Medical Society. 
4. Treasury Experience. Health is an area of significant and growing 
spending and is, therefore, a constant concern of Treasury ministers. This 
was reflected in the composition of the 1988 ministerial review, which 
included two Treasury ministers and one health minister. Stephen Dorrell 
was Financial Secretary to the Treasury before returning to the 
Department of Health as Secretary of State. Warwick Lightfoot as a 
special adviser to both Nigel Lawson and John Major whilst they were 
Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
5. Medical Advisers: The interface between health policy is central to the 
policy process, given the constant negotiation between the professions 
and the politicians. Independent expertise plays an important role in 
decisionmaking. Walter Holland has provided medical expertise to 
policymakers over many years,  Michael Goldsmith played an important 
part in the development of the primary care elements of internal market 
reforms, and Roger Williams on secondary care. 
6. Commentators. Health policy is conducted in a very public arena, and 
interviewees with an understanding of perspectives outside of Whitehall 
are of value in providing breadth to the data. Currie, Malone, and 
Lightfoot have all had careers in national journalism, and Bosanquet has 
long been involved in providing expert commentary, including advice to 





Conducting and Analysing the Interviews 
Informal, unstructured interviews are best suited to situations in which the 
interviewer is unable to know the most relevant questions in advance, as is usually 
the situation in exploratory research (Berg and Lune 2012:110-111). As the purpose 
of the research is to identify the factors at play in health system changes, a 
prescriptive set of questions within a programme of structured interviews would run 
the risk of failing to elicit factors that might be unknown in advance. Furthermore, 
comments in early interviews may suggest factors worthy of investigation in 
subsequent discussions, so that the interviews themselves may well be adapted as 
the research progresses. 
Reik has described a role for the interviewer as a choreographer “listening with the 
third ear” (Reik 1948), constantly reflecting on interviewee comments, and adapting 
as necessary to control the interview, drawing on the interviewer’s own intuition and 
insights. It is in this role that the prior knowledge of the interviewer plays an 
important part.  
The interviews were conducted in locations most suitable for the interviewees, 
ranging from offices to public spaces. One interview (Currie) was conducted by 
telephone. The author’s intention was that the interview environment was as 
amenable to relaxed conversation as possible in order to obtain open commentary 
on the issues. Indeed, most of the interviews began and concluded with informal 
conversation which, although irrelevant to the research can be a powerful incentive 
towards the building of a degree of rapport between both parties. Berg and Glassner 
successfully used informality and rapport-building in order investigate the very 
sensitive topic of alcohol drinking habits amongst Jews in New York City. Indeed, 
they were so successful in this that several of their interviewees commented that 
they would not have spoken on the topic so openly with their own friends and 
family(Glassner and Berg 1980:651).  
All of the interviews were digitally recorded and the interviewees’ contributions 
were subsequently transcribed. The duration of each interview was between 30 
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minutes and one hour. The transcripts were then coded to separate data relevant to 
each case study, the internal market, and the political environment. "Non-indexical" 
data  containing value judgements and generalised commentary was also retained  
as this "life wisdom" might prove relevant to the eventual analysis as part of a 
combined macro-micro research strategy(Jovchelovich 2000:69). 
Ethics 
All of the interviews were digitally recorded with the interviewees agreement. The 
time lapse between the interviews taking place and submission of the thesis  raised 
the possibility that interviewees' views on the topic may have changed, or their level 
of political sensitivity changed. Although only one interviewee requested sight of any 
direct quotations before publication all of the interviewees were provided with a 
copy of the transcript of their contribution to check. In recognition of the privileged 
nature of some of the interviews, the long time scale over which they took place, and 
the risks to interviewees the transcipts themselves cannot be published. 
Author Involvement 
As has been mentioned previously the author of this thesis was closely involved in 
aspects of health policy during the period of the research. In the latter half of the 
1980s he was involved in national policy discussions within the Social Democratic 
Party (SDP), and from 1990-92 he served as Research Assistant to the former Health 
Minister and then SDP Leader, Dr David Owen MP, who was an early advocate of the 
"internal market" reforms of the NHS. During this work with Dr Owen he also played 
a central role in the development of the Social Market Foundation think-tank in 
Westminster, which was very active in the health policy arena at the time. From 
1995-97 he served as Special Adviser to the Secretary of State for Health, and was 
closely involved in debates and decisions over the NHS "internal market" and more 
specifically on policies relating to the case studies of this thesis.  
This level of personal involvement clearly presents both problems and opportunities 
for the research, and is not unusual within a relatively small policy arena. A similar 
situation was faced by Oborn in a study of the role of policy entrepreneurs during 
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the development of health reforms for London(Oborn et al. 2011). The risk of author 
bias is significant, but it is hoped that the research design can overcome this as much 
as possible, and as in the Oborn case mentioned above the benefits to the research 
can be significant. Indeed, it is highly unlikely that without this involvement the 
selection of interviewees could have been so broad and novel. The insights brought 
to the research by the inclusion of Mans, Libby, Goldsmith, and Williams, for 
example, are unlikely to have been sought without a first-hand understanding of 
their significant roles behind the scenes of policymaking. The selection of case 
studies covers a range of policy areas, some of which will have seen author 
involvement, but others which predate his activity in the health policy arena, broadly 
from the time of the 1987 General Election campaign onwards. The research 
methodology relies heavily upon literature sources, official records, and political 
memoirs, with the interviews providing supplementary, reminiscent data. It thus 
combines both positive, factual accounts and normative assessments. This 
combination should mitigate the effects of bias emanating either from the author or 
the interviewees.   
The research opportunities arising from author involvement are considerable. Firstly, 
a broad prior knowledge of the topic enables an approach that is alert to the wider 
political and social circumstances of the time. Secondly, his close involvement has 
provided insights that have made it possible to cast the net for potential 
interviewees much wider than would be the case for a researcher less closely 
involved in policymaking, through a detailed understanding of the range of people 
who might carry influence and of those who have rarely reported perspectives on 
policy change. Thirdly, it raises the likelihood of productive interviews as political 
interviewees are more likely to present a relaxed and open narrative when 





4. The Conservatives and the NHS 1944-74 
In order to better understand boundary changes that may have taken place under 
the Conservatives from 1979-97 an analysis of the Party's historic approach to policy 
on the National Health Service will provide useful context, and offer insights into the 
forces shaping a Conservative approach. Only by doing so is it possible to understand 
whether reforms under the Thatcher and Major administrations constituted new 
directions in health policy, or whether they sit within an historically-consistent 
strategy. This is relevant not only to the general approach taken which is considered 
here, but also to the specific cases of boundary change during the Thatcher and 
Major years that will be separately discussed later, namely dentistry, long-term care 
of the elderly, ophthalmics, pharmaceuticals, and private medical insurance. In order 
to avoid repetition events involving the case study  areas are only covered in this and 
the subsequent chapters if they are of wider historical or contextual significance, in 
order to reserve a more complete commentary for the dedicated sections. 
As explained earlier the research methodology used draws heavily on personal 
accounts from some of the major players, often from their memoirs or biographies. 
As previously mentioned this approach, focused on autobiography, is recommended 
by Ferrarotti, as a  means to using subjective accounts to better understand 
historical events rather than rely purely upon a factual narrative(Ferrarotti 1990). 
Such sources should assist in detecting whether internal forces associated with the 
NHS limit or enable change, as expected from the self-reinforcing processes that are 
central to path dependency theory, or whether external factors play a more 
significant role in policy outcomes. A degree of analysis of the decades leading up to 
the 1979 to 1997 extended period of Conservative government will provide useful 
context for the analysis. 
For the purpose of discussion the Conservative approach to the NHS from its 
creation to the fall of the Heath government in 1974 has been separated into three 
discrete periods: the debate around the creation of the NHS in 1948 under a Labour 
government; the unbroken 13-year period of Conservative rule between 1951 and 
1964; and  the Conservative government of 1970 to 1974 led by Edward Heath.  
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Aside from the return to a Labour government in 1974, this year represented a 
turning point for the NHS and for the Conservative Party. It was the year in which the 
first major structural reorganisation of the NHS took place, but which then became a 
regular policy option for ministers in the decades that followed. It was also the year 
in which the Conservatives lost two General Elections under Heath and began to look 
for a new approach to politics. A "New Right" was emerging within the Conservative 
Party, with its emphasis on individual freedom and a limited state(Taylor-Gooby 
1981). One leading exponent, Keith Joseph, denounced "thirty years of socialistic 
fashions"(Joseph 1974), embarked upon a policy review and created the Centre for 
Policy Studies, with Heath's approval, to promote the "counter revolution"(Harris 
2011:478-479). 
The rise of a "Thatcherite" approach thereafter is dealt with in a separate chapter 
covering the path followed until the 1988 Ministerial Review of the NHS, that led to 
the 1989 White Paper "Working for Patients".(Dept of Health 1989b).  
Developing the National Health Service  
The theoretical foundations of a Conservative approach could be traced back to the 
inter-war years. An academic backlash to collectivism in Europe and elsewhere was 
underway. The Austrian "classical liberal" economists Von Mises and Hayek began to 
exert influence on alternative policy thinking at this time, following their respective 
moves to America and Britain. Hayek's students at the LSE included Arthur Seldon, 
who was later a founder of the Institute of Economic Affairs(Cockett 1994:22-24).   
The 1942 Beveridge Report, which laid the foundations of the modern welfare state, 
whilst popular with the public, caused considerable disquiet amongst Conservative 
MPs, which was reflected in a confidential report to the Party's policymakers 
planning their post-war agenda, warning not only of the costs of universal social 
security, but also its impact on individual liberty.(Cockett 1994:61-2). The 
Conservative Chancellor of the Exchequer in the wartime coalition warned Churchill 
that Beveridge's plans presented "an impractical financial commitment".(Raison 
1990:5)  Formal groups  were formed within the Conservative Parliamentary Party, 
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including the Progress Trust and the Tory Reform Group respectively to oppose or 
lend support to Beveridge. The former included Henry Willink (Cockett 1994:67-68) 
who became the coalition Health minister during the war, after his predecessor's 
plans for a National Health Service, which included unifying all health services at a 
regional level and bringing general practitioners into a salaried service, ran into 
strong opposition from the British Medical Association (BMA). (Raison 1990:8).  
 After successfully steering Britain through World War II, in 1945 Churchill led the 
Conservative Party to its worst defeat in almost 40 years, winning just 213 seats in 
the House of Commons for his party and its allies. Labour won 392 seats. The 
Conservative historian Harris has described how: "In every sense that mattered, the 
1945 election marked a great shift leftwards in the British polity" (Harris 2011:373). 
The importance of the creation of the NHS remains a topic of considerable dispute. It 
can be argued that post-war welfare state legislation represented a major juncture in 
policy, or that it was an incremental development from the Beveridge report. 
Glennerster, for example, describes 1945 as "merely a staging post" within a pre-
existing process of welfare state development, albeit with a "coherent and long-
lasting institutional legacy". (2000:2-3). Indeed, in the months leading up to the July 
1948 creation of the NHS  the Labour health minister Bevan had been arguing that 
his proposals were a natural development from preceding policies with broad 
support: 
"The history of the Health Service Act is a very long one. It started with the 
National Insurance Act in 1911–12. Then in 1920 there was the report of a 
committee under Lord Dawson. Then in 1943 it was revived, and in 1944 there 
was a Coalition White Paper. Then there were protracted discussions with my 
predecessor" (Hansard 9 February 1948).  
Rivett's history of the NHS demonstrates how centralised approaches to welfare had 
gathered cross-party support during the war, exemplified by the 1944 Goodenough 
Report on a system for medical manpower planning (Rivett 1998:13), and the 1946 
creation of the National Blood Transfusion Service (Rivett 1998:12); as examples of 
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how the war was influencing the country's social development. According to Rivett: 
"the war had increased the sense of social solidarity and many saw the advantages of 
a command structure" given that military personnel in particular had received better 
health services during the war than they had previously.(Rivett 1998:27).  
Furthermore, the war had also demonstrated the feasibility of a national health 
service through the creation of the Emergency Medical Service (EMS) under which 
the state took charge of hospitals and directly employed doctors in order to provide 
a managed service to the sick and wounded of the war(Titmuss 1950).   
Whilst the balance of archival evidence may now show that the voluntary hospitals 
were indeed in declining financial health  (prior to widespread state support through 
the EMS), driven by a changing social environment and rising costs (Gorsky et al. 
2002), this was by no means clear to those debating the creation of the NHS after 
the war. Indeed, even at the time of the creation of the EMS the government’s 
analysis was that voluntary hospitals deficits may have been little more than cyclical 
features, concentrated in London teaching hospitals, and in some cases due mainly 
to poor management(Gorsky et al. 2002:535). Other topics of debate have been the 
degree to which state funding crowded-out voluntary support in 1938-39, and 
whether the deficits that were incurred at that time were exacerbated by hospitals 
scaling up in anticipation of state support under the EMS.(Gorsky et al. 2002:539) 
Klein, however, argues that a degree of "consensus" on a revised health system had 
developed in the years between the creation of a national insurance scheme in 1911 
and the outbreak of World War II(Klein 2001:2-3), particularly as the voluntary 
hospitals increased their financial reliance on charges to their patients(Webster 
1988:4). 
Whilst the Labour government of 1945 might have willingly followed a  consensus on 
the general direction towards creation of some form of national health service, its 
specific proposals to do so proved highly divisive. The preceding Coalition policies 
had, anyway, been vague on detail (H. Jones 1992b:10). According to Clark's history 
of the Conservatives, by the Spring of 1945; "Labour effectively detached itself from 
any cross-party consensus on 'Medical Reform' and signalled that an incoming 
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Socialist government – at that time thought unlikely – would play a free hand on this 
topic"(A. Clark 1997:252). This contrasted with the bipartisan approach that 
produced the Education Act of 1944, that created a free schooling system based on a 
partnership between the Minister, local education authorities, and the voluntary 
sector (mainly churches).(Raison 1990:11) 
The Conservatives, as mentioned previously, had been divided on the development 
of universal social security. Churchill had neglected the development of clear post-
war policies, not least by closing down the Conservative Research Department (CRD) 
for the duration of the war (Cockett 1994:75). Jones too has demonstrated that any 
appearance of consensus may have been little more than superficial given the 
underlying concerns within the Conservative Party (H. Jones 1992a). Pimlott has also 
firmly rejected the notion of a post-war consensus(Smith 1988).  
The Conservative Party policy adviser of the post-war period, Michael Fraser14, has 
also rejected the notion of a cross-party consensus:  
"The two main parties coming out of the coalition government in 1945 had 
already hammered out, not without some hard bargaining and horse-trading, 
the broad policies for dealing after the war with those social problems that 
had been identified and prepared for during the war on the basis of the 
Beveridge Report, the Employment Policy White Paper and the Butler 
Education Act of 1944, there was for a time an unusual degree of apparent 
unity of aim. To say, however, that the situation after 1945 amounted to a 
'consensus' is a myth of more recent origin. No one thought that at the time. 
The real position was like that of two trains, starting off from parallel 
platforms at some great London terminus and running for a time on broadly 
parallel lines but always heading for very different destinations"(Hennessy 
and Seldon: : 310-11: quoted in Raison (1990):15).  
                                                     
14 Lord Fraser of Kilmorack (1915-1996). Joined the Conservative Research Department in 1946. 
Deputy Chairman of the Conservative Party 1964-75. House of Lords 1974-96 (Patrick Cosgrave, 
'Obituary: Lord Fraser of Kilmorack', Independent, 4 July 1996 1996.)  
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The ideological divide between the Conservatives and Labour was significant. The 
Conservative Party, for example, donated one-and-a-half tons of its paper ration to 
the publisher Routledge to enable a reprint of Hayek's "The Road to Serfdom"(Hayek 
1944), which warned of the possible adverse consequences of collectivism, to 
coincide with the 1945 General Election(Cockett 1994:93). Churchill's attacks on 
socialism during the General Election were soon afterwards described as a "diatribe" 
by the young Conservative MP Quintin Hogg(Hogg 1947:228).  
The Conservatives faced a post-election dilemma in confronting the inevitability of 
the creation of Bevan's plans for a National Health Service. They struggled to 
maintain a policy of support for the British Medical Association (BMA), whilst trying 
to avoid being too closely associated with it in its intransigence on co-operation with 
the new health system. It was expected that most doctors and dentists would, in 
fact, choose to participate in the new system come the appointed day, and the BMA 
position not to do so posed great risks for the party. The Parliamentary Party was, 
therefore, advised by its policy secretary (Iain Macleod) to concentrate its attacks on 
Bevan himself(H. Jones 1992b:150). Nevertheless, voting against the NHS at all 
stages of its progress through Parliament presented a great dilemma for the 
Conservative Party given the popularity of the project. One Conservative MP told the 
House of Commons in the Third Reading debate that they would vote against it; 
"with a sense of very real regret that we cannot conscientiously support the Bill as it 
is now".(Raison 1990:18) 
The debate over the new NHS became heated and personal. In February 1948, after 
the legislation had passed,  the Government sought a debate in the House of 
Commons to attack both the Conservatives and the BMA for their opposition to the 
new NHS, and to which the Conservatives could offer only a muted response. Bevan 
told the Commons: 
"What we do take serious objection to is to organised sabotage of an Act of 
Parliament. We desire to know from the Opposition whether they support 
that. Do they support the B.M.A. organising resistance on 5th July, because I 
would warn them that the beginning of that road might look very pleasant 
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but the end would be exceedingly unpleasant, not only for us but for Members 
opposite."(Hansard 9 February 1948: Col 49).  
As Klein observes: "The consensus may have provided a foundation. It did not provide 
a blueprint" and the proposals created "conflict within consensus" that was to 
become a consistent characteristic of NHS policy making.(Klein 2001:5) Whilst the 
1944 Coalition White Paper had left open the possibility of charges for health 
services under the new system(Webster 1988:56), Labour's proposals expressly ruled 
charges out. As will be seen this was to become a very persistent source of debate. 
The health minister, Aneurin Bevan, was determined to nationalise the hospitals and 
create a universal service free at the time of need. His policy was, therefore, one of 
considerable centralisation. Rather than give a significant role to local authorities 
Bevan opted for a regional system of administration, in order to provide executive 
control for hospital planning(Rivett 1998:28). According to Harris the NHS that was 
created in 1948 was: "significantly different from anything that a Tory-led coalition, 
let alone a Conservative government, would have introduced" but the Conservatives 
had failed to set out their alternative by the time that Bevan presented his Bill to 
Parliament, which left a "poisoned legacy" for the Party thereafter on its approach to 
the NHS(Harris 2011:368). Again, this was to become a persistent issue in the 
decades to follow, between centralisation in pursuit of equity and decentralisation 
and local flexibility.  
Writing in 1947 Quentin Hogg MP (later Lord Hailsham) claimed that: "in almost 
every sphere of national policy Labour social policy was based on the motto "Divide 
and Rule", arguing that the Conservative scheme for the new NHS "would not have 
found it difficult to avoid antagonising all the great professions and institutions 
through whom the service, whatever its nature, would have to be carried out."(Hogg 
1947:255). It would be ironic, therefore, that forty years later the Conservatives 
would incur the wrath of the health professions and institutions whilst returning 
managerial autonomy to hospitals.  According to Hogg the Conservatives in power 
would have followed a similar approach to that taken in 1944 in the Education Act: 
"using existing machinery and leaving with localities a free responsibility and a great 
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measure of freedom of policy – but welding the whole into a general plan in which 
general standards were enforced, but in which diversity and variety were reconciled 
with efficiency and the ultimate control by Government of quality" (ibid) 
Care of the elderly also came under the spotlight at the end of the war, with the 
beginnings of a shift towards the provision of measures to provide the elderly with 
independence rather than be left untreated in long-stay institutions. The first 
geriatric services were established in 1948-9(Rivett 1998:75-6) and the old Poor Law 
system of local support for those in need was replaced in the 1948 National 
Assistance Act with a new centralised system of  cash payments. The local 
authorities, however, retained responsibility for welfare services, which would 
include the provision of  old people's homes to replace the workhouses. The original 
intention of this dual system was that the level of non-means tested retirement 
benefits paid would be sufficient to cover subsistence costs. According to Timmins 
the fact that they were not, and were also poorly indexed attracted little attention at 
the time; "But the impact of the decisions was profound and forms part of the next 
fifty years' history of the welfare state" (Timmins 2001:136-7).  
Taking up the Reins: 1951-64 
By the time of the election of a Conservative government three years after the 
creation of the NHS, the service was already proving to be a substantial, and 
apparently unexpected, financial challenge. According to Campbell the 
miscalculation by Bevan and officials in the Ministry of Health on the costs of the 
new service became immediately apparent in 1948(Campbell 1987:180).  This had 
already led the Labour Government to undermine its earlier commitment to a free 
service when it legislated in 1949 to enable the implementation of a charge for 
prescribed medicines, although it did not actually impose a charge. The Conservative 
opposition had also taken the opportunity presented during the passage of the 1949 
NHS (Amendment) Act to argue for steps to encourage growth in the private health 
sector. (H. Jones 1992b:156) and in 1950 the Party set up a committee to investigate 
ways to cut the cost of the NHS and encourage private care. Proposals considered by 
the Lucas-Tooth Committee included subsidies for patients to offset any price 
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difference between their choice of a private bed and the NHS alternative15.(H. Jones 
1992b:157).  Then in 1951 the Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer, Hugh Gaitskell 
obtained Cabinet approval for charges for dental and optical services (Klein 2001:26) 
which were announced in his Budget in April (Webster 1988:176).  
The first Conservative Minister for Health following the 1951 General Election, 
considered not only charges but also the almost total abolition of the General Dental 
Service, although the Cabinet eventually opted to implement only a prescription 
charge and a flat-rate dental charge(Webster 1988:189). A focus on post-war house 
building added to the pressure on all other aspects of social spending given a 
manifesto pledge for 300,000 homes to be built each year in pursuit of a “property-
owning democracy”, placing housing second only to defence in public spending. With 
regard to education and health, the manifesto simply said that: “for the money now 
being spent we will provide better services and so fulfil the high hopes we all held 
when we planned the improvements during the war”(Conservative Party 1951)  
 For the next four years the Conservatives put the question of the NHS to one side. In 
1952 the Government created the independent Guillebaud Committee to investigate 
the costs of the NHS, which reported four years later. The Committee’s economic 
analysis, carried out by Titmuss and Abel-Smith, showed that the real-terms costs of 
the NHS were in fact less than often thought, and falling as a proportion of 
GDP(Abel-Smith and Titmuss 1956). Although the Committee’s final report largely 
endorsed the status quo, including the recently-introduced prescription charge 
(Ministry of Health. 1956), according to Klein it also heralded the end of "health care 
utopias" based on an assumption that health gains would make the service "self-
liquidating"(Klein 2001:27). 
The Guillebaud Report effectively tied the government’s hands on reforming the 
NHS, leading ministers to claim that all it really required in 1956 was "time to settle 
down"(Webster 1988:107). By this time the Ministry of Health had declined in 
stature; it was no longer a Cabinet post and had become something of a "revolving 
                                                     
15 This was a policy to which the Conservative Party returned in 2003, with proposals for a "Patient's 
Passport".Cpu, 'Setting Patients Free [Electronic Resource] : A Conservative Policy Consultation',  
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door" for ministers(Klein 2001:32). The exception was Iain Macloed, who remained 
in post for three years but who had, upon his appointment, declared a period of 
"tranquility" for the health service (ibid). This approach largely reflected the wider 
aspirations of the government. Churchill was 77 when re-elected and, according to 
Harris, had "finished with taking risks, or at least any that seemed avoidable"(Harris 
2011:387). Nevertheless, appointing such an independent committee to investigate 
the costs of the NHS had been a political mistake by the Treasury in response to 
Macleod’s wish for a Royal Commission with a much wider remit, covering the whole 
of social service spending. As the Chancellor’s wish to further undermine the 
potential for political criticism of the Government’s intentions by appointing a leader 
for the review who “would confound the critics”(H. Jones 1992a:320). Instead the 
review confounded the wishes of those who appointed it. 
The best the Conservatives could do after the Guillebaud Report, amidst internal 
discussions of a switch to a social insurance scheme, was to increase dramatically the 
allocation to the NHS from the National Insurance Fund(Webster 1998:37). In a 
review of Churchill’s peacetime government from 1951 Harris draws comparison 
with later Conservative administrations: “An opportunity was…missed. A comparison 
of 1951 with 1979 and Margaret Thatcher – and in a different way 1970 and Edward 
Heath – is perhaps illuminating. On each of these occasions an incoming Tory 
government was faced with the choice between holding power and using it. Churchill 
chose to simply hold it. Trying to do more, even with a slim majority, was not 
impossible”(Harris 2011:387-88).  
 Nevertheless thinking within the Conservative Party and academic debate on the 
size and operation of the welfare state continued behind the scenes. In response to 
continued weakness in attacking Labour on the welfare state, opposition 
Conservative MPs decided to create the "One Nation" group, choosing social services 
as the topic for its first pamphlet, and in 1954 publishing the politically provocative 
book "Change is our ally"(Powell et al. 1954). In 1950 Richard Law MP, for example, 
had published "Return from Utopia" (Law 1950) which, according to Cockett, 
"became the gospel of post-war liberal Conservatism. Enthusiasts for this new "social 
market" approach as an alternative to collectivism included Diana Spearman and 
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Enoch Powell, of the Conservative Research Department.(Cockett 1994:98-99), 
drawing on the earlier work of Hayek and Robbins. Cockett claims that it was at this 
point that the "seed for the future blossoming of economic liberalism" had been 
planted (ibid). Hayek's Mont Pelerin Society (MPS) of like-minded economists 
centred on the LSE, Chicago and Vienna had become an important forum for the 
development of liberal economics. In time it attracted the attention of Conservative 
researchers and parliamentarians, including Geoffrey Howe, Enoch Powell, Keith 
Joseph, and Edward Heath (Cockett 1994:118-119), and in 1955 the Institute of 
Economic Affairs (IEA) was created to further improve the dissemination of these 
ideas amongst policy entrepreneurs(Cockett 1994:132). Ironically, it was Powell, as 
health minister, who announced a major state hospital building programme in 1961, 
albeit alongside large increases in the NHS Contribution from the National Insurance 
Fund, the prescription charge, dental and optical charges(Webster 1988:37). 
For all the theoretical debate around the margins of the Conservative Party, 
however, the thirteen years of Conservative government between 1951 and 1964 
can be described as a time of “enviable organisational tranquillity” for the health 
system(Glennerster 2007:83) although Labour’s 1964 election manifesto referred to 
it as “thirteen wasted years”(Labour Party 1964). For all its optimism for action on 
social policy based on expectations of strong and consistent economic growth, 
reflected in the removal of prescription charges in 1964, the economic environment 
for the Labour administrations of 1964-70 quickly turned hostile, and the charges 
were re-introduced in 1968 following the devaluation of sterling in late 
1967(Webster 1998:71). Labour also faced serious difficulties in restraining public 
sector pay, as part of its programme of spending cuts; not only across the generality 
of the nationalised industries and public services, but most particularly in the NHS, 
where pay reviews led to recommendations for 20 and 30 per cent increases for 
nurses and doctors respectively for 1970(Webster 1998:72).  
Economic Crisis 1970-74 
Much as the Conservatives could have supported the Labour Party's efforts to 
weaken the unions in 1969, it chose not to do so, possibly for fear that this would 
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undermine the Conservatives' anti-union political advantage, and their emerging 
plans for a package of legal measures of their own (Howe 1994: :47). The economic 
situation, industrial relations, and plans for joining the European Economic 
Community were the main interests for Edward Heath, the new Conservative Prime 
Minister, in 1970(Layton-Henry 1980:169). Whilst Heath was elected on a manifesto 
that carried much right-wing ideology it was  rhetoric in which Heath never himself 
believed(Young and Trewin 2009;109). Nevertheless, Heath's  failure to follow up on 
the rhetoric was to subsequently take on an importance that was to profoundly 
influence the direction of the Conservatives under its next leader.   
According to Harris (2011:470-475)Heath governed in three phases. The first, until 
1972, saw a focus on tax cuts and public spending control, and the introduction of 
the Industrial Relations Act which imposed legal duties on trade unions in collective 
bargaining agreements and the conduct of strike ballots. At the beginning of 1972 
unemployment reached one million and a miners' strike was underway, and the 
second Heath phase began as he resorted to spending increases, incomes policy, and 
industrial support in an attempt to boost the economy. After settling one miners' 
strike with a substantial pay increase, another soon followed. The Yom Kippur war 
and an Arab States oil embargo led to dramatic rises in oil prices, that pushed Heath 
into his third phase, with an emergency budget in December 1973 to produce cuts in 
public spending. Heath responded to the miners' February 1974 decision to strike 
with an energy-saving three-day working, and then with a General Election, which 
brought a minority Labour government to power. 
The Heath government may have begun with plans to alter the basis of the welfare 
state, as reflected in the October 1970 Budget, which the Chancellor introduced 
talking of a more selective approach (Timmins 2001:280), but this rhetoric quickly 
changed. Keith Joseph, the Minister of Health and Social Security, had been an 
enthusiast for moving the NHS to a social insurance scheme, but in office was 
persuaded that such a change would not be worthwhile as the state would still bear 
much of the cost(Timmins 2001:291). 
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Instead Joseph embarked upon a strategy of increasing NHS funding in general, and 
for the more neglected services in particular, and upon a large and rapid NHS 
reorganisation. This was intended to unify hospital, primary care, and local authority 
services, and to deliver management efficiency. Joseph was guided by external 
management consultants, hoping to create a health system that could be planned 
from the centre, and was able to deliver on those plans. The reform was announced 
in a White Paper in 1972(Parliament 1972), attracted little media comment(Rivett 
undated), was legislated for in 1973, and its implementation was rapid in order to fit 
in with a local government reorganisation also planned for April 1974(Timmins 
2001:294-295). The reorganisation saw the number of administrators in the NHS 
increase rapidly from 70,000 in 1971 to 98,000 in 1976(Cabinet 1978). 
Following the Conservatives' electoral defeat in 1974 Joseph expressed regret that 
he too had succumbed to "socialistic" fashions: " We have overestimated the power 
of government to do more and more for more and more people, to re-shape the 
economy and indeed human society, according to blueprints. We have tried to take 
short cuts to Utopia. But for lack of a really good map, because we were in too much 
of a hurry, we have finished up further away than ever.  In the social services, alas, 
we seem to have generated more problems than we have solved."(Joseph 1974) 
In 1974 the  radical analysis that had been first presented in the 1945 Conservative 
manifesto,  based on Hayek's "Road to Serfdom", and promoted for the preceding 
two decades by the  Institute of Economic Affairs,  now found a group of frontline 




5.  The New Right 1974-1987 
This chapter highlights the significance of the rise of New Right16 philosophy in 
response to the perceived failure of Heath to stand firm on both the management of 
the economy and confrontation with the trade unions. The experience of 1970-74 and 
the Conservative Party's rejection of the old consensual form of politics  typified by 
Heath was to dictate the Party's direction under Margaret Thatcher, in opposition until 
1979 and thereafter in government. An approach based on Kingdon's policy streams 
will be used to map health policy changes from 1979, and the contents of the streams 
of problems, politics and policies can be traced back to this period: The serious 
problems in public expenditure and industrial relations that emerged under Heath 
were going to come to a head under Labour, marking the beginning of a new era of 
austerity in public services. Thatcher and her allies within the Conservative Party were 
to develop as a serious political force, and in 1975 a search  for radical policies based 
on a rethinking of the role of the state began.  
Commentary and analysis of health policy under the Conservatives led by Margaret 
Thatcher has a tendency to take a short-term view, treating the Thatcher years from 
1979 as an entirely new direction(Mohan 1995). But, as already shown, the 
Conservative  market-based approach of the 1980s has roots that extend to the period 
before the 1948 creation of the NHS, and which also owe much to the "New Right" 
approach that became central in Conservative policymaking after its 1974 defeat, 
although it had been present within the Party since the 1960s.. 
In 1969 the Party Leader, Edward Heath used well-publicised shadow cabinet 
brainstorming sessions at the Selsdon Park Hotel to debate the Party's agenda, this 
included discussion of several radical briefing notes and ideas17.  This  led Harold 
Wilson to describe the Party's direction saying: "Selsdon Man18 is designing a system of 
                                                     
16 The term "new right" will be discussed later in the chapter 
17 The agreed policies were less radical than often portrayed, as the Party was by no means widely 
committed to a change of direction. Timothy Raison, Tories and the Welfare State : A History of 
Conservative Social Policy since the Second World War (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990) 218p.:69   
18 Presumably a reference to Piltdown Man, reconstructed  in 1912 from fossil finds in a Sussex gravel 
pit, and thought to be the "missing link" in human evolution. This was proven to be a hoax in 1953.   
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society for the ruthless and the pushing, the uncaring. His message to the rest is: you're 
out on your own" (Harold Wilson 20/02/1970). 
Thatcher  recalls: "Selsdon Man won the 1970 election on a radical Conservative 
manifesto" (Thatcher 1993:13). Indeed, the later 1979 manifesto was rather low key  
in comparison despite the radical government agenda that was to follow:  In 1976 
Chris Patten, Director of the Conservative Research Department (CRD) had suggested 
that for the next election the Conservatives would have a "common sense" manifesto 
with less ideology than in 1970 (Young and Trewin 2009:95) despite the new Leader's 
commitment to an ideological agenda. 
In 1973, following Heath’s failure to consistently pursue the Selsdon agenda in 
government, the right-wing  Selsdon Group of MPs was formed to build the 
Conservative commitment to pursue the free-market ideology set out in the 1970 
manifesto.  A similar concern to pursue the new approach led Keith Joseph to establish 
the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) in the mid-1970s, with Thatcher as its Deputy 
Chairman (Thatcher 1993:13-14). The CPS played an important role in the 
entrenchment of a "new right" agenda within the Conservative Party(Jenkins 2006:40-
41) and the spectre of Heath's policy about-turn influenced much that was to follow 
within the Conservative Party over the subsequent two decades. 
From Heath to Thatcher (via the IMF): 1974-79 
When Edward Heath finally faced a leadership election in February 1975 following the 
loss of two elections in 1974 the ideological divisions within the Conservative Party 
came to the fore, and Heath suffered an unexpected defeat by Thatcher on the first 
ballot, when many had assumed that she was merely a "stalking horse" preparing the 
way for more established candidates in the second ballot(Jenkins 2006:45). She only 
decided to stand when Joseph had to concede that he would not, following a furore 
following a speech on social policy that he made in Birmingham (Thatcher 1995:266). 
Her first-round success is often attributed to the tactics employed by her campaign 
manager, Airey Neave in strongly downplaying Thatcher's own prospects so that MPs 
could vote for her safe in the knowledge that other candidates would take over in a 
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second round of voting. In fact, such was her first round success that any other 
candidate stood little chance of stopping her (Cockerell 1988:217). This was, according 
to Thatcher, "a shattering blow" to the Conservative establishment(Thatcher 
1995:277). One of Thatcher’s first acts was to appoint Joseph as Chairman of the 
Conservative Party’s Advisory Committee on Policy(Layton-Henry 1980:18). 
The five years from 1974 to 1979  was a period of great  political division over the NHS. 
Legislation to quickly remove private beds (known as "pay beds") from NHS hospitals, 
and which was announced in November 1974, has been described as a "sacred 
mission" for Barbara Castle, Labour's Secretary of State for Health and Social Services: 
"It was the means whereby she would redress the historic error of her hero, Aneurin 
Bevan"(Owen 1991:233). This battle between the major parties over the existence of a 
mixed public-private market within the NHS was to remain a point of contention into 
the next millennium.  
More generally, the Labour government elected in 1974 faced early difficulties, given 
the economic circumstances of the time and ongoing industrial unrest. The NHS pay 
bill increased by more than 20 percent in its first year(Webster 1998:75), at a time 
when public spending needed to be cut in order to meet the demands of foreign 
lenders supporting sterling and the British economy. The Chancellor had already told 
the new Cabinet at its third meeting, in March 1974, that the country faced its worst-
ever peacetime economic situation, with high inflation and a £400 million balance of 
payments deficit(Castle 1990:432), and in March 1975 the Cabinet was warned of a £1 
billion cut in spending programmes for 1976-77(Castle 1990:584). In July 1975 the 
Cabinet agreed to an emergency statement setting out a firm "reversal of policy" to 
target a rapid cut in inflation by pay and price limits (rather than further spending cuts) 
in order to steady the foreign exchange markets and stave off recourse to an IMF loan 
which would be tied to spending cuts(Cabinet 1975). The then Chancellor later 
described himself as an "eclectic pragmatist" in his abandonment of a reliance on 
Keynesian demand management policies (Denis Healey 1989:383), and claimed that in 
1974 the Treasury had been "the slave" to Keynes(Denis Healey 1989:378). As the 
economic situation worsened the Treasury's planned spending cuts rose to £5 billion 
by October 1975. For the health services the Government's reduction plans in the 
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February 1976 White Paper concentrated on NHS capital spending,  proposing to 
reduce expenditure in this area by more than a third from its 1974 peak.  
In November 1976 the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in preparation for an IMF loan 
agreement, explained to the Cabinet that reducing the Public Sector Borrowing 
Requirement would now need to come primarily from spending cuts rather than tax 
rises, and that inflation would need to be tackled through the money supply rather 
than pay and price controls(Cabinet 1976). The Cabinet thus adopted a monetarist 
approach to economic management, and the Chancellor wrote to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) on 15th December 1976 formally  requesting long-term financial 
support for the British economy19, and offering to go further in reducing the Public 
Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) if required, telling the IMF: "The United 
Kingdom government will consult the Fund …on the adoption of any measure that may 
be appropriate"(Dennis Healey 1976:12). Harris asserts that: "the real turn-around in 
economic thinking came about not in reaction to Heath but in consequence of the 
International Monetary Fund intervention in 1975-6"(Harris 2011:481).  
In fact, the Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer, Healey, had already in 1975 taken 
many of the steps that would be required by the IMF in 1976. And in September 
1976 the new Prime Minister (from April 1976), James Callaghan, told the Labour 
Party Conference: "We used to think that you could spend your way out of recession" 
(Finlayson A undated). Callaghan recalls that he was already "deeply convinced of the 
need to win the battle against inflation" before he stood for the Labour 
leadership(Callaghan 1987:287).  
Such was the Labour government's conversion to a monetarist approach to the 
economy that around the same time as the IMF request the Prime Minister was 
arguing in the House of Commons that the Government would resist the temptation 
to "lose their nerve" on the money supply, unlike the previous Conservative 
government in 1972-3(HC Deb:12 Oct 76 Col 235). According to Jenkins: "Callaghan's 
                                                     
19 The United Kingdom had taken a short-term $5 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund 
for the period June-December 1976 to cover Sterling volatility. 
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three years as prime minister (1976-9) sowed the seeds, but only the seeds, of the 
dismantling of the post-war consensus"(Jenkins 2006:35).  
Labour's adoption of monetarism was, however, born out of necessity rather than 
conviction. Professor Milton Friedman, in his acceptance speech for the Nobel prize 
for economics in December 1976 quoted Callaghan's conference speech and 
described this and a similar Canadian government statement as: "remarkable 
statements, running as they do directly counter to the policies  adopted by almost 
every Western government throughout the post-war period". They were, he said, 
driven by  the "force of events" rather than ideology or  political belief.(M. Friedman 
1976) 
The austerity programme imposed as a major component of the IMF agreement had 
an inevitable impact on the NHS. In 1978 the Social Services Secretary, David Ennals, 
told his Cabinet colleagues  of rapidly rising waiting lists, untreated illness, dilapidated 
hospitals, and low morale, in support of his bid to win an agreement to raise annual 
health spending growth for the following two years to 3 per cent from the 1.7 per cent 
then planned(Cabinet 1978). 
The New Right and the Conservatives 
Britain's public spending problems had developed under both the Conservatives and 
Labour. As Bacon and  Eltis noted: "employment in education increased more rapidly 
when Mrs Thatcher was Secretary of State for Education and Science (1970-74) than in 
1964-70; and during the same period, when Keith Joseph was Secretary of State for 
Social Services, employment in the provision of health and welfare services grew 8.2 
per cent faster than employment in general" (Bacon and Eltis 1976:14). Whilst the 
apparent ideology of the Conservatives had changed little from the 1970 manifesto, 
the strong resolve within much of the new leadership in 1975 to implement the free-
market agenda in practice was completely new. 
 The term "New Right" had already come into common usage in the 1970s(Garnett 
2010). The Fabian Society  had already published a pamphlet on the topic in 
1968(Collard 1968) and  in 1969 Philips used the term in predicting a rightward shift in 
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American politics(Phillips),  successfully encouraging Richard Nixon to resist the 
temptation to moderate his policies when faced with the US Presidential election. The 
New Right combined an emphasis on morality and traditional values  with a critique of 
the increasing role of the state.  
An early indication of the former was given in Keith Joseph's 1972 speech in which he 
put forward a hypothesis giving an important role for families in maintaining an 
unfortunate "cycle of deprivation" that had proven unresponsive to the growth in 
social spending since the war (Welshman 2005). Mrs Thatcher's instincts lay in the 
same direction. In her memoirs (dedicated to Joseph) she recalls her Methodist 
upbringing in Grantham: "It was a visiting Congregationalist minister who brought 
home to me…that whatever the sins of the fathers (and mothers) they must never be 
visited on the children," although she balances this at the time of writing with the view 
that society may have gone too far in removing stigma from parents as well as 
children:: "We still have to find some way of combining Christian charity with sensible 
social policy".(Thatcher 1995:11). According to Thatcher, whilst the economic "left-of-
centre" consensus was being challenged in the late 1960s, the "new liberal consensus 
on moral and social matters was not"(Thatcher 1995:150). It was the combination of 
these elements in the 1970s that produced what has become known as the New Right 
in Britain. This was far more than economic liberalism, as noted by the economic 
journalist Samuel Brittan, in his epilogue to his 1987 update of his 1972 book 
"Capitalism and the Permissive Society". Brittan refers to the 1980s approach taken by 
Reagan in the US and Thatcher in the UK as "The New Spartanism" with common 
features: (i) a hawkish or super-patriotic attitude to foreign and military affairs; (ii) an 
opposition to social permissiveness and a desire to return to 'traditional values'; and 
(iii) a hostility to government economic intervention, often partial and inconsistent, but 
going beyond that of previous Republican or Conservative governments. The first two 
features are the opposite of liberalism in the sense of a belief in freedom and emphasis 
on the individual rather than a group or nation."(Brittan 1988:240)  
Alongside Joseph and Thatcher, Enoch Powell may have played a more significant 
frontline role in the emergence of the New Right had he not fallen from favour 
following an ill-judged speech on immigration in 1968. Nevertheless, he remained an 
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important influence on Thatcher and others thereafter, although Joseph became her 
principal mentor. In 1975 Thatcher's Shadow Defence Secretary, Ian Gilmour, told a 
journalist off the record that it was: "Not  clear  who she listens to except Keith Joseph" 
(Young and Trewin 2009:49). 
Thatcher was also very open to the views of business leaders. John Hoskyns, the 
Chairman of the Hoskyns Group, was taken on by her  in 1975 to lead the 
Conservatives' policy development in opposition, and later became the head of the 10 
Downing Street Policy Unit when she became Prime Minister. Hoskyns' "Stepping 
Stones" report laid the basis for the Conservative government's strategy in its first 
term from 1979. Hoskyns convinced Thatcher that economic rectitude alone would 
not solve Britain's problems, but needed to be accompanied by a range of strategic 
"turn-around" measures for the long-term, including a transformation in the attitudes 
and role of the trades unions(Hoskyns 1978). Once in Government, however, Hoskyns 
soon tired of the limitations placed on the radical agenda and resigned as head of the 
Downing Street Policy Unit in 1981(Jenkins 2006:82). 
"The Right Approach" 
As a former education and housing and local government minister Thatcher always 
showed limited interest in health policy in comparison to an ongoing focus on the 
aspects of policy for which she had been responsible under Heath. But in 1977 she 
explained her views on the NHS in an interview with the Sunday Times. In addition to 
her main theme of reducing NHS bureaucracy in order to save money: 
“…she said she would like to see more people have the chance to provide for 
themselves independently, though it couldn’t be done quickly. She agreed, 
however, that expensive independent education and health care provided an 
escape route only for a very few – until there was a much bigger income in the 
pay packet. That was why she supported mixed public-private features such as 
the Direct Grants schools (the Conservatives would bring them back), and 
amenity beds. She said she believed the health service would be in ‘considerable 
financial difficulties very soon, and it would be better if we moved in a direction 
75 
 
which encouraged people to take out their own insurance’. Only a few could, 
but at least it brought more money into medicine as a whole” (Butt 1977). 
In October 1976 the Conservatives had compiled a paper setting out their policies 
under their new leader, entitled "The Right Approach".. The section on health policy 
provided a clear statement of the intended direction: 
"The Health Service is the largest single employer in the country and one of 
the biggest spenders. But the demands on the service have risen even faster 
than the increase in resources devoted to it. The advance in medical 
techniques, the rise in the number of elderly people in need of hospital 
attention, and what has been called the 'infinity of demand, for medical care 
have together put an immense strain on the service…  
When the service is short of funds for priority tasks, there is no case for 
holding down prescription and other charges. More important, we should 
encourage  rather than deter private provision. Increasing numbers of people 
have shown that they are ready to provide more for themselves; private 
medical insurance has doubled and redoubled over the last twenty years.  It 
will be our aim to encourage this trend, and in particular to reverse the run-
down in NHS pay beds. There is a strong argument for seeing that pay bed 
revenue goes directly to the hospital concerned, where it can be spent on 
identifiable items of equipment.  
We see no reason for quantitative controls over the development of the 
private sector outside the NHS. We are examining ways of providing greater 
financial incentives to employer-employee medical insurance schemes, for 
example by restoring income-tax relief.  The Royal Commission on the Health 
Service  should be looking at other ways of increasing the funds available to 
the service,  including systems of health finance that exist in other countries… 
" (Conservative Party 1976:60) 
The Conservative Campaign Guide 1978 supplement made much of the number of 
patients on waiting lists for hospital inpatient treatment, which had risen to over 
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600,000 under Labour and attacked Labour's reductions in NHS paybeds, arguing that 
insurance and the private sector had an important part to play in the financial 
sustainability of the NHS, alongside increased charges.(Conservative Party 1978:156)  
 The 1979  Conservative Manifesto, however, paid little attention to health policy. It 
was covered in a short section outlining one of their identified five tasks "Helping the 
Family": 
HEALTH AND WELFARE  
The welfare of the old, the sick, the handicapped and the deprived has also 
suffered under Labour. The lack of money to improve our social services and 
assist those in need can only be overcome by restoring the nation's prosperity. 
But some improvements can be made now by spending what we do have 
more sensibly.  
In our National Health Service standards are falling; there is a crisis of morale; 
too often patients' needs do not come first. It is not our intention to reduce 
spending on the Health Service indeed, we intend to make better use of what 
resources are available. So we will simplify and decentralise the service and 
cut back bureaucracy.  
When resources are so tightly stretched it is folly to turn good money away 
from the NHS and to discourage people from doing more for themselves. We 
shall therefore allow pay-beds to be provided where there is a demand for 
them; end Labour's vendetta against the private health sector; and restore 
tax relief on employer-employee medical insurance schemes. The Royal 
Commission on the Health Service is studying the financing of health care, and 
any examination of possible longer term changes - for example greater 
reliance for NHS funding on the insurance pnnciple - must await their report.  
In the community, we must do more to help people to help themselves, and 
families to look after their own. We must also encourage the voluntary 
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movement and self-help groups working in partnership with the statutory 
services. (Conservative Party 1979) 
1979: The New Right in Government 
Once in office the priorities for the new government were very clear. It had become 
essential to deal with Britain's economic problems, and to tackle the industrial unrest 
that was gripping much of the economy. The Government's challenges in 1979 
extended much further than economic matters. These included Rhodesian 
independence, the overthrow of the Shah in Iran, and on-going terrorism associated 
with the troubles in Northern Ireland. Within the first two years in government the 
Conservatives also had to face a new peak of 3 million unemployed, and invasion of 
the Falkland Islands, and threats of another strike in the coal mines. On the latter, Mrs 
Thatcher was painfully aware of the factors that led to the fall of the previous 
Conservative government. When appointing a new Energy Secretary in September 
1981 she told him categorically: "we mustn't have a coal strike"(Lawson 1992:140). 
The Labour Party at the same time widened the ideological divide by electing a left-
wing leader, Michael Foot, following the resignation of Callaghan. This, in turn, led to 
the defection in 1981 of the "Gang of Four" of leading Labour politicians to create the 
Social Democratic Party (SDP), which for its first few years became an electoral 
concern for both Labour and the Conservatives. By the end of 1981 combined electoral 
support for the Liberals and the SDP reached more than 50 per cent(Crewe and King 
1995:133, Fig 1). In a by-election that year within the Labour stronghold of Warrington 
Roy Jenkins stood for the SDP and gained 42 per cent of the vote, to Labour's 48 per 
cent. Shortly afterwards the Conservatives lost Croyden North-West to the Liberals, 
then Shirley Williams took the "safe" Conservative seat of Crosby for the new SDP, and  
in March 1982 Roy Jenkins won the former Conservative seat of Glasgow Hillhead. 
During 1981, particularly after the Budget, Thatcher was warned of numerous 
potential defections to the SDP. In November the Conservative Research Department 
produced an analysis of the situation saying: "This new phenomenon [the Alliance] 
may well end by burying the old Labour party, but the electoral and poll evidence 
suggests that it threatens also to sweep the Conservative party into a small minority 
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position, worse than anything we have experienced for over one hundred years".(CRD 
1981)    But from this point onwards the environment improved for the Conservatives, 
and the SDP threat to them declined(Crewe and King 1995:136-147). 
The new government of 1979 had been determined to mix the immediate economic 
needs of the country with ideologically-driven steps in other policy areas. Thus the first 
legislative agenda included the abolition of price controls and the creation of an 
Assisted Places Scheme, to support children with bursaries for private 
education(Thatcher 1993:39), alongside school choice within the state sector. Whilst 
the new Chief Secretary to the Treasury, John Biffen, was willing to spend an 
additional £50 million above Labour's pre-election spending plans in order to fund the 
Assisted Places Scheme, he expected the NHS to produce £100 million of annual 
savings within two years by means of increased prescription charges, the reversal of 
Labour's removal of pay beds, and the abolition of Area Health Authorities (Cabinet 
1979:3). In the Housing Act (1980)  the Government introduced "right-to-buy" 
legislation which allowed tenants in social housing to buy the local-authority 
properties in which they lived at a discount. 
By 1981 the Chancellor of the Exchequer was well aware of the political risks of putting 
additional financial pressure on the NHS, warning the Cabinet that they would need to 
look for new ways to cut public sector borrowing, including areas previously 
considered "sacrosanct" in order to make tax cuts and measures to tackle 
unemployment possible. Unemployment was already forecast to rise soon afterwards 
to a post-war record of more than 3 million. According to the Cabinet minute the 
Government was running the risk of going into the subsequent election with the 
overall burden of taxation higher than the position in 1979 when the Conservatives 
came to power, with both unemployment, and inflation risen. But, despite this political 
imperative, they could also ill afford deterioration in the NHS: "Some programmes had 
already been cut to such an extent that to look for further cuts was politically 
unrealistic. Measured as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product the health and social 
services programmes in the United Kingdom were significantly smaller than in all other 
member countries of the European Community".(Cabinet 1981).  
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Industrial relations problems were as evident in the National Health Service as 
elsewhere in the public sector, as pay restraint remained at that time a key component 
of the battle against inflation, as the Conservatives had not yet adopted a completely 
monetarist approach to inflation(Lawson 1992:47-48). Amidst the public sector 
austerity the Conservatives in their first term also faced the prospect of two reports 
commissioned by its predecessor which were likely to increase the pressure for 
spending. The Royal Commission on the NHS was set up in 1975 by Barbara Castle, as a 
means to put Labour's serious problems with the NHS to the side for a while. The 
junior doctors were in dispute with the government, and the BMA was asking for an 
independent inquiry, although they (and the Prime Minister) wanted the issue of pay 
beds included, which Castle resisted(Castle 1990:662-664). The health minister, David 
Owen, said of the Royal Commission that he: "juggled its membership to ensure that it 
was at least composed of sympathisers, not antagonists to its principles"(Owen 
1991:237) and Castle made it clear to the chairman, Alexander Merrison, when 
appointing him that the issue of pay beds was not to be included. Merrison was, 
anyway, she claimed: "the product of a left-wing family, and instinctively against pay 
beds"(Castle 1990:711) and his name had come up because ministers viewed him as: 
"a dedicated supporter of the NHS…[who] would have no truck with private financing 
and all that nonsense" (Castle 1990:671). The creation of the Royal Commission did 
not, in fact, lessen the Government's problems with the NHS in general, or the junior 
doctors in particular but, given its carefully chosen membership,  it did present a 
serious trap for an incoming Conservative government. 
Another potential trap was inadvertently set by Castle's successor at the DHSS, David 
Ennals, who replaced her once James Callaghan had succeeded Harold Wilson as Prime 
Minister in 1976.  It is reported that  Ennals was persuaded by  Brian Abel-
Smith(Berridge 2002:133) and Douglas Black to launch an investigation into health 
inequalities, which Ennals thought might provide a good basis for a celebration for the 
30th anniversary of the NHS in 1978. But, as Black himself, has reflected: "It took us 
three years to disappoint him" (ibid). Unlike Castle's Royal Commission, the Black 
Report was not an attempt to defuse or delay debate on a difficult subject, but Black 
was determined that he would not be pressurised by time, regardless of either Ennals' 
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wish for a 30th anniversary celebration or the prospect of a change of 
government(Berridge 2002:141). It was thus Patrick Jenkin, Mrs Thatcher's first 
Secretary of State at the DHSS, who received Black's report in May 1980, which 
proposed measures "costing upwards of £2 billion". Publication of the report was held 
back until the summer recess, after contentious social security upratings had been 
agreed in Parliament, but publication during the summer holiday added to the political 
difficulty caused because it gave every impression of suppression (Jenkin 2002).  
 Patrick Jenkin had worked over the Conservatives' final three years in opposition in 
the 1970s with a group of advisers devising a publicly-administered health insurance 
system, only to be thwarted in his ambitions by Department of Health civil servants 
once he gained office.(Timmins 2008:33). The Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), which 
became an important influence over Conservative Party policy in the 1980s, had also 
been working for some time on alternative systems for raising and distributing health 
funding. It became particularly associated with the promotion of the replacement of 
the state provision of education and welfare services with voucher schemes (Arthur 
Seldon 1986). 
McLachlan describes how the 1979 election had marked the apparent end of a cross-
party consensus in support of the NHS, amidst increasing interest in alternative models 
of health funding and provision (A Culyer et al. 1982:6). He also noted open ministerial 
interest in continental European social insurance systems, albeit alongside a formal 
policy that was limited to encouraging the growth of a complementary private health 
insurance system(A Culyer et al. 1982:8-10), and a Bill to this effect was announced in 
the new Government's first Queen's Speech in May 1979. Nonetheless, there was no 
significant change as a result of this activity. 
According to Willetts, a conservative policy adviser in the 1980s:  “The Government’s 
policy in its early years was so cautious that it is no surprise that some people 
concluded there must be a more radical secret agenda” (Willetts 1989:45). Indeed, the 
strong NHS manifesto commitments of the Conservative governments elected in 1970 
and 1979 invited suggestions of a secret agenda given the contrast with their over-
riding ambitions to reduce the role of the state and promote individual enterprise and 
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responsibility. Hence the widespread media interest in early leaks of any Whitehall 
interest in alternative funding systems. Additionally, the appointment of Gerard 
Vaughan as health minister in 1979, meant that the NHS found itself under the 
leadership of a politician who, as a hospital consultant, understood his brief and who 
was “not an enthusiast for the Bevanite model of a National Health Service” 
(Independent, 21 May 2009). 
Early on health ministers did commission officials  to establish a working party to look 
at alternative funding systems. The working party had wide participation from across 
government, including the Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS). It also included two 
external consultants who, the minister said, had "many years' experience in health 
care outside the NHS" ( HC Deb 10 November 1981  c 77-9W). Additionally two health 
officials were given a travelling fellowship to study European and North American 
health systems (ibid.). 
Walter Holland recalls this Departmental exercise: Mrs Firth and Jeremy Hurst were 
sent off to look at private insurance cover. There was a lot of discussion as to whether 
in fact the whole system should change to a social insurance system or whether you 
could change to a private insurance system". They later presented their findings at a 
confidential seminar held at the Civil Service Staff College, with around 20 participants 
drawn from the civil service, the medical profession, academic medicine, the British 
Medical Association, and the health insurance sector, but no politicians. "There was a 
very clear division of opinion" says Holland: "All the doctors except the BUPA man, 
were absolutely united in opposing any change to an insurance system". In the open 
session the representatives of the insurance industry "chose their words very 
carefully", but in private discussion they  "were absolutely explicit they wanted no 
part."20  
The review of 1981 held out no  prospect for an alternative system being any cheaper 
than the NHS, so that the project progressed no further in 1982. Some of the ideas on 
privatisation options for dental and ophthalmic services, and a move to activity-based 
                                                     
20 Interview: 26 May 2009 
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funding for hospitals did however, later take place although this had little to do with 
the study.(Smee 2005:32). 
Other events in 1982 did have an important effect on Conservative handling of the 
NHS and its future. The Treasury was concerned that the government should develop 
a view on the prospects for public spending into the 1990s, and in February 1982 the 
Chancellor, Geoffrey Howe, obtained the Prime Minister's agreement that the 
Treasury, the Central Policy Review Staff21 (CPRS), and the spending departments 
should work to produce this. Due to the Falklands War the work did not begin until the 
summer, with Howe telling the Prime Minister that: "Radical changes affecting most if 
not all major programmes will be required", and a special Cabinet meeting was held on 
9th September 1982. Howe recalls that: "The one serious mistake which I made was to 
propose that the CPRS should also be asked to 'point up some possible long-term 
options'. Or, more accurately, I had erred in allowing the CPRS to become involved on 
such a tight time-scale, for we had left insufficient time for any resulting CPRS paper to 
be edited or revised" (Howe 1994:257). At that time the CPRS had a new and politically 
inexperienced head recruited from a merchant bank. 
According to Howe: "The CPRS paper amounted to a rather alarming schedule of very 
radical policy ideas many of which had been rejected several times already…The 
meeting was a disaster" (Howe 1994:258). Lawson has described the meeting as "the 
nearest thing to a Cabinet riot in the history of the Thatcher administration" (Lawson 
1992:303).Thatcher herself recalls: "I was horrified by this paper. As soon as I saw it, I 
pointed out that it would almost certainly be leaked and give a totally false 
impression", adding that "We were to be plagued by talk of secret proposals and 
hidden manifestos up to polling day and beyond". (Thatcher 1993:277). 
The Health and Social Services Secretary, Norman Fowler, has also described the 
September 1982 CPRS paper as “disastrous” given that he was engulfed in industrial 
unrest in the NHS at the time (Fowler 1991:183-5). The document and Cabinet 
discussion leaked within days. The Economist magazine reported that:  
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The paper suggests replacing the National Health Service with private health 
insurance…In the meantime savings could be made by charging for visits to the 
doctor and more for drugs” (Economist 1982, 18 Sept).  
Amidst the political furore surrounding the CPRS paper both Fowler and Thatcher had 
to use the Party Conference the following month to re-state their firm commitment to 
the NHS (Fowler 1991:187).  The Department of Health’s chief economist has noted 
that the leaking of the CPRS report: “effectively stopped all work on radical funding 
alternatives for six years” (Smee 2005:32). Mrs Thatcher abolished the CPRS 
immediately after the 1983 election, and in the years that followed it appeared that 
she had indeed determined that NHS privatisation was a political battle in which she 
would never engage. Social policy was, anyway, not at the heart of political debate 
around the time of the 1983 General Election which, as Raison recalls, "was about the 
economy, nuclear weapons, Europe and leadership, and took place against the 
backdrop of the Falklands".(Raison 1990:122) 
Pearson described the NHS as: “The one ‘untouchable’ which has thwarted the 
Thatcher government’s mission to roll back the frontiers of the state”  (Cloke 1992). 
The lack of a viable alternative model, however, meant that the only recourse was to 
strict budgetary control and the pursuit of efficiency. Shortly after the 1983 General 
Election the Leader of the House, John Biffen, confided to a journalist that Lawson, 
who was now Chancellor the Exchequer, wanted ongoing spending cuts, in order to 
fund tax cuts. "The Tory party likes its cottage hospitals" he said(Young and Trewin 
2009:193). 
The widespread industrial unrest experienced by the NHS and union demands for flat-
rate increases, alongside fears of a growing NHS bureaucracy,  led to a shift of the 
policy focus onto strengthening the management function, particularly personnel 
management, within the NHS.(Edwards and Fall 2005:14). The imposition of a 4 
percent public sector pay factor, intended to establish a norm for pay rises, led to 
widespread industrial unrest in the NHS involving 13 unions, that lasted eight 
months(Rivett 1998:352), and resulted in the Secretary of State requiring a police 
guard(Fowler 1991:172). The coincidental leaking of the CPRS Report added to a 
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general sense of crisis in the NHS. The dispute finally ended in December 1982, with 
the establishment of an independent pay review body for the nurses (as already 
existed for doctors) and a two-year agreement with the other public sector unions.  
Against this background Fowler announced the creation of the Griffiths Inquiry in the 
search for a longer term solution. 
In appointing Roy Griffiths, the Managing Director of the Sainsburys supermarket 
chain, Thatcher once again turned to a businessman for advice. Griffiths insisted, 
against the wishes of Thatcher and Fowler, that the inquiry should cover the whole of 
NHS management and not just manpower (Graham 1994)22. This insight  demonstrates 
that in 1982 the political focus was on tackling the  industrial relations problems of the 
NHS, and not on a wider agenda for fundamental change. The Griffiths Report was 
short and precise, setting out a clear prescription for managing the NHS. 
In a review of NHS changes since 1983 the publication of the Griffiths Report has been 
described as a " seminal moment for the NHS" which "arguably provided a turning-
point at which NHS management was transformed. Indeed, without 'Griffiths' it is fair 
to surmise that NHS management would not look or act like it does today."(Macfarlane 
2012:135). Griffiths appears to have brought into the health service the new business-
like approaches that  were already permeating most other aspects of public 
administration(Gorsky 2010:23). Indeed, Graham Hart, a former Permanent Secretary 
at the Department of Health has described how "managing" the NHS was simply not 
part of the role of the Department of Health before the Griffiths Report, as 
responsibility rested with the health authorities(Gorsky 2010:26). The case for 
management systems within the NHS was reinforced by the official inquiry into a 1984 
outbreak of food poisoning in an NHS hospital that killed 19 patients. The Report 
found evidence that health authorities had no plans for such major events, and 
confused lines of accountability(DHSS 1986a) 
                                                     
22 Fowler has recently denied that a manpower inquiry was originally intended despite the strong 
evidence to the contrary Martin Gorsky, 'The Griffiths Nhs Management Inquiry: Its Origins, Nature 




Day and Klein highlight some of the environmental factors driving change in health 
policy, not least the rise in consumerist attitudes, reflected in strong growth in private 
medicine and rising legal claims over NHS treatment, and rising expectations. Whilst 
the population might have previously accepted NHS mistakes as par for the course, 
this attitude was clearly changing, and negligence claims were increasing from a very 
low base throughout the 1980s. The average subscription for medical defence rose 
ten-fold between 1980 and 1988(Day and Klein 1989:13). These cultural changes 
would serve to increase demands on the NHS, together with the effects of an ageing  
population. The problem of affordability could only worsen.  
In the 1970s Barbara Castle had argued that the NHS required real-terms annual 
funding increases of one-per cent above the retail prices index in order to maintain 
service levels whilst faced with an ageing population, plus a further one-per cent in 
order to keep pace with advances in medical technology(Rivett 1998:356). A decade 
later Nick Bosanquet, from the Centre for Health Economics at York, produced a report 
on NHS funding for the British Medical Association, the Royal College of Nursing, and 
the Institute of Health Services Management. Bosanquet's analysis  demonstrated that 
a minimum real increase  for hospital and community health services was needed of at 
least two-per cent per annum, and that a commitment should be given to such a 
sustained increase over three years, alongside full-funding of Pay Review Body awards 
(Nicholas Bosanquet 1985a). The three organisations met with the health minister, 
Barney Hayhoe, to present the research. Whilst the minister agreed with the 
calculation that two per cent growth was required, he asserted that this implied 
growth in services, rather than growth in funding(Hayhoe 1986)23. The Department of 
Health responded more fully with a firm assertion that it believed that there was still 
"fat to cut" from the NHS, and that efficiencies due to the introduction of general 
management and other measures would be "substantial"(DHSS 1986c).     
Even before the 1987 election the Prime Minister was becoming frustrated that the 
extra funding and managerial reforms of the NHS had not dealt with the problem of 
                                                     
23 Total real terms health spending growth  swung from 0.2 percent in 1985-6 to more than  four 
percent in each of the three years that followed, before falling to 0.7 percent in 1989-90 (HC Debates 
16 February 1998 c492W) 
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NHS waiting lists, suggesting that if GPs and patients could not make informed choices 
between hospitals there would be little pressure for improvement.(Edwards and Fall 
2005:56). Early in 1987, therefore, DHSS officials prepared another report for the 
Prime Minister “Towards Better Healthcare: A Case for Change” again outlining 
possible insurance schemes, additional charges and tax incentives for the take-up of 
private medical insurance. (Edwards and Fall 2005:56). The paper also commented on 
Professor Enthoven’s suggestions for an internal market system within the 
NHS(Enthoven 1985), although Downing Street felt that an internal market would be 
unlikely to “give sufficient voice to the consumer”. (Edwards and Fall 2005:57), which 
was to be a central theme of the 1987 election manifesto. 
To some commentators, however, the “management agenda” in health policy 
appeared far from cautious. Ham, for example, has argued that this agenda  brought: 
“to an end the period of incremental adaptation that had been characteristic of the 
post-war consensus on the NHS”.(Ham 2000)  This, however, was already not the first 
time that such a breach of consensus had been claimed. Nor would it be the last. It 
was clear, however, that whilst there were problems aplenty, there also seemed to be 
more substantive reform ideas beginning to appear in what Kingdon (1995) refers to 




6.  An Internal Market 
This chapter and the case studies that follow explore the major health policy changes 
that took place under the Conservatives, set against the history of the Conservative 
approach that has already been discussed. As set out in the conceptual framework for 
this research it is important to consider the possibility that the changes that were 
witnessed in the 1980s and 1990s might have roots that form part of a Conservative 
approach to health policy that predates the creation of the NHS. It may, of course, also 
be the case that change is sometimes a spontaneous reaction to short-term events, 
but setting events in their historical and cultural context should assist in making these 
distinctions. Having traced the development of Conservative Party thinking the 
research now seeks to set out the main characteristics of the political environment 
and to map relevant developments leading to each policy using  three streams of 
problems, people, and policies. As a study of policymaking amongst the policy elite the 
research is focused on the people involved, whilst incorporating the remainder of 
Kingdon's "politics" stream  into the discussion of context.  
Background 
The internal market reforms received extensive coverage at the time of their 
development in 1988-89 and introduction in 1990 and the years that followed. The 
Labour Party committed itself to abolish the new system, which was a commitment 
that it only partially fulfilled when next elected in 1997. All of this has been thoroughly 
documented(Timmins 2001:431-492) and analysed(Le Grand et al. 1998).  
My intention in this chapter is to understand how the particular set of reforms that 
emerged came about, and the factors that generated such change. The internal 
market reforms, as the name suggests, were ostensibly  intended as a means of 
improving the internal operation of the NHS, and not with shifting the boundaries in 
either the finance or provision of care. They may, nevertheless, have facilitated 
subsequent boundary shifts due to their impact on the health policy environment. The 
focus of the analysis here is to unearth data that sheds light on the motivations, 
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intentions, and  tactics of those involved rather than to present another history of this 
short but fascinating period of British politics. 
At some point the NHS did take a decisive change of direction in terms of the provision 
of care, developing a mixed market in the supply of care similar to those which have 
been seen in many other aspect of welfare provision with increasing recourse to 
independent provision (Glennerster and Le Grand 1994)  In 2010 the new 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government announced proposals to 
"liberate" the NHS, and quickly produced a substantial Health & Social Care Bill to 
enact the changes. These included entrenching the principle that the NHS should 
commission "any willing provider" to provide NHS-funded care, rather than rely mainly 
on NHS providers. At this point some of those who supported the internal market in 
the 1980s expressed the view that an external market had, in fact, emerged. 
In 1986 Dr David Owen, Leader of the Social Democratic Party (then in a formal 
alliance with the Liberal Party) lent his party's support to Alain Enthoven's suggestions 
of an internal market for the NHS(Enthoven 1985). Owen argued that: "An internal 
market could serve patients' interests better than the present model" adding that as 
well as a market between district health authorities "the internal market would, as 
today, enable authorities to buy services from the private sector and vice versa. To win 
acceptance for the internal market model it will be necessary to convince staff and, 
particularly, the health unions that this is a sensible development, wholly within the 
ethical principles of an NHS whose remit is to provide care on the basis of need, not the 
capacity to pay"(Owen 1986:170-71). 
In July 1987 Owen recommended an internal market to the Government, adding that 
its introduction would also be: "a good opportunity to deal with the frontier between 
the private and public health sectors. It makes no sense to prevent somebody who 
can be dealt with in a private hospital more cheaply than in another part of the NHS 
from having treatment. There is no reason why treatment cannot be contracted out if 
a patient can have his inguinal hernia dealt with in that way. Good for him. He does 
not pay—the health district pays" (HC Deb 2 Jul 1987 Col. 663). Owen did, however, 
see the private sector as a supplier to the NHS and not a "competitor", arguing that 
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Conservative policies to actively promote the private sector risked damaging both 
the NHS and social cohesion within the country (Owen 1986:171). 
Twenty-five years later, however, when confronted with a Health and Social Care Bill 
that actively promoted competition in healthcare Owen expressed his regret that: 
"at the  very early stages in 1985, I was the advocate of the internal market. I must 
say I am ashamed of that advocacy now. So often the work that was done on an 
internal market is used to justify the external market that is the basic fundamental 
underpinning of this Bill, which I am afraid will become an Act". (HL Deb 25 oct 2011 
Col 674). It seems that Owen had assumed in 1985 that his proposed reforms would 
provide a final solution for the NHS, and not form part of a progression to a market-
based environment for health care. 
This episode, which took place over a quarter century, serves to emphasise the value 
of policy analysis that sets specific events within their historic context. The 
Conservatives went into the 1987 General Election with a manifesto focused on rising 
prosperity, tax cuts, and a consumerist approach to housing and education. The 
manifesto said that local authority housing tenants would be given rights to opt-out of 
local authority control of their estates, and parents would be given more effective 
choices between schools, compared to the 1980 Act that already provided a degree of 
choice, and schools would be able to manage their own budgets. Polytechnics too 
would be taken out of local authority control, with their own budgets.  
In what has since been described as "the most unpopular  decision Thatcher 
made…which played an important part in her downfall" (Anthony Seldon and Collings 
2000:111)  the Conservative Party committed itself to a high profile policy to quickly 
replace local rates with a "community charge". With regard to the NHS the 
Conservative manifesto was, according to Thatcher herself "notably 
cautious"(Thatcher 1993:577) and sought only to offer reassurance of an on-going 
commitment on funding, capital investment, public health, and managerial flexibility. 





Health and the 1987 General Election 
The Conservatives went into the 1987 election with a strong case to present to the 
electorate; unemployment was falling, the public sector deficit was on track to be 
eliminated entirely, and the Chancellor had produced a populist Budget with a 
substantial cut in income tax(Young 1990:512). These were the grounds on which the 
Conservatives would campaign. They may have chosen to fight the election on 
grounds other than health policy, but the opposition parties made this a central area 
of attack. Thatcher knew that this would be the case as health was a particular 
"weak point".(Thatcher 1993:577) 
Both the Labour Party and the combined SDP-Liberal Alliance targeted the 
Conservatives’ perceived vulnerability in this area. But it was a journalist who was to 
use health policy to cause problems for the Conservatives in the final week of their 
re-election campaign. According to the then health minister, the question at a daily 
press conference was just an oft-repeated "try on", asking why the Prime Minister 
used private health facilities rather than the NHS; but Thatcher was suffering from a 
painful tooth abscess which had kept her awake overnight, and was irritated by a 
sudden and unexpected Conservative slide in the opinion polls(Thatcher 1993:584), 
and her "patience snapped" and she gave a long and damaging reply(Fowler 
1991:279): 
"I, along with something like 5 million other people, insure to enable me to go 
into hospital on the day I want; at the time I want, and with a doctor I want. 
For me, that is absolutely vital. I do that along with 5 million others. Like most 
people, I pay my dues to the National Health Service; I do not add to the 
queue, and if I said, 'Look, because I cannot come when you want me, I must 
come when I want to', you would accuse me of jumping the queue. I exercise 
my right as a free citizen to spend my own money in my own way, so that I 
can go in on the day, at the time, with the doctor I choose and get out fast. 





The debate over NHS funding  intensified from 1985. The aspirations for 
management efficiencies following the Griffiths Report (Griffiths 1983) meant that 
the Conservatives expected savings to produce much of the two-percent annual 
growth called for by independent research(Nick Bosanquet 1985b; Maynard and 
Bosanquet 1986). According to Timmins, the Department of Health and Social 
Security had been routinely "getting just enough cash to survive", and before the 
1987 election the NHS had been building up debts, including delayed pay increases, 
so that it was technically bankrupt by the end of the election(Timmins 2001:452). For 
the Conservatives, however, by the time of the 1987 General Election they appeared 
to have succeeded in restraining health spending growth, having since 1982 
consistently kept real growth in NHS purchasing power below 1percent per 
annum(Owens and Glennerster 1990). During the second Thatcher term the seeds 
had been sown for the financial crisis that was to engulf the NHS in the winter of 
1987-88. 
Facing  the prospect of another five years of Conservative government austerity for 
the NHS from 1987 two reputable and independent health organisations, the 
Institute of Health Services Management and the Kings Fund announced reviews of 
NHS funding in a search for alternative income sources. Additionally, John Moore, 
the new Secretary of State for Health and Social Security, went into routine spending 
negotiations with the Chief Secretary to the Treasury (John Major) and "quixotically 
… bid for too little money", true to his philosophy as a former Treasury minister 
(Major 1999:105). The health minister Edwina Currie's diary records that John Major: 
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"gave me to understand [Moore] could have had more money in the recent PES24 
round if he'd boxed cleverer"25. The NHS fell into financial crisis.  
Even before the winter of 1987-88 health authorities began to close beds as an 
economy measure and industrial unrest over pay returned(Rivett 1998:358). The 
mounting financial problems of the NHS coincided with a devastating storm in 
southern England on Thursday 15th October 1987, and on the following Monday the 
year's transatlantic stock market boom came to an dramatic end on "Black Monday" 
and predictions of an economic slump(Lawson 1992:746). Even the medical Royal 
Colleges were attacking the Government, issuing a joint press release in early 
December 1987 calling for: "an immediate overall review of acute hospital services" 
and "additional and alternative funding" (Edwards and Fall 2005:63; Hoffenberg 
1987). Later that month the Treasury finally conceded that the health minister's 
demands for extra funding were essential and provided an additional £100m.  
The problems of the NHS had been personified in November 1987 by the case of 
David Barber, a "hole in the heart" baby, due for treatment at Birmingham Children's 
Hospital but whose operation was cancelled five times in six weeks, due to a 
shortage of specialist nurses. His parents had taken unsuccessful legal action in an 
attempt to force the hospital to operate. He was finally treated in late November, 
but died(Edwards and Fall 2005:63; ITN 1987). A stream of other paediatric cardiac 
cases followed throughout the winter. (HC Deb 15 January 1988  cc645-52). 
According to Lightfoot, a Treasury political adviser this was: "one of those periodic 
moments when [the NHS] blew up as a media thing, provoked by some genuine 
underlying problems"26.  
At this crucial and difficult time the Secretary of State at the DHSS had been absent, 
from mid-November to mid-January, suffering from pneumonia, and it was left to 
the Minister for Health to launch a White Paper on Primary Care which, as an 
                                                     
24 Public Expenditure Survey – The annual negotiations between spending departments of 
Government and the Treasury 
25 Unpublished diary entry: See Annexe 
26 Interview 27 July 2011 
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economy measure worth £170m, included the removal of free sight tests and 
additional dental changes (HC Deb 25 November 1987 cc259-60). 
 
 
Announcing a Ministerial Review of the NHS 
The session of Questions to the Prime Minister (PMQs)on 21st January 1988 was 
almost entirely taken up with questions about the NHS "crisis". (HC Deb 21 January 
1988  cc1090-4). Within a week, and before she next faced PMQs she had 
announced a ministerial review of the NHS. Moore had urged her to launch a review 
when he was appointed to the DHSS in June 1987, and in January 1988 it seems that 
both the Chancellor, Lawson, and her Official Spokesman, Ingham, had both 
recommended that the time had come for a review.(Lawson 1992:614). According to 
Libby the Prime Minister "used it to get out of a hole on Panorama"27. Lawson 
believed that: “The start of a new Parliament was the only practical time to consider 
the matter” and the Health Minister, Fowler, has commented that: “There would 
never be a better time to introduce legislation which would inevitably face hard 
battles in both Houses of Parliament. It was now or never.” (Fowler 2008:26)  
The Permanent Secretary at the DHSS believes that it was the high-profile tactics of 
the medical professions over the winter of 1987-88 that finally convinced the Prime 
Minister of the need for a thorough review of the NHS rather than simply continue to 
provide more cash although they were, of course, hoping for the latter(Edwards and 
Fall 2005:65). 
Thus, on 25th January 1988 the Prime Minister announced a  review during a BBC 
“Panorama” television interview during which the interviewer, David Dimbleby,  had 
accused her of “dithering” on the NHS and pressed her to consider the inevitability of 
a greater role for private care (McQueen Undated).The five-minister Review team 
                                                     
27 Interview 3 June 2009 
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was established within three days, under the chairmanship of the Prime 
Minister(Lawson 1992:614). 
In fact, even before the 1987 General Election, the Prime Minister had asked David 
Willetts, who had left her Policy Unit to join the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) think 
tank, to undertake an unofficial review of the NHS, which she thought would have 
far greater freedom that an official review(Isom and Kandiah 2002:30). Willetts 
believes that in making her Panorama announcement she was, in fact, referring to 
the CPS Review (Timmins 2001; Willetts 2006:457-8) but that immediately after 
making the review public she realised that a degree of control would now be 
needed. Willetts has also suggested that Thatcher had earlier hoped that the 
economist Lord (John) Vaizey would lead such an external review (Isom and Kandiah 
2002:30); but Vaizey died in 1984. This does suggest that she had long intended to 
turn her attention to long-term reform of the health service.   
The experience of the election itself had perhaps moved Thatcher towards a 
fundamental review. Claims of a secret Conservative agenda had plagued the Party at 
both elections since the leaking of the 1982 CPRS report. According to Willetts, who 
was assisting her during the 1987 election campaign, being accused of having a secret 
agenda when there none existed "was the worst of all possible worlds… far better to 
have a genuine reform agenda which would be out in the open", but it was the 
addition of a financial crisis from the Autumn of 1987 that finally convinced the 
Prime Minister.28 
The then Chairman of the British Medical Association described the Panorama 
announcement as a "classical political device to divert attention from the NHS 
scandal" (Marks 2008:168) But, even as an official review, this was not to be another 
Royal Commission lasting several years, but something more similar to the Griffiths 
review of NHS management, to produce answers for implementation before the next 
election. In fact, the Prime Minister had already given considerable thought to 
radical NHS funding and structural reform immediately before the 1987 election, 
                                                     
28 Interview 4 July 2006 
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commissioning a secret report from the Department of Health entitled "Towards a 
Better Healthcare: A Case for Change"(Edwards and Fall 2005:56). 
Policies 
When the Prime Minister announced the review in January 1988 the “policy privemal 
soup” did not contain a ready-made solution, and according to the Secretary of State  
for Health’s political adviser: “People were invited from everywhere to send 
submissions in, which arrived in great volumes … I think most of it was absolutely 
irrelevant”29. David Green from the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), and others in 
the policy arena,  was given a security pass so that he could spend time in the 
Department questioning officials and offering ideas. Green recalls: “I used to go over 
to John Moore’s office in the afternoons when he was in the House of Commons and 
could ask civil servants to tell me anything. I wasn’t allowed to take anything out, but 
I could take notes. Freestanding hospitals was discussed…but at that time I didn’t 
ever get the feeling that it was going anywhere. It was little position papers… I would 
leave him little notes”30.  
Although there was no specific proposal available in January 1988, in health as in 
other policy areas there had been increasing interest in the use of market 
mechanisms to deliver social policy. Ideas to develop an internal market within the 
NHS, as mentioned earlier, and interest in decentralising the purchasing of care to 
GPs as a form of consumer empowerment had been discussed during the previous 
five years. Taking this a stage further, there was considerable interest in the use of 
earmarked vouchers to enable individuals to select services themselves, although 
these ideas failed to enter health policy making save for the introduction of spectacle 
vouchers which will be discussed  later, and through the Assisted Places Scheme31 in 
education. The deadweight cost for the exchequer of any voucher scheme (funding 
those who would have paid for private care regardless) was always a major barrier to 
implementation of vouchers schemes for the Conservatives(Thatcher 1993:591). 
                                                     
29 Interview 3 June 2009 
30 Interview 28 June 2011 
31 The Assisted Places Scheme, introduced in 1980 provided means-tested burseries for children to 
attend selective private schools. 
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They had, however, always carried considerable attraction for the New Right, 
particularly the IEA which had long promoted their use as a means for reducing the 
role of the state in service provision and empowering individuals, notably in 
education (M. Friedman 1962; L. A. Friedman et al. 1974; Jencks 1972; Arthur Seldon 
1986) although the types of schemes vary, particularly according to whether the 
purpose is purely consumer empowerment as in the Friedman scheme which 
suggests vouchers of equal value that could be topped up, or also has equity goals, 
as in the Jencks scheme that proposes an inverse relationship between voucher 
value and financial means(Barr 1987:352; Nicholas Bosanquet 1983). 
The "social market" and "market socialism" 
As the 1980s progressed the shift towards market-based policies began to gain 
interest across the mainstream political and policy spectrum. The concepts of "social 
markets" and "market socialism" became popular areas for investigation. The social 
market drew on Germany’s post-war success in combining economic discipline with 
well-developed social programmes with no bias towards state provision of services, 
whilst market socialism was more focused on the use of markets in the delivery of 
public services. The term "social market" was first adopted for the New Right in 
British politics by Keith Joseph in the 1970s. In doing so he was drawing on the liberal 
"Freiburg school" that had advised the Adenauer government on the post-war 
reconstruction of West Germany: including Walter Euken, Wilhelm Röpke, and 
Ludwig Erhard, all of whom were closely associated with Hayek(Cockett 1994:109-
110). Their philosophy, rooted in “sound money” was a response to Germany’s 
earlier experience with hyper-inflation. 
In 1981, shortly after the creation of the left-of-centre Social Democratic Party SDP), 
one of its founders David Owen declared that the social market, which had been 
adopted by the New Right, was "worth re-examining"(Owen 1981:5). In 1989 as the 
SDP dwindled as a political party, Owen and his supporters established the Social 
Market Foundation think tank to continue to promote the use of market 
mechanisms as a social tool. 
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During the 1980s "market socialism" was also being developed to "show that market 
mechanisms can be used to achieve socialist ends", separating ends and the means 
by which they are achieved (Le Grand and Estrin 1989:1). Le Grand argued that:  
"Market-oriented reforms of welfare provision, such as voucher and user 
taxes, particularly if coupled with systems of wealth taxes and poll grants, 
could make welfare in particular, and the wider society in general, more 
responsive, more efficient, and more egalitarian" (ibid:211)  
Amongst Conservatives Willetts has argued that the use of markets within tax-
funded welfare services, known as "quasi-markets", formed a core element of the 
Conservative's social policy agenda throughout the 1980s, and that the NHS reforms 
at the end of the decade fit within this agenda (Isom and Kandiah 2002:36). 
 
General Practitioner Fundholding 
Alongside the development of ideas around the separation of purchasers and 
providers to form quasi-markets, within the health policy arena  ideas were also 
developing  in the 1980s  around the concept of General Practitioners holding budgets 
and acting as purchasers of services for their registered patients. The economist Lord 
Vaizey, a former Labour peer who joined the Conservatives in 1979, hosted a seminar 
at Cumberland Lodge (of which he was Principal) in June 1984. to discuss NHS reform 
ideas. Teeling-Smith recalled that Vaizey, who died shortly after the seminar, believed 
that: “the principles of the Beveridge Report need to be fundamentally re-appraised in 
the light of the changes in British society since the 1940s.”(Teeling-Smith 1984:3).  
At the seminar Marshall Marinker32  presented a paper on his suggestions for radical 
changes to the NHS. In a shift away from a hospital-based NHS he proposed that 
private general practices might compete with NHS providers, to provide a system of 
“diverse and competitive primary care” including NHS franchised primary care units 
                                                     




which would be given annual budgets, so that “the unit will become the budget holder” 
(Teeling-Smith 1984:21) . Marinker draws on a suggestion from Maynard that these 
budgets could cover both primary and secondary care which would “permit an 
entrepreneurial competitiveness in both…” (Teeling-Smith 1984:22). The idea of GPs 
holding budgets, rather than health authorities had already been developed within 
government in 1984 in drafts for a Primary Care Green Paper. This was described by 
insiders as "the lunatic chapter" (Isom and Kandiah 2002:31) which was removed from 
the draft (Giaimo 2002) before publication of the final paper although the final 
document did retain  an emphasis on consumer choice (DHSS 1986b). 
Other participants in the 1984 OHE seminar, who were actively working on similar 
themes to Marinker and who would play important policy roles in the years that 
followed included Alan Maynard, Director of the newly-established Centre for Health 
Economics at York University, Nick Bosanquet from City University, and Robert 
Maxwell from the Kings Fund. Marinker recalls that Bosanquet and Maynard thought 
his proposals for GPs holding budgets for all primary care needs "timid", and suggested 
an extension to incorporate some non-emergency secondary care(Isom and Kandiah 
2002:31). The seminar was also attended by the Government’s Chief Medical Officer, 
Donald Acheson, thus ensuring a direct link into the Department of Health. 
These discussions coincided with rising interest within the USA on "managed  care" 
delivered through Health Maintenance Organisations (HMOs)33 acting as purchasers of 
Medicaid-funded care on behalf of their enrolled patients, but using prepaid plans 
rather than traditional insurance. Such a plan had been introduced in 1983 in Arizona, 
and had delivered improvements in the quality of care whilst achieving lower cost 
inflation than the traditional Medicaid programme, because the presence of an HMO 
as a selective purchaser within the market was generating stronger incentives for price 
competition amongst suppliers than had the insurance-based system. (Osborne and 
Gaebler 1993:87).  
                                                     
33 These had existed on a small scale since the 1930s, when the Kaiser Company set up a health plan 
for its employees 
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In England in the early 1980s a HMO-style development in Harrow came to 
policymakers' attention. Dr Mike Goldsmith, a GP trainer, had earlier resigned from 
the NHS and established a private health centre funded by monthly subscription, 
similar to a squash club, rather than insurance; thus "free" at the point of use. 
Goldsmith says: "I decided to do a different type of primary care, one that wasn't so 
poor quality [as the NHS] and one where it was a one-stop shop" with in-house 
pharmacy and cardiac testing. The Harrow Health Care Centre aroused the interest of 
the Conservative Medical Society, David Willetts (then at the Treasury), John Redwood 
at the Downing Street Policy Unit, and the health minister Kenneth Clarke. Writing in 
October 1985 Laing highlighted the Harrow model as an example for: "the 
development of GP-based health maintenance organisations… the HMO dimension 
broadens the issue for debate from one of 'privatisation' to the development of 
mechanisms to improve efficiency in the supply of health services generally. Full 
exploitation of HMO type incentive structures, however, would require contracting for 
hospital services"(W. Laing 1985:48).  
When Willetts moved to the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) in 1986, Goldsmith 
became a Health Research Fellow at the think tank. The CPS published a pamphlet by a 
former government official who had been responsible for health finance within the 
Treasury. This investigated the scope for an internal market, but raised the question 
of: "How can affairs be arranged so that GPs have an incentive to see that their 
patients are cared for with economic efficiency…?" (Peet 1987:13) The idea of GPs with 
their own budgets was beginning to spread, but by the time of the NHS Review was 
still in its early stages with no practical development. Once such ideas were brought 
to the Prime Minister's attention by Willetts,  he used Goldsmith and Dr Robert 
Gumbiner34, the American HMO "pioneer" (Nelson 2009) and others within a group 
of people that he had developed to convince the Prime Minister that such a scheme 
could work in practice despite her scepticism35. The Prime Minister held a seminar 
with doctors at Chequers in May 1988 and her Policy Unit produced ideas for GPs, as 
                                                     
34 Robert Gumbiner founded the Health Maintenance Organisation FHP in 1961as a pre-paid health 
plan because he objected to fee-for-service health care. In 1983 FHP obtained a contract to provide 
health services for a fixed fee under the state-funded  Medicare programme for citizens aged over 65 
years. 
35 Interview: Goldsmith 6 May 2009, Willetts 4 July 2006 
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well as hospitals, to be able to opt out of district health authority(DHA) control and 
manage their own budget. The attraction for Thatcher was that “the patient would 
be able to choose between a GP who held his own budget or one who worked under 
the DHA”(Thatcher 1993:614). 
A Purchaser-Provider Split 
The Stanford University Professor Alain Enthoven was invited to England in 1984 by 
the Nuffield Trust to study the operation of the NHS. In 1985 he produced a 
suggestion for  a purchaser-provider split within the health service, to create an 
“internal market” (Enthoven 1985). This suggestion was heavily promoted by the 
sponsor, and  as part of this Enthoven met with a number of politicians and 
policymakers, including John Redwood and David Willetts from the Prime Minister's 
Policy Unit (Timmins 2001:456). Then an enterprising health authority manager, 
Alasdair Liddell36, led what became known as the "Rubber Windmill exercise"37 in 
East Anglia in which the local health service ran a mock-up of an internal market 
system. (Timmins 2001:456) 
Also in 1985 the Chairman of the new NHS Management Board which had been 
created as part of the Griffiths management reforms, took Enthoven's paper to the 
Board for discussion, so that he would prepared should it come up in subsequent 
discussion with the Prime Minister. The Board took the view that an internal market 
would be a distraction; not only was it already possible for districts to buy-in 
services, but the Board was concerned that a more complete internal market might 
revert the NHS to the pre-war situation of patients travelling long distances for 
treatment. The priority was "to deliver on the basis of agreed programmes rather 
than diverting too much attention to the study of alternative models"(Edwards and 
Fall 2005:36). This demonstrated a strong resistance to further change, even at the 
highest level within the new management structure of the NHS.  
                                                     
36 Chief Executive, East Anglian Regional Health Authority, later Director of Planning, Department of 
Health 
37 Interview: David Willetts, 4 July 2006 
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The Prime Minister's initial response to an internal market was also negative, as she 
thought that it would do little to address the Government's aim to make public 
services more responsive to their consumers(Edwards and Fall 2005:57). With the 
addition of GP Fundholding this concern was, at least partially, overcome. 
After the 1987 General Election, and before the 1988 Review was announced it 
seems that the Secretary of State for Health, if not the Prime Minister, was already 
thinking of ways in which a market might be developed in the health system. In early 
October 1987 the six DHSS ministers had a political "thinking day" at Chevening 
House.  Following the ministers’ discussion of health policy Edwina Currie recorded 
in her diary that Moore and Thatcher want: "to 'meld' the state and the private 
sector by getting the NHS to behave more like a private operator. If one has spare 
capacity, the DHA can "sell" it to others or to the private sector. They're thinking of 
Bart's which is planning to lease a whole wing to the private sector38." These initial 
thoughts from health ministers were focused on income generation by NHS 
providers, rather than on creating an internal market or otherwise empowering 
patients, but a similar scenario was developing by another means. 
People 
In the story of the genesis of the internal market I have identified just three "veto 
players" within the political arena (Tsebelis 2002); those who might realistically have 
altered the course of events and led to the production of a very different set of 
proposals for the NHS. The first, of course, is the Prime Minister, who began to take a 
very active interest in long-term reform of the NHS from 1986. The second was the 
new Secretary of State for Health and Social Services, John Moore; a  "Thatcherite" 
appointed immediately after the Conservatives 1987 General Election victory. The 
third was David Willetts, who had been acting very much in the “policy entrepreneur" 
role of the Kingdon model of agenda setting, bringing policy ideas from outside 
Government to the attention of the Prime Minister and others since 1983. 
Margaret Thatcher 
                                                     
38 Edwina Currie: Unpublished diary extract for Monday 5th October 1987 (Annexe) 
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Brian  Edwards39 , one of the new Regional General Managers of the NHS, reports that 
Thatcher's exasperation with the NHS was made very clear during a dinner with the 
NHS Regional Chairmen in September 1986: "Why is it that with all the extra 
investment, waiting lists have gone up?" She asked. According to Edwards she made it 
very clear that she was not impressed.(Edwards and Fall 2005:56) The arrival of 
reports in the mid-1980s forecasting long-term rising demands that would be placed 
on the NHS (Nicholas Bosanquet 1985a; Chew 1986)  against restrictive spending plans 
was followed from the summer of 1986 with the Prime Minister requesting ideas for 
reform from both the Department of Health (Edwards and Fall 2005:47; Thatcher 
1993) and the Centre for Policy Studies(Willetts 2006).  
By the time of drafting the 1987 election manifesto, however, the Prime Minister 
believed that she did not yet have the ideas in place: "there were still too many 
questions unanswered", and she was, anyway, reluctant to add health reform to the 
manifesto  list of areas of the welfare state proposed for fundamental reform(Thatcher 
1993:571). Thatcher held the NHS in much higher regard than she did other aspects of 
the welfare state, particularly education, which was to be targeted for reform again in 
1987, as it had been in 1979. She believed that the NHS provided enviable quality at a 
modest cost, and was happy to repeatedly defend it in a way that she could not bring 
herself to do for schools. Professor Walter Holland  recalls an incident during the 1988 
review of the NHS when David Green from the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) put 
forward ideas for an insurance-based system of healthcare: "Both Maggie [Thatcher] 
and Roy [Griffiths] slapped him down very hard and said whatever happens we never 
want to go back to pre-war conditions"40. The NHS, she believed simply: "lacked the 
right economic signals" to respond effectively to the task of balancing demand with 
the funds available(Thatcher 1993:606-607). The role of incentives was an important 
theme for Thatcher, but she was concerned in the context of healthcare that 
misplaced financial incentives could have politically disastrous effects. Willetts41  and 
Goldsmith42 both recall that she was particularly concerned that giving budgets to GPs 
                                                     
39 Regional General Manager, NHS Midlands Region 
40 Interview 26 May 2009 
41 Interview 4 July 2006 
42 Interview 6 May 2009 
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could produce moral hazards, with GPs selecting low-cost patients, or diverting NHS 
funds to their own enrichment.(Goldsmith 2009; Isom and Kandiah 2002:31).  
Goldsmith was  asked by the Downing Street Policy Unit to write a paper explaining to 
the Prime Minister why practice-level funding would not be dangerous, provided that 
any savings could be invested in the practice: "What she thought was that they'd all be 
driving around in Porsches, they'd live off their savings"43. The Prime Minister's fears 
for the potential impact on risk sharing for high-cost patients and adverse selection led 
to the fundholding scheme being initially "quite narrowly defined for only a small 
number of cold surgeries"44. 
Thatcher’s general antipathy towards the NHS, which compared well with her 
hostility to the education system and local government, was combined with strong 
support for the private alternative. This was something that, despite advice of 
potential electoral damage, she was keen to make the case for. In the closing days of 
the 1987 election campaign, in a national television interview, Thatcher responded 
to a question suggesting that in her support for private care she might be insensitive 
to the health needs of ordinary people, saying: “No, along with five million other 
people … I pay my way for private health…I pay three times: I pay my whack in taxes, 
I pay personally when I go to a doctor, and I forgo 20 per cent of my salary which falls 
back into the Treasury” (Cockerell 1988:329).  
Showing little sign of electoral fear on health policy Thatcher recalls that in the 
election campaign: “I refused to be apologetic for the fact that I used private health 
insurance to have minor operations done speedily…I was not going to back down, 
however much others around me hoped that I would stay silent on the matter in the 
interviews when it was bound to be raised … By the end of the campaign I had won 
this argument – and it was definitely worth winning” (Thatcher 1993:585). Her 
support for health insurance was to resurface again a year later, when she was to 
force the subject onto the agenda in discussions of NHS reform. It was clearly a topic 
                                                     
43 Dr Michael Goldsmith. Interview 6 May 2009 
44David Willetts MP. Interview 4 July 2006 
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on which she was passionately committed not only that she was right, but also that 
she could convince the public that she was right despite the warnings of her advisers. 
John Moore 
Thatcher clearly viewed Moore as a young, attractive face for her brand of 
Conservatism. In her memoirs she recalls appointing him as Transport Secretary in 
1986: “I had high hopes of John. He was of my way of thinking. He was conscientious, 
charming, soft spoken and in some ways he had the strengths of Cecil Parkinson – that 
is, he was right-wing, but not hard or aggressive.”(Thatcher 1993:563). Willetts also 
suggests that she may simply have seen Moore as a: "nice, good smooth PR man who 
will help to lead the case on the NHS"45. The comparison with Parkinson is particularly 
interesting, as Libby, Moore's special adviser, recalls  that Parkinson was first offered 
and rejected the post of Secretary of State at the DHSS following the 1987 election. 
According to Libby, however, Parkinson better understood the political situation in 
1987 than Moore, and realised that he was being offered a "poisoned chalice"46. The 
suggestion that Thatcher appointed Moore for his perceived presentational qualities 
rather than his Thatcherite ideological stance is reinforced by her subsequent decision 
to appoint Kenneth Clarke, a left-winger, to head the new Department of Health 
during the Review. Presentation mattered to the Prime Minister. When, after losing 
many inner city seats in the 1987 General Election, she asked Lord Young who she 
might choose to lead on inner city policy "Ken Clarke, because he looks like he lives in 
one!" he said. She laughed and agreed (Balen 1994:148). 
John Moore’s appointment to the DHSS came at a difficult time for the NHS and good 
management and presentation would be much needed. Financial difficulties within the 
NHS were mounting during 1987, but Moore interpreted these as the usual bids for 
more cash and warned the NHS Regional Chairman against “public appeals for more 
money” and used his Party Conference speech to emphasise the need for greater 
                                                     
45 Interview 4 July 2006 
46 Interview 3 June 2009 
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efficiency rather than greater funding, and to develop income generation in the NHS 
and the public-private mix in health more generally (Edwards and Fall 2005:59).  
As in 1979, the Conservatives once again had a Thatcherite minister in charge of the 
NHS. Although those who believe that appointing Moore to the DHSS was a strategic 
move on the part of Thatcher to privatise the NHS (as Moore had already led several 
privatisations in other sectors) are contradicted by close commentators, who saw this 
simply as part of her attempt in 1987 to bring on the next generation of potential 
successors to her, not least to reduce Michael Heseltine’s chances of succeeding her as 
party leader (Fowler 2008:29). Furthermore, Moore appears to have played a crucial 
role in actually bringing the NHS to the crisis point at which another fundamental 
review had become inevitable.  As a former Treasury minister he had lost none of his 
zeal for spending restraint when he joined the DHSS. Major has reported that Moore, 
in 1987 in his first annual negotiation with the Treasury took an unusual approach on 
behalf of his struggling Department and: “bid for too little money in the public 
expenditure settlement, rather than too much” (Major 1999:105). The winter crisis and 
industrial unrest that ensued led directly to the Prime Minister’s decision  for a review, 
albeit one that led  to the internal market rather than to the insurance-based systems 
that most interested Moore. 
Although the Review announcement in January 1988 was a surprise to the Secretary 
of State for Health and Social Security he was reportedly delighted, after she had 
previously turned down his requests for just such a review when he was appointed 
as Secretary of State the previous year(Thatcher 1993:608) (Lawson 1992:614). Until 
her appearance on Panorama there appears to be no evidence that the Prime 
Minister had committed herself to a fundamental review of the NHS, other than 
asking  Willetts for ideas.  
Moore’s junior health minister Edwina Currie claimed that whilst Moore might have 
hoped to use the review to produce a shift to an insurance-based market in health 
care, this was partly thwarted by her clandestine close relationship to the then Chief 
Secretary to the Treasury, John Major, who was also a member of the small 
ministerial review team(Times 2002). She said of Moore that: "If he had been a 
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stronger or cleverer politician, some of that might actually have happened"47.  
Thatcher does, however, give Moore credit for some of the ideas that emerged 
despite moving him off the review team in July 1988 before its work was complete:  
“There can be no doubt that John had made a very important contribution to 
the review. The idea of money following the patient, the distinction between 
purchasers and providers and the concept of self-governing hospitals all 
emerged in the review during his period as Secretary of State. Also he pushed 
hard for tax reliefs [on private medical insurance]…”(Thatcher 1993:614) 
Most accounts suggest that Moore’s performance as Secretary of State at the DHSS 
suffered after his winter  bout of pneumonia, leading Thatcher to split his Department 
in July 1988 leaving him with Social Security and Kenneth Clarke with Health(Timmins 
2001:460).  
Whilst Moore was fully committed to the NHS Review, and had requested just such a 
review upon his appointment, his lack of experience in health policy appears to have 
meant that he had no clear direction. David Green, from the Institute for Economic 
Affairs, was one of a number of people who were given security passes for the 
Department in order to question officials and pass ideas to Moore. Green recalls that 
nothing came of this unusual way of working48. 
 
David Willetts 
All accounts show a central role for Willetts in putting the internal market and 
general practice fundholding, and supporting the concepts thereafter. Willetts 
recruited two doctors as informal advisers, Clive Froggatt and Mike Goldsmith, to 
reinforce his arguments and demonstrate their practical viability to the Prime 
Minister. Willetts also possessed a particularly historic approach to policy, seeking to 
                                                     
47 Interview 24 May 2012 
48 Interview 28 June 2011 
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right the "wrongs" inflicted by both Bevan in 1948 and Joseph in 1974(Isom and 
Kandiah 2002:41-43).  
He and John Redwood met over lunch with Enthoven at the Nuffield Trust(Rivett 
1998:360), and Enthoven's work convinced Willetts that a funding formula that 
mitigated the risks of adverse selection if funds were held at practice level was a 
realistic endeavour49. When the Office of Health Economics held a 1985 follow-up 
meeting to the 1984 Cumberland Lodge event at which Marinker, Maynard, and 
Bosanquet all appeared to be working towards a concept of budgets held at practice 
level in primary care (Teeling-Smith 1984), Willetts was among the participants. The 
meeting heard the journalist Katherine Whitehorn describe how patients would 
increasingly require efficiency and the latest technology in general practice to be 
combined with  autonomy over their care needs. Maynard put flesh on the bones of 
the earlier idea of GP's having budgets covering both primary and secondary care, 
"competing for patients" and buying in services from both the public and private 
sector, whichever is the cheapest(Teeling Smith 1985:46). Willetts  inclusion in these 
expert discussions of GP budgets and the possible operation of an internal market 
for the NHS, and his position within the Downing Street Policy Unit put him in a 
strong position to act as a policy entrepreneur when reform of the NHS came onto 
the political agenda in late 1987.  
Conclusion 
In the case of the 1988 Ministerial review of the NHS it is clear that there was a 
confluence of Kingdon's three streams of problems, politics, and policies as a 
window of opportunity for change opened. The NHS winter crisis of 1987/88 (despite 
annual increases in health spending since 1979), coincided with the presence of a 
Prime Minister who still had a substantial majority in the House of Commons, and a 
Secretary of State at the DHSS who was keen to change the health system. It seems 
unlikely that  if any of these elements had been missing a fundamental review of the 
NHS would have taken place in the 1980s. Furthermore, Willetts played the 
important role of policy entrepreneur. Given the wide range of ideas being 
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presented to Moore it appears to have been Willetts who pressed the concepts that 
were to underlie the eventual proposals. Moore's special adviser says of Willetts that 
he was a regular visitor to the Department and that: "John Moore liked him hugely, 
rated him"50 and that this was one of the few good relationships that Moore enjoyed 
in his time at the DHSS, where he otherwise appears to have provoked some 
hostility51. When responsibility for health policy was taken from Moore in February 
1988, Willetts was in a strong position to maintain support for the internal market 
plans within the Review. 
 In a discussion of the events of late 1987 and suggestions that the NHS Review was a 
panic response to these Stephen Dorrell, who later became Health Secretary, has 
suggested that by the end of 1987 it may have been: "true that there was real public 
unease about the Health Service, and if it was also true that there were a number of 
ideas around which were felt could offer realistic improvement to the way the Health 
Service was administered, it seems to me it's actually part of the politician's art to use 
events like that to create openings for change. It's what the Americans … called 
'triangulation'; using current events to drive through processes that you see as being 
desirable"(Isom and Kandiah 2002:38) 
Willetts argues that "the political moment became ripe in late 87… there was a policy 
agenda around. We had been thinking for several years about what became known as 
the internal market, and there was a political crisis that required that we show we are 
doing something"52. If it had not been for the NHS winter crisis of 1987-88, according 
to Dorrell, it is unclear that the subsequent path of reform would have been taken: 
"Healthcare has always been an area of extreme political sensitivity, so I don't think it 
is by any means certain that anyone would grab hold of it if there wasn't a compelling 
need to do so"53. 
In terms of the direction taken Willetts has suggested a historic logic to what the 
Government was offering general practitioners, and a lack of logic in the profession's 
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51 Edwina Currie unpublished diary entry 29 November 1987 (Annexe) 
52 Interview 4 July 2006 
53 Interview 26 July 2011 
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response: Since the creation of the NHS the profession had been fearful that Bevan's 
ambition of a salaried service would eventually be fulfilled. What the Conservatives 
were offering was a settlement that would finally confirm their independence from 
the state(Isom and Kandiah 2002:37). 
The internal market built on the development of general management in the NHS 
following the Griffiths Report, which would have affected the timing of when market-
based reform became a practical possibility. Bosanquet also argues that the 
management reforms of the 1980s created an essential group of potential supporters 
for subsequent changes(Isom and Kandiah 2002:41). The decision to present "Working 
for Patients" (Dept of Health 1989b) as a revolutionary reform rather than an evolution 
from Griffiths was taken by the then Secretary of State, Kenneth Clarke, possibly as a 





7. An Introduction to the Case Studies 
The five case studies include four which produced a substantive and enduring 
change of direction. As a result  households were making a significant new 
contribution to the services that earlier generations would have received largely or 
completely free of charge. This chapter sets out to demonstrate the individual 
significance of each change, and their mutual significance within a significant 
programme of relative retrenchment on the part of the welfare state, despite 
continued growth in state spending on these services. 
The initial changes that set these services off in a new direction took  place between 
1983 and 1990, although in the case of dentistry a policy response took some six 
years to be put in place. The chronology of the changes is listed below: 
1979 
Prescription charge increased from 20p to 45p. The first increase since 1972 
1980 
Prescription charge increased to £1 
Relief on employer-provided medical insurance announced 
1983 
Means-tested Supplementary Benefit made widely available to support people in 
private residential care 
Three popular prescription medicines “switched” to pharmacy availability 
1984 
Quality regulation for residential care introduced 
Health & Social Care Act: Opticians’ monopoly on spectacle sales ended and 
advertising permitted 
1985 
NHS Limited List of black-listed medicines introduced  
NHS spectacles restricted to the poor and those with special needs 
1986 
Voucher scheme replaces NHS supply of spectacles 
1988 
NHS dental charges made proportionate to treatment costs 
Spectacle voucher scheme extended to contact lenses 
1989 
Universal free sight tests and dental checks abolished 
1990 
NHS & Community Care Act gives local authorities a duty to promote independent 
community care provision 
Tax Relief on Private Medical Insurance for Over-60s introduced 
1991 




First medicines switch guidelines 
1993 
Griffiths reforms of community care implemented, with local authorities as lead 
purchasers with a ring-fenced budget 
1994 
Range of medicines that can be switched extended 
1996 
Community care Direct Payments introduced 
“Partnership” proposals for long-term care insurance published 
NHS Dental contract shifts  focus to children, and purchaser-provider scheme pilots 
 Scale of the Shift 
The 1980s and 1990s saw large shifts in both the supply and funding of the aspects 
of care covered in the five case studies. Other than for the tax relief on private 
medical insurance(PMI), which had a limited effect on the market for PMI, these 
shifts continued beyond the 1990s in an ongoing transformation of the United 
Kingdom health system.  
 
In 1983 the NHS and local authorities accounted for 59 percent of total provision of 
long-stay beds for the elderly; in 1996 they accounted for just 20 percent (Audit 
Commission 1997). The revenue from charges for local authority placements in 
private residential care homes rose from £8 million in 1985/6 to £595 million in 
1995/6 (at 1995/6 prices), and private spending for both residential and non-
residential care rose from £354 million to £1.9 billion.  Over the same period public 
spending on residential care home fees also rose from £262 million in 1985/6 to £2.1 
billion(Burchardt 1997). In 1986 opticians stocked around 200 spectacle frames. By 
the early 1990s they often stocked 3000 or more(Fulop and Warren 1993).  
 
By 1994 the market for medicines sold in pharmacies reached £1.2bn, equivalent to 
one-third of the NHS drugs bill(Blenkinsopp and Bradley 1996). Despite increased 
charges revenues from NHS prescriptions remained below 10 percent of gross NHS 
spending on medicines throughout the 1980s and 1990s(Burchardt 1997).  
 
Privately-paid dentistry quadrupled between 1988 and 1998 to one-quarter of all 
patients. Over the same period enrollees in the private Denplan scheme rose from 
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30,000 to 900,000, and overall private dentistry revenues grew from £181m to 
£991m(Laing & Buisson 1999)  
 
By 1997, when tax relief on private medical insurance (PMI) for people aged 60 or 
over was abolished  it was said to have reached an annual cost of £110 million, 
assisting about 550,000 people(Inland Revenue 1997). Following abolition the 
proportion of this age group with PMI fell from 9.2 percent to 8.8 percent, with an 
estimated 4,000 people losing cover(Emmerson et al. 2001).  
 
Despite the scale of these changes it is important to note, however, that real-terms 
NHS spending rose steadily throughout the period: in the first Thatcher term of 
1979-83 by an average of 3.9 percent per annum, in the second term 1983-87 by 2.1 
percent per annum, in the  third 1987-92 by 3.9, and in John Major’s first full term 
1992 to 1997 by 2.4 percent per annum. These averages do, however, cover some 
significant annual fluctuations. Between 1980/1 and 1981/2 real spending growth 
fell from 10.1 percent to 2.2 percent, it was then kept low (falling to 0.2 percent in 
1985/6) prior to a jump to 4.4 percent in the pre-election year of 1986/7 and it 
stayed at around this level before falling to 0.7 percent in 1989/90, with growth as 
high as 6.4 percent in the three years of implementation of the internal market 
reforms up to the 1992 General Election (HC Debates 16 February 1998 cc492-3W).   
 
As can be seen from these figures, the changes did not achieve a seismic shift in the 
public costs of the health services, but enabled ongoing increases to be contained 
whilst the private alternative was encouraged to grow in order to deliver additional 
capacity and enhanced quality.  The case studies that follow will set out these shifts 
in more detail, although the focus is on the factors that generate the changes rather 
than their impacts, which became more significant over time. As in the discussion of 
the internal market proposals, drawing on Kingdon’s policy streams theory,  each 
case study will be used to identify the problems, people, and policies that may have 
come together to perhaps open and exploit a window of opportunity for change.  
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8. General Ophthalmic Services 
Introduction 
Whilst general ophthalmic services (GOS) may no longer  be perceived as a "core" 
part of the National Health Service, this is a relatively modern development, as this 
service has popular origins that even pre-date the creation of the NHS. It was one of 
the most developed services under the National Health Insurance system of the early 
twentieth-century, covering 12 million adults, whilst children were covered under 
the School Medical Service. (Webster 1996:368-70).  
Once the National Health Service came into being after the World War II a similar 
level of service as before was maintained. Not only were ten types of spectacle 
frames available free of charge, but a small selection of additional frames could be 
obtained for a small charge, with free NHS lenses, which became known as 
"hybrids"(ABDO 2008). This was deemed sufficient to avoid too utilitarian an image 
for the service, whilst trying to avoid an excessive boost to demand. Nevertheless, 
demand did exceed what the NHS could afford, and small charges were introduced in 
1952, but with very little effect on demand until they were raised(Webster 
1988:370-72). 
In 1956 the Guillebaud Committee Report(Guillebaud 1956) expressed regret that 
spectacle charges had been imposed, as these would present a barrier to use, and 
called for a "substantial reduction" when NHS finances allowed(Klein 2001:27). 
Additionally, a special Social Services Committee chaired by R.A.Butler54 had been 
set up by the Conservative Government after the 1955 General Election, to look at 
rising public expenditure. During its deliberations the Treasury urged the wholesale 
removal of dentistry and ophthalmology from NHS coverage. These drastic steps 
were not agreed due to the opposition of the ministers from the spending 
departments (Glennerster 2007:79). The fiscal crisis escalated, prompting the 
resignation of the whole Treasury ministerial team55 in January 1958(Harris 
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2011:426). These events were to have a lasting effect both on how spending 
negotiations would take place in future (with much greater Treasury control) and on 
the 'sound money' debate within the Conservative Party.  
In 1980 the Government included the abolition of free NHS sight tests in a Health 
Services Bill, but withdrew the proposal during the passage of the Bill, following 
substantial opposition amongst Conservative members of parliament (HC Deb 15 
May 1980 cc1761-824). At the time both the Conservative Party and the Cabinet 
were far from united over an economic strategy that was producing high inflation, 
rising taxes, rising unemployment, and spending cuts. Ian Gilmour suggested 
privately that most of Thatcher's Cabinet was against her(Young and Trewin 
2009:144), which meant that she must have had to choose her battles carefully.   
Despite the climb down over free sight tests other aspects of opticians' services were 
also attracting political attention. The widespread practice of Resale Price 
Maintenance, by which manufacturers would set minimum retail prices had been 
forbidden since 1964, as part of a general move to promote competition. The 
General Optical Council, however, avoided price competition between opticians by 
stipulating  a ban on advertising, which it actively enforced. In two reports during the 
1970s the government’s Price Commission had raised concerns over the impact of 
this restriction on the price of spectacles and on competition between 
opticians(Price Commission 1976, 1979), but no steps were taken to address it. 
Experience comparing American states that allowed optician advertising against 
those that prevented it demonstrated significant price reductions(Hailey 1980), and 
with the rise in air travel during the 1970s56 personal experiences from other 
countries were beginning to play a role in the debate over health policy. In 1979 the 
former Conservative health minister, Baroness Hornsby-Smith told the House of 
Lords that the one optician on the Maltese island of Gozo enjoyed a thriving trade in 
providing spectacles to visitors from the United Kingdom, using prescription lenses 
                                                     
56 Laker "Skytrain" offering low-cost flights to New York launched in 1977Bbc, 'That Was Then: Sir 
Freddie Laker', (2012; London: BBC, 2002).. 
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supplied from England, but selling the frames at one-third of the English price (HL 
Deb 08 November 1979 c983) 
The scope for a market in spectacles was a topic of debate amongst the ophthalmic 
profession itself. When a letter to the British Medical Journal in 1978 suggested that 
Britain should return to making reading glasses widely available in the retail sector, 
as was the case in other countries and had been before the NHS, two 
ophthalmologists wrote that this "naïve" view: "would turn back the clock in Britain 
50 years and would be responsible for loss of sight in quite a proportion of the 
elderly population"(Williamson and Doig 1978). To the contrary, however, a 
specialist from the Royal Eye Infirmary in Plymouth responded that whilst it might be 
"convenient and desirable" to combine spectacle fitting with sight testing:  "On the 
other hand is it not an unwarranted interference with personal liberty to prohibit the 
sale of ophthalmic lenses to the public? We do not prohibit the sale of many drugs 
such as aspirin, which can lead to delay in the diagnosis of serious disease and which 
can moreover do undoubted harm to the patient if wrongly used, which glasses 
never do. And should we enforce routine medical examination, cervical cytology, 
mammography, WR, ECG, EEG, and a host of other useful tests on every member of 
the public? And if we did, who is to carry out the work?" (Payne 1978) 
By 1983, however, the critical report from the Office of Fair Trading on the opticians' 
monopoly in the supply of spectacles(OFT 1982) gave the Government an 
opportunity to liberalise this particular market and begin an NHS withdrawal from 
the provision of spectacles, albeit whilst having to offer wider assurances on NHS 
sight tests, and on free spectacles for those groups who were still eligible. The Social 
Services Secretary, Norman Fowler said: "We believe that the present non-exempt 
customer will be able to obtain a wider range of glasses at comparable prices as a 
result of the proposed deregulation of the market". (HC Deb 28 November 1983 
c657). 
In the second reading debate Fowler also gave advance notice of a future voucher 
scheme for NHS spectacles: 
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"I should point out that when, as we expect, prices in the new deregulated 
market come down sufficiently, the Government would see great advantage 
in also allowing the exempt groups the right to choose more widely and 
either reimburse them or provide them with some kind of money voucher. 
This would have advantages both for the customer and the Department of 
Health. It is not at once obvious that a Government Department is best 
equipped to carry out the cosmetic role of designing spectacle frames, and 
perhaps that is one reason why there has been only one updating of NHS 
glasses since the early 1950s. (HC Deb 20 December 1983 c297)" 
Fowler viewed the Conservatives' reforms of opticians' services in the 1984 Health 
and Social Care Act as a new model for social policy that is pursued from the point of 
view of the consumer rather than producers: 
"In 1984 we ended the opticians' monopoly and taken off the ridiculous 
restrictions on advertising which prevented the public from shopping around 
for the best value. The changes had met with howls of rage from the 
profession; a host of cartoons in the press; but above all a reduction in price 
for the consumer"(Fowler 1991:197). 
In 1986 the Government said that it was indeed satisfied with the effect of 
competition on the price of spectacles and used secondary legislation57 to introduce 
a voucher scheme for children, and for adults with low incomes or complex spectacle 
needs. Henceforth the NHS might assist with the cost of purchasing spectacles, but 
would not provide its own. The vouchers came in a range of values between £2 and 
£66, determined by the complexity of the lenses needed (HC Deb 03 June 1986  
c548W). 
Private Sight Tests 
Plans to restrict entitlement to free sight tests for the first time since the creation of 
the NHS, and to make dental charges proportionate to the costs of treatment were 
                                                     
57 NHS General Ophthalmic Service Regulations 1986 (SI 1986/975)  
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included in a white paper on primary care(DHSS 1987b)58 alongside a Bill for the 
parts that required primary legislation. This policy document, published on 25th 
November 1987 was focused on improving preventative care and a new contract for 
general practitioners, so the new restrictions on sight tests seemed to sit poorly with 
its overall emphasis.  
In his statement to announce the white paper the minister for health, Tony Newton, 
presented the sight test change as a price to be paid for the other planned 
improvements in primary care. Another minister wrote in her diary that this was a 
"ghastly week" and that Newton was: "slaving away, teeth gritted, on proposals to 
charge everyone through the nose for their teeth…"59. At this stage the NHS was 
entering a severe winter crisis, that was to lead to a wholesale review of the NHS 
early in 1988. The Department of Health was under the new leadership of John 
Moore as Secretary of State, who seemed less keen than his predecessors to gain 
additional funding for the health service. 
Pushing the changes through Parliament was by no means easy for the Government, 
and the House of Lords made amendments that would have ensured the free sight 
tests were retained if they had been successful. Raison reports that: "A group led by 
Dame Jill Knight MP, and ranging across the political spectrum of the [Conservative] 
party, did all they could to get the government to accept the Lords changes, and by 
the time it came to eye tests the government's majority was down into single 
figures"(Raison 1990:165). 
Nevertheless, the Government's plans survived and were implemented under 
secondary legislation in 198960. Other measures in the 1988 legislation enabled 
health authorities to engage in "income generation" schemes. These were plans that 
John Moore had raised with the other DHSS ministers on their "thinking day" at 
Chevening House in November 198761. The aim was not only to generate income for 
the NHS, but also to assist with a change within the NHS towards a "consumer-
                                                     
58 This also included a proposal to eztend the voucher scheme to contact  lenses, which came into 
effect on 1 April 1988. 
59 Edwina Currie. Unpublished diary entry 29 November 1987 (Annexe) 
60 60 SI 1989/395 
61 Edwina Currie: unpublished Diary entry 29 November 1987 (Annexe ) 
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centred" and "professional" culture (NAO 1993). For all the dramatic changes in 
ophthalmic services, as with dentistry, the amount spent by the NHS remained 
substantial. By 1992 the NHS was still spending in real terms 80 percent of what it 
had in 1979(Timmins 2001:503). 
 
Impact on the Market for Spectacles 
Competition, however, did have dramatic market effects. The Office for Fair Trading 
reports that:  
"The deregulation of the retail spectacles market since the 1980s not only led 
to an increase in the range and quality of spectacles (from 200 frames in 1986 
to more than 3,000 and the development of features such as anti-scratch 
coating and tinted lenses), but an improvement in the quality of the service 
including increased opening hours, speed of service, and immediate 
consultations" (OFT 2009:9). 
An analysis focused more on spectacle prices, however, found the evidence 
inconclusive, with significant initial falls, but rising prices from the mid-1990s(Davies 
2004:15). The same study also found that the voucher scheme initially saw users 
choosing to pay a significant and increasing premium over the price of the least 
expensive spectacles. This peaked at a price differential of more than £70 by 1992, 
but then fell consistently until 2000(Davies 2004:17). Data does not exist to explain 
this trend reversal which might, for example, be caused by improvements in the 
quality of the lowest priced spectacles, or it might have been the case that those 
who had been paying the greatest premium gradually switched to using the voucher 
towards contact lenses instead of spectacles. 
Impact on sight testing  
The number of NHS sight tests grew rapidly during the 1980s, from 7.9 million in 
1978-9,  with a final surge to 11.9 million in 1987-88,  the financial year during which 
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the new restrictions were announced62 (HC Deb 30 January 1996 c719W). The 
subsequent fall to 10.8 million in 1989-90 when the restrictions were actually 
implemented, was followed by a jump to more than 12 million per annum thereafter 
(HC Deb 4 April 1995 c1038W), about half of which were paid for by the NHS (HC Deb 
27 January 1997 c115W).  
Currie summarises ministers' thinking on the ophthalmic changes:  
"All opticians are private businesses, and small businesses in those days … 
The feeling was if we remove the subsidy to them they'd be OK, the patients 
would be fine. These are not life-threatening circumstances we're talking 
about … When it came to opticians we thought sod it, they could do what 
they like, and indeed they have, and they've done very well since. Opticians 
gave us a lot of grief during the Bill's passage because of Jill Knight MP, whose 
husband Monty had been an optician. She harrassed us all the way through. I 
just found that exasperating because of her solid belief that the state should 
be subsidising a private activity like that. To me it was over the border.  
My expectations were based on talking to a number of opticians in my own 
patch … I said, what would you do as a 'come on' to get people into your 
shop, especially if there is another one opening down the road? And the 
answer was free eye tests. So I concluded that abandoning universal free eye 
tests under the NHS was not going to be a problem"63. 
The changes certainly had a strong effect in the short term. NHS expenditure on the 
General Ophthalmic Service fell by 30 percent in real terms between 1978/9 and 
1991/2(Bloor and Maynard 1993), but saw steady growth again from 1992/3(OHE 
2012). 
Problem 
In the 1980s the rise of a consumer culture was expected to place increasing 
demands on the NHS(Taylor 1983a). This was particularly pertinent in ophthalmic 
                                                     
62 The announcement was made in November 1987 
63 Interview: 24 May 2012 
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services, with the development of a wide range of spectacle frames and lenses. By 
the early 1980s  the UK was operating one of the most restrictive markets in 
spectacles. This had led to the concerns expressed by the Prices Commission in the 
1970s. Widespread complaints over the high price of spectacles in the United 
Kingdom led the Government to ask the Office of Fair Trading to investigate both the 
opticians’ monopoly on selling spectacles and  the General Optical Council’s ban on 
advertising. 
By 1983 the opticians’ monopoly was probably unsustainable. In a House of Lords 
debate on the Office of Fair Trading Report, Lord Rugby, who had long argued 
against the monopoly on the supply of spectacles that had been given to opticians’ 
under a 1958 Act said of opticians that: “when faced with the greatest reliance on 
these status quo tools, you comply or you go without, or, as many do, you go abroad 
to buy them. Over the years, Government have been in possession of a vast quantity 
of correspondence. Their vaults must be overflowing with complaints from the public 
on this one issue” (HL Debates 27 April 1983 c1005). 
 It is notable that the major changes of introducing competition and removing free 
sight tests coincided with particularly difficult financial years for the NHS; the Lawson 
public expenditure cuts after the 1983 General Election and mounting NHS financial 
difficulties that came to a head after the 1987 General Election. At these times the 
search for public sector economies and for sources of income was intensive. In 
responding to the April 1983 House of Lords debate on the Office of Fair Trading 
report the health minister demonstrated how complicated links existed between 
NHS spending on ophthalmics and the high price of private spectacles, as opticians 
were found to be using profits on private sales to offset declining NHS fees (HL 
Debates 27 April 1983 c1037). The loss of these sales by breaking the monopoly 
could, therefore, lead to demands to substantially increase NHS financial support to 
the General Ophthalmic Service. It would have been a major concern that dealing 





Norman Fowler, Secretary of State for Social Services 1981-87 
Fowler was widely seen as a thoughtful, strategic politician with a "political 
mind"(Balen 1994:109)and according to John Major "a safe pair of hands"(Major 
1999:87). His approach to liberalisation of general ophthalmic services reflected this, 
with a cautious incremental process of liberalisation, restrictions on NHS provision, a 
voucher scheme, and eventually the abolition of free sight tests.  
 John Moore, Secretary of State for Social Services 1987-88 
Moore arrived at the DHSS with aspirations for radical change. His ideas for co-
payments, subsidies for private medical insurance, and for the NHS to sell excess 
capacity in the open market were shared with the other health ministers at their 
"thinking day" in November 1987. Each of these ideas was pursued, even after 
Moore lost responsibility for health policy in 1988. By the time Moore took over at 
the DHSS, the private market for spectacles had already expanded, with new 
corporate chains having entered the market.  
Dame Jill Knight MP  
The opposition to changes in ophthalmic services that caused most concern for the 
Government came from its own side, led by Knight, who was MP for Birmingham 
Edgbaston from 1966 to 1997. In 1980 she had won her fight against Conservative 
proposals to remove free NHS sight tests when the appropriate legislative clause was 
suddenly withdrawn  (HC Deb 15 May 1980 c1767). Knight was made a Dame (DBE) 
in 1985. Her late husband "Monty" had been an optician.   
At the Second Reading of the Health and Medicines Jill Knight complained: 
"I must tell my hon. Friend with as much force as I can muster that it is 
insulting to tell a man who has been trained for three, four or five years at a 
university or at an eye hospital that he should give his professional, expert 
services free and make his money selling frames. That is an offensive thing to 
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say to him, that his professional expertise is worth nothing and that he must 
get his money by other means. It is particularly offensive when the 
Government themselves took away the ophthalmic opticians' customary sale 
of frames in the 1985 legislation. I listened very carefully to my hon. Friend 
this afternoon when he said that the Government had enabled people to take 
their prescriptions from the optician and go and buy their frames wherever 
they liked. That is what they do" (HC Deb 07 December 1987 c59). 
Knight voted against the Government in 1983 on the second reading of the Health 
and Social Security Bill liberalising the ophthalmic market (HC Deb 20 December 
1983 vol 51 cc366-367) and in the November 1988 vote to put the abolition of free 
sight tests back into the legislation after  the House of Lords had removed this from 
the Bill. The Government majority was reduced to eight64 (HC Deb 01 November 
1988 cc959-60). Knight had worked hard over the summer to prepare the ground for 
this rebellion, and an Early Day Motion that she had tabled calling for free sight tests 
to be kept gathered the signatures of 60 Conservative MPs. Knight says that 
Government Whips threatened her that she would be removed from her role as 
Vice-Chairman of the Conservative MPs’ powerful 1922 Committee, which she was, 
and as Chairman of the Health Committee, which she was not(Knight 1995:168-171). 
Policies 
Market liberalisation had long been a core theme for the Conservatives, and a retail 
market without price competition would have raised concerns in 1979. In this case, 
however, the Conservatives had to balance the need to satisfy the demands of 
consumers for better value spectacles against the risk that NHS opticians would 
require higher state funding in order to maintain a universal General Ophthalmic 
Service. Policies needed to address both a consumer and a fiscal goal. 
                                                     
64 The Government's majority in the House of Commons following the 1987 General Election 




Vouchers had become a key theme for the public choice economists of the Institute 
of Economic Affairs. They had been arguing the case for voucher schemes, 
particularly in education, since the 1950s, but had been met with practical objections 
once a "new right" government had been elected in 1979(Arthur Seldon 1986). 
Ophthalmics provided an opportunity to experiment. According to Willetts this was 
"a conscious decision to be radical, because it looked like quite a defined area where 
you could carry out a bold experiment"65. Heavily restricted eligibility for NHS 
spectacles since 1984 meant that a voucher scheme would not carry the 
"deadweight costs"66 associated with their use in education or medical care. 
Discussion 
As Klein notes, a cautiously incremental policy of privatisation: "fell most heavily on 
those services which – rightly or wrongly – have been perceived since the 1950s as 
most marginal to the purposes of the NHS: dental and optical charges"(Klein 
2001:137) 
In this case there was a clear incremental strategy on the part of ministers, that 
amounted to something more than muddling with a purpose. In 1983, whilst 
liberalising the retail market for spectacles, Fowler also suggested that if the 
liberalisation worked well and prices fell then the Government would consider a 
voucher scheme for those who remained eligible for NHS spectacles HC Deb 20 
December 1983 Col 297). Before a voucher scheme could be introduced, eligibility 
for taxpayer support had first to be restricted, and supply-side competition 
developed. This competition then also allowed the Government to withdraw free 
sight tests believing that competing opticians would wish to continue to offer tests 
as an important part of the process of selling spectacles and contact lenses. 
Whilst opticians services might now be regarded as peripheral to the NHS, at the 
beginning of the liberalisation process this was by no means the case. As a 
                                                     
65 Interview: 4 July 2006 
66 Diverting public funds to those who would have willingly bought the product without the subsidy. 
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demonstration of the former it is telling how little this privatisation is covered in the 
histories of the NHS by Timmins, Klein and Rivett. A measure of the importance 
attached to NHS opticians services in 1983 is demonstrated by contributions to the 
House of Commons second reading debate on the Health and Social Security Bill. The 
Shadow Secretary of State, Michael Meacher MP, described the legislation in 
dramatic terms: 
"This is a mean, nasty, spiteful and authoritarian Bill from an increasingly 
mean, nasty, spiteful and authoritarian Government … there is one common 
thread running through all the unrelated elements … I refer to the piece by 
piece mutilation of the welfare state. …  Clause 1 is a classic example of Right-
wing Tory dogma in dismembering part of the NHS into its basic services only, 
while privatising as much as possible of the profitable elements in order to 
open up new markets for the Tory party's big business friends … It is no 
matter to the Secretary of State, as he sits there smiling, that NHS frames, by 
being restricted to the poor, will become stigmatising as a badge of poverty 
for adults" (HC Debates 20 December 1983 cc304-305) 
Ernie Roberts MP said:  
"The Secretary of State becomes fouler and fouler in his privatisation 
schemes for the Health Service. The Tory Government, not satisfied with the 
murderous attacks that they have made on hospital services, are now 
determined to make the public pay through their eyes by making them pay 
more for eye care. About 3 million people will be deprived through the 
operation of the Bill. Those who suffer most will be people, such as those 
whom I represent, who are already beaten down into poverty by the 
Government".(HC Deb 20 December 1983 vol 51 c342) 
The most significant barrier to change, however, came from the Conservative 
backbenches and despite its significant majority in the House of Commons in 1987 
the Government came close to defeat on the legislation to introduce charges. They 
had already experienced this in May 1980; withdrawing the plans the Minister for 
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Health, Gerard Vaughan emphasised the role of Conservative pressure: "This is an 
important matter. In no way do we wish to create a deterrent for people seeking eye 
testing who need treatment. Representations were made—in many cases strong 
representations—by my right hon. and hon. Friends and people outside the House, 
but I am not aware that strong representations were being made by Opposition 
Members". (HC Deb 15 May 1980 c1781). The lost revenue would be recouped 
through other NHS charges. In fact, the clause dealing with charges was withdrawn 
at the last minute, after Jill Knight had visited the Table Office of the House of 
Commons to lay an amendment. According to the Speaker at the start of the debate: 
"We cannot pursue that now. It just disappeared"   (HC Deb 15 May 1980 c1761). 
Factors that supported change in this case, however, may have been threefold. 
Firstly, there was a very strong imperative to focus NHS resources where they were 
most needed. Currie commented, for example, that on sight tests "these are not life-
threatening circumstances"67 and Bottomley emphasised that these were not on the 
list of things, like accident and emergency services, that the NHS must provide68. 
David Green, from the Institute of Economic Affairs, comments that whilst 
privatisation was the Government's "default action" this did not apply to the NHS 
except for dentistry and eye care: "They were both heading for privatisation. I 
remember that more or less taken for granted, or feeling it wasn't a problem"69. 
Secondly, the Government had a strong belief in market forces and the rise of 
consumerism, allied with the knowledge that the United Kingdom was a restrictive 
market compared to other countries. They could, therefore, make confident 
predictions of the market response to liberalisation and NHS retrenchment. 
Thirdly, an opportunity existed to raise quality. There was little evidence that 
competition or the withdrawal from universal sight tests would cause harm to 
people's sight, and developments in spectacles and contact lenses were presenting 
new consumer opportunities. 
                                                     
67 Interview: 24 May 2012 
68 Interview: 20 March 2006 
69 Interview: 28 June 2011 
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Bosanquet highlights the ophthalmic market as one in which "a combination of  
technical change favouring new kinds of customer, deregulation, and a very strong 
provider group" came  together to provide a successful outcome70. The comparison 
with what was to happen in dentistry, however, would be instructive. In ophthalmics 
a carefully managed incremental approach managed to create a situation in which  
rapid private sector growth was enabled, and consumerist demands on the NHS 
minimised. The final steps in restricting the NHS to a core service for those with 
either the most limited resources or the greatest clinical need were not taken until it 
was clear that a network of NHS opticians would continue to exist on the high street 
without additional funding.  
 
                                                     
70 Interview: 12 May 2009 
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9. Long-Term Care of the Elderly 
Introduction 
Writing in the mid-1990s Pearson and Wistow identify: "A silent, if not surreptitious, 
shift in the balance between state and individual responsibilities for funding long term 
care that has taken place over the past 15 years" (1995). A key part of this shift, 
according to Rivett, was that: "The NHS was ceasing to see, as part of its function, the 
provision of accommodation for frail, elderly people" (1998:321). In the words of the 
Audit Commission the NHS had: "narrowed its role to that of a provider of acute care" 
(Audit Commission 1997:13). 
Until the early 1980s the NHS and local authorities had been seeking ways to build 
capacity to meet demand for the ongoing care of the elderly who were unable to cope 
at home but who did not require the acute treatment facilities of an NHS hospital. 
Henceforth, from 1983, the state appears to have sought both to reduce its role as a 
provider of accommodation for these people, and then to limit its financial liability to 
fund their ongoing care within the context of an ageing population. The change of 
approach took place in the 1980s, although its implementation was largely delayed 
until the 1990s. 
The section that follows summarises developments leading up to 1983 changes in the 
Supplementary Benefits system that prompted dramatic growth in voluntary and 
private sector provision of residential care, and highlights the consequences 
thereafter.  
1948-1983  Building Capacity for Elderly Care 
At the beginning of the modern welfare state the public sector did not possess 
anything like the infrastructure required in terms of hospital, hostel, and asylum 
beds. By 1953 some 15-20 percent of hospital beds were blocked by patients suitable 
to be discharged but needing other accommodation (HC Deb 13 Nov 1953 Col.1366). 
There was, therefore, extensive recourse to contracts with voluntary providers of 
128 
 
accommodation. The National Health Service was also beginning to employ specialist 
geriatricians to lead an initiative to rehabilitate elderly patients to prepare them for 
discharge from hospital, rather than leave them in long-stay wards. As can be seen 
from the quotation below the concept of a service to attempt to rehabilitate these 
patients was novel  
It is notable in consideration of how boundaries have shifted in this case that the frail 
elderly were seen as "chronic sick" as distinct from the "medical sick", whereas over 
time a less generous "social 
care" and "health care" 
distinction has been 
developed; the use of the 
term "social care" brings the 
care within the scope of 
means-tested social security 
rather than within the ambit 
of freely-provided health care.  
Much of the early policy was driven by a repulsion at the continued reliance upon old 
workhouses as local authority hostels for the elderly and mentally ill, and a desire to 
provide more appropriate care. Wider awareness of conditions in these places 
eventually generated serious demands for better standards of care. Townsend's 
survey of residential care (Townsend 1962) was hugely influential, throwing light on 
conditions that the public and policymakers were either unaware of or ignoring. This 
was followed by the 1967 "Sans Everything" report (B. Robb 1967), which revealed 
appalling treatment of the elderly and mentally ill in long-stay institutions. After the 
publication of these reports both Townsend and Robb were active in campaigning 
for substantive change. Pressure for improvement in the quality of care, however, 
came on top of the increasing pressure on capital funding to meet longstanding 
plans to increase the quantity of elderly care. This included the progressive closure 
of old workhouses (HC Deb 11 July 1967 Col 549). At the end of the 1960s demands 
for change were reinforced following the official report from an Inquiry into the 
Early Days of "Geriatric" Care 
House of Commons 1953 
Miss Patricia Hornsby-Smith (Con. Health Minister):  
Nearly all the regional hospital boards have now a specialist 
geriatrician whose task it is to see that these services are 
extended and provided throughout the area under his 
control. 
Mr Reginald Paget QC (Lab): What is a geriatrician?  
Miss Hornsby-Smith: The opposite to a pediatrician. It is 
someone specialising in the care of the old.  
(HC Deb 13 November 1953 c 1361) 
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treatment of patients at Ely Hospital, Cardiff71(Howe 1969). Nevertheless, concerns 
over the "warehousing" of people with long-term care needs persisted into the 
1970s(Miller and Gwynne 1972). Bosanquet recalled working on nurses pay for the 
Prices and Incomes Board at the time and asking a Ministry of Health official to 
suggest a good mental health hospital that he should visit, only to be told "there are 
no good ones"72. 
Lack of Co-ordination 
As well as problems in the quantity and quality of care, there have also been 
perennial problems associated with poor co-ordination between the state agencies 
involved, prompting repeated ministerial intervention. In September 1965, for 
example, the Ministry of Health sent a "Memorandum on the Care of the Elderly in 
Hospitals and Residential Homes" to hospitals and local authorities. According to 
ministers they thus: "restated in more definite terms the responsibilities which both 
partners ought generally to accept. But it went further. It also contained a final 
section advocating joint planning and joint operation of the two services, and it 
suggested in detail administrative arrangements for achieving these objectives"(HL 
Deb 15 November 1966 c1249-56). Successive governments were to repeat this 
message over the decades that followed. 
Local Authority social services spending on residential care of the elderly increased 
only slightly between 1975/6 and 1978/9 (HC Deb 18 June 1980  cc557W), but by 
1977 there were 108,000 residents aged over 65 in local authority homes and 24,000 
in private homes (HC Deb 26 March 1979 c27W). Restrictions on public spending, 
particularly within capital budgets, following the economic crisis of 1975-6 meant 
that local authorities had to curtail investments in homes for the elderly, but were 
also reluctant to spend their current budgets on places in homes within the 
voluntary sector.(Timmins 2001:414) This meant that the longstanding problems 
associated with capacity were very real by the time of the 1979 General Election. 
                                                     
71 This revealed treatment that was so bad that civil servants in Cardiff and London attempted to 
prevent the Minister, Richard Crossman, from seeing the full report. He only did so due to the 
insistence of the Chairman of the Inquiry, Geoffrey Howe QC, and the Minister's Special Adviser, 
Brian Abel-Smith (Geoffrey Howe, Conflict of Loyalty (London: Macmillan, 1994).:42) 
72 Interview 12 May 2009 
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In 1979 the new Conservative Government remained committed to pursuing the "joint 
financing" scheme, that had been created by Labour in 1976; to use NHS funds to 
support patients' transition to external accommodation from NHS hospitals in joint 
local initiatives with local authorities, and a process of gradual handover through a 
tapering mechanism. In March 1983 the Government issued Guidance to health and 
local authorities to give a further boost to joint finance initiatives, supported by 
£11.5m of central funding. (HL Deb 14 March 1983 cc591-2WA). Such was the scale of 
the problem of capacity that in the first Thatcher term the Government began pilot 
schemes for the development of NHS nursing homes, although little came of this as it 
was not developed more widely. Even in 1992 the Kings Fund was still calling for this 
to take place as part of a solution to the on-going problem. (BMJ 1992). 
Until 1983 the public sector provided most of the care that it funded; the NHS 
provided acute, community and long-stay beds, and local authority social services 
offices provided residential, day, and domiciliary (home) care. Additionally local 
authority housing departments provided housing with support(Audit Commission 
1997:10).  
Supplementary Benefit and Care Home costs 
The economic circumstances around 1979 left many voluntary-sector homes facing 
financial difficulties, and individual providers started to seek discretionary support for 
their residents' fees from social security offices (Timmins 2001:414). In 1983, however, 
the Government opened floodgates for the expansion of private sector residential care 
provision, by using a Statutory Instrument to clarify the terms and limits for recourse 
to centrally-financed Supplementary Benefit to pay these accommodation costs(DHSS 
1983a). Local authorities' use of discretionary powers under the National Assistance 
Act 1948 had been rising during the 1970s, to reach a total of £39 million a year by 
1983, assisting 16,000 people. Klein says that in 1983:  
"the Department decided to stop the creep. Each local social security office 
was asked to set a limit for the weekly payments, based on the highest 
reasonable charge for the area. The result was precisely the opposite of that 
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intended. The maxima quickly became the minima. More importantly, what 
had previously been a low-visibility, discretionary payment overnight turned 
into a highly visible, as-of-right entitlement"(Klein 2001:134). 
This support through Supplementary Benefit was available to anyone who qualified in 
terms of an  income and capital assessment, with no regard to their clinical or social 
needs. It was also  only available for residential care, and not for NHS, domiciliary or 
day care. Supplementary Benefit was centrally funded and not by local government, 
and also did not come within the departmental spending  limits of the DHSS as these 
benefits were demand-led by items such as unemployment.  
During the remainder of the 1980s the independent sector in long-stay elderly care 
grew rapidly. By 1987 it accounted for the majority of this type of care. According to 
Day & Klein this dramatic growth can be put down to the 1983 "policy blunder" on 
Supplementary Benefit rather than any consumer-driven process or government 
strategy (1989:16). Timmins claims that the Government simply failed to estimate the 
impact of its decision within the context of an ageing population, which led private and 
voluntary care home to become the leading source of growth in public spending 
(Timmins 2001:414).  
Day and Klein argue that government actions since 1983, show that it has continuously 
sought to escape its obligations on residential care and to limit the costs of the 
Supplementary Benefit change. These, they say, demonstrate that there was no 
"simple ideological moral" driving policy(Day and Klein 1989), particularly as the 
Government also engaged in steps that raised the costs of private providers, notably 
the imposition in 1984 of new quality standards on residential care providers(Day and 
Klein 1985). Indeed, Klein asserts that private sector provision would have risen 
regardless of what was happening within state funding and provision, given 
demographic change and rising household wealth in the 1980s(Day and Klein 1989).  
Against the accusations of blunder and miscalculation it was clear that Conservative 
ministers in the DHSS did have a strong desire to support the voluntary sector. In 1981, 
for example, the Government said: "The primary sources of care for elderly people are 
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informal and voluntary … It is the role of local authorities to sustain and where 
necessary develop – but never to displace – such support and care. Care in the 
community must increasingly mean care by the community" (DHSS 1981a:3). Ensuring 
the survival of voluntary sector providers was, therefore, central to Conservative plans 
for the future of the welfare state. Their failure would have done huge damage to 
these plans at the outset. In fact, the number of private and voluntary sector nursing 
and residential care beds grew by 242 per cent between 1983 and 1996(Audit 
Commission 1997:10). Early action had to be taken, however, to ensure that this 
rapidly growing cottage industry73, was not profiteering74 from Supplementary Benefit 
proceeds. 
Wistow points to a strong "anti-statist" approach in the first Conservative term. The 
two documents "Care in Action"(DHSS 1981b) and "Growing Older"(DHSS 1981a) have 
been described as the "high water mark of an anti-statist bias"(Wistow 1988). For local 
authorities the 1983 decision on Supplementary Benefit Regulations meant that they 
faced less pressure to find capital resources to directly meet their statutory obligations 
under Part III of the National Assistance Act (1948) to provide accommodation for 
those who need it(often known as "Part III Accommodation), but could do so indirectly 
through the use of Supplementary Benefit which was centrally-funded by the DHSS. 
Timmins refers to an "unforeseen effect" of nationalising the funding of care home 
accommodation which had previously (with limited uptake) been almost wholly 
dependent upon private fees paid directly by residents. For NHS hospitals too, wishing 
to reduce bed-blocking and the need for long-stay geriatric wards, this was also a 
significant breakthrough due to the boost to private-sector capacity (Timmins 
2001:424).  
                                                     
73 Corporate providers amounted to just 3.7 of residential care home places in 1989 Laing & Buisson, 
Laing and Buisson (1989), Care of Elderly People Market Survey 1989/90 (London: Laing & Buisson, 1989). 
74 A random survey of individual care home finances in the 1980s demonstrated huge variations in 
profitability.Irvine Lapsley and Sue Llewellyn, 'Government Policy and the Changing Market in 
Residential Care for the Elderly: A Financial Analysis of the Private Sector', Financial Accounfability & 




The number of NHS hospital geriatric beds had been static during the 1970s, but fell by 
almost 20 per cent during the following decade and a further 40 per cent during the 
1990s (Crisp 2002).  The chart shows the fall in NHS elderly beds in general wards 
against the growth in private nursing home places (Audit Commission 1997:12). The 
costs to the state of residential care rose from £39 million in 1982 to £489 million in 
1986, and continued to grow rapidly thereafter (Higgins 2004:156). 
According to Bottomley, part of this shift away from NHS provision was brought 
about by health authorities choosing to buy places in nursing homes; meanwhile 
social services were also moving people into private homes: "It was amazing that 
more people didn't realise  what was going on, but it meant that by the time their 
successors came along there were no longer the beds in the health service, and the 
health service did not pay for their care75". 
Sir Roy Griffiths' Report on Community Care  (1988) 
Following the Griffiths Report on NHS Management (Griffiths 1983) Sir Roy Griffiths 
became a regular adviser to Thatcher, with sufficient influence over the Prime 
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Minister that the Health Secretary threatened to resign in 1986 if this position 
became formalised at 10 Downing Street (Gorsky 2010:20). In December 1986 
Griffiths was commissioned to undertake another inquiry, this time into the use of 
public funds in community care. 
The Griffiths Inquiry was by no means the only thorough consideration of the 
situation in community care at the time. The decision to turn to Griffiths for a second 
time followed a damning report from the Audit Commission on the situation in the 
provision of community care(Audit Commission 1986). The Firth Report and Wagner 
Report were completed whilst the Griffiths  Inquiry was underway. The Firth Report 
had come to the conclusion that public funding should be channelled through local 
authorities(DHSS 1987a), and the Wagner Report that residential care should form a 
"positive choice" within a spectrum of care, rather than form a default option for 
long-term care(Wagner 1988).  
During the Griffiths Review a pamphlet from the influential Conservative think tank, 
the Centre for Policy Studies, saw potential community care reforms as a pathfinder 
for an internal market in the NHS, saying: "Whatever conclusions the Griffiths Inquiry 
comes to it will probably recognise that although it partly arose by accident, the 
growth in social security-financed private provision for the elderly, mentally ill, and 
handicapped should be maintained: Indeed, it could be a useful precedent for other 
parts of the NHS"(Peet 1987:21) 
For all the Conservatives' concerns, therefore, Griffiths recommendations for local 
authorities to become an enabling authority, and to offer people more involvement 
and choice in decision making fitted well with the ideology of the time. Nevertheless, 
the arrival of the report in early 1988 coincided with the start of the ministerial 
review of the NHS, and it is unsurprising that the Government took more than a year 
to develop its proposals for community care. 
Thus it was not until 1989 that the Government finally found an acceptable (partial) 
solution, based upon local authorities acting as purchasers within an open market for 
community care provision, with needs and means tests restricting access to state 
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funding; but the system would not be fully implemented until 1993. The 
longstanding veto on change, despite the obvious costs of delay, had been the Prime 
Minister, for whom giving the purchasing role to local authorities grated with her 
foremost concern to diminish the role of such state bureaucracies.(Timmins 
2001:475). Her Government had, for example, taken powers to cap local authority 
rates in 1984, abolished the Greater London Council (GLC) in 1986, and introduced 
an Education Reform Act in 1988 that encouraged schools and colleges to "opt out" 
of local authority control. The new system was set out in a white paper in 1989(Dept 
of Health 1989c) and included within the 1990 NHS & Community Care Act.  
Bottomley emphasises the importance to gaining Cabinet support for the community 
care reforms of moving funding from an open-ended Supplementary Benefit 
commitment to a ring-fenced budget: "By transferring the funds and ring-fencing 
them, then it was possible to give people a domiciliary package; three home helps a 
week instead of a nursing home has actually achieved value for money"76. 
The rapid growth in private and voluntary residential care provision was finally 
halted once the NHS and Community Care Act (1990) came into effect on 1st April 
1993. By then local authority social services departments were expected to have a 
plan in place to take the lead responsibility for arranging social care, based on a clear 
assessment of individual needs. The change was supported by additional capped and 
ring-fenced central funding through a Special Transitional Grant. Shifting the focus 
away from residential care, the new arrangement applied equally to all types of 
care(Audit Commission 1997:11). 
Alongside this new regime for means-tested "social care" the NHS continued to 
withdraw from the continuing care of the elderly. This was a point that was 
highlighted by the Health Service Commissioner in 199477, following a complaint 
from a woman whose 55-year old brain-damaged husband had been discharged 
from NHS care and into a private nursing home despite requiring on-going care. The 
                                                     
76 Interview 20 march 2006 
77 The patient was actually discharged in September 1991, prior to the community care aspects of the 
recent NHS & Community Care Act coming into force, although this is unlikely to have affected the 
clinicians' decisions in the case.  
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NHS, the Commissioner had found, had withdrawn too far; this indictment resulted 
in the health authority refunding the fees incurred(HSC 1994), and further 
Department of Health Guidance to health authorities on NHS Responsibilities in such 
situations(Dept of Health 1995).  
The story of long-term care is ongoing. Following the 1997 General Election the new 
Labour Government created another inquiry, in the form of a Royal Commission, 
which reported in 1999(TSO 1999), and when a Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
coalition came to power in 2010 it established the Dilnot Commission on long-term 
care funding, which reported in July 2011(TSO 2011). 
Whilst concerns over standards of care and cost-shifting continue, the focus has 
moved onto issues related to the private costs of long-term care needs. The 1980s 
shift towards the independent provision of care, is now well established. In the 
section that follows I will once again apply Kingdon's three policy streams to consider 
the problems, people and policies that might have brought this shift about. Analysis 
of the genesis of the 1983 change of direction in the provision of elderly care is 
limited to a very small number of variables as the initial change itself was so small. It 
is, perhaps, the most extreme example of how simple a change of path can be, even 
if the repercussions are far from simple.  
Problems 
An Insufficient Supply of Care 
The first issue facing the Conservatives was the very limited capacity to provide 
residential care against the rising needs of an ageing population. Dorrell recalls: 
"When I first became an MP in 1979 one of the aspects of caseloads that used to be 
a regular event in my constituency surgery was people who had elderly dependent 
relatives who wanted to get them into care home settings; couldn't afford private 
nursing homes and, therefore, there was a waiting list for local authority Part III 
accommodation"78. 
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Costs of community care 
 A central concern for the Treasury was that social security spending on residential 
care rose from £10 million in 1979 to £2,072 million in 1991(Glennerster 2007:208). 
This did, however, enable the NHS to withdraw from the expensive provision of long-
stay geriatric beds. In 1982 the weekly cost of a long-stay bed in an NHS hospital was 
£222, compared to £118 in a private nursing home despite the fact that people of 
equal dependency would be found in each mode of care(AJ Culyer and Birch 
1985:479). Nevertheless, this was an area of rapidly rising public expenditure, at a 
time when the Government was committed to reducing the burden of taxation. 
Cost Shifting 
The 1983 change in the Supplementary Benefit Regulations certainly did not improve 
the situation in terms of ensuring that people would receive appropriate care. Once 
recourse to central Supplementary Benefit funding became available for the 
purchase of residential care in the independent sector both the NHS and local 
authorities had a strong financial incentive to use this facility. 
The boundary between the responsibilities of the NHS to provide free health care 
and those of local authorities to ensure access to means-tested social care has 
remained problematic even after social services departments had taken on a lead 
role following the 1988 Griffiths Report, and implemented in 1993. In 1997 the Audit 
Commission said that: "The first legacy of the 1980s that needs managing is the 
change to the cut off point at which the NHS stops providing care" (Audit 
Commission 1997;12). Both the NHS and social services departments were under 
severe pressure at this time, and the political priority for the NHS was to manage 
waiting times ahead of the impending general election. 
Bottomley stresses that Griffiths was very aware of the difficulty that social care is 
means tested and NHS care free at the point of use, creating perverse incentives for 
households and hospitals: "families want to keep their near ones in hospital as long 
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as possible because it is free; the health service will do anything it can to get them 
off their books and into social care where there is a means assessment"79. 
The growth of the private sector and increasing availability of residential care, 
however, brought the costs to households of means-tested support to the centre of 
political debate. The Conservatives had pursued the creation of a property-owning 
democracy, but means tested care in old age meant that property wealth played an 
increasing part in the means test, and properties were being sold to pay care fees. 
For the Conservatives this seemed to punish the prudent. At the Selsdon Park 
meeting of Heath's shadow cabinet prior to the 1970 General Election, Quentin Hogg 
had set out this concern in relation to disability benefit claims by the elderly:  "If you 
are old and have not made provision, I think you are to blame. Every person ought to 
recognise that by the time he is 70 he will have arthritis or something else" 
(Conservative Party 1970:10). In dealing with the care capacity problem in the 1980s, 
the Conservatives had fuelled the rise of a lasting new problem over the private cost 
of care.  
People 
Norman Fowler 
Fowler had been DHSS spokesman in Opposition, and retained the portfolio in 
government from 1981 to 1987. He was admired by Thatcher, not least because he 
had urged her mentor, Keith Joseph, to stand against Heath for the leadership(Balen 
1994:109). Although not a "wet" Fowler was deeply unhappy with the Chancellor's 
wholehearted focus on tax cuts from 1983, supporting a more "balanced approach" 
to tax and spending policy: "I did not threaten to resign, but I did make it clear that I 
would not endorse changes I could not justify"(Fowler 1991:202). Fowler embarked 
on a wholesale review of the social security system, beginning with plans to replace 
the State Earnings-Related Pensions Scheme (SERPS)80 with a system based on tax-
relief for all private pensions, in addition to occupational pensions. Additionally, both 
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Fowler and Thatcher favoured a system that would make pensions 
compulsory(Lawson 1992:592).  
Fowler's tense relationship with the Treasury continued, given their fears over the 
potential costs of pension tax relief. Indeed, one of his own ministers had passed 
information on his social security plans to the Treasury, and when John Major was 
appointed as a DHSS minister, coming from the Whips Office, in 1985 Fowler was 
concerned that he was placed there as a "Whips' nark".(Major 1999:86-87) On 25th 
February 1985 a Cabinet committee was due to discuss Supplementary Benefits, but 
it emerged that the Treasury was seeking £2 billion of savings within two years from 
Fowler's review. Fowler cancelled the meeting, and the Treasury was eventually 
forced to concede before the social security review's green paper (DHSS 1985a)was 
published, but the total replacement of SERPS was abandoned by the time of the 
subsequent white paper (DHSS 1985b). Fowler had to agree to a more modest 
proposal, with no universal tax-incentivised replacement: "As long as I live I will 
regret having to abandon our plans to give an occupational pension to every worker 
in the country".(Fowler 1991:220-222) 
Fowler evidently carried more weight with the Treasury than many departmental 
ministers. Lawson expresses concern that Fowler was shifting the emphasis of social 
security support away from the elderly, and onto families with children, not only 
because this "ran clean counter to the moral sense of the nation", but also because 
"any upsurge of popular feeling about pensioner hardship was bound to lead to 
renewed pressure for a general increase in the basic state pension, over and above 
indexation". Nevertheless, he did not argue against Fowler's general strategy on this 
shift as the battle over SERPS was a priority, and Lawson comments: "Whether it 
would have made any difference if I had is more doubtful"  (Lawson 1992:595-596) 
Nigel Lawson 
According to Fowler: "From the start of his Chancellorship, Nigel Lawson made no 
secret of the fact that his ambitions were tax reform and lower taxes. Almost his first 
action was a post-election dawn raid in July 1983 on departmental budgets. The raid 
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netted him £500 million and over the next few weeks he made his strategy clear. He 
believed that lower taxes were the route to higher growth and more jobs " Due to 
the scale of spending by the DHSS, the largest of any department, Fowler remarks 
that: "It needed no great powers of prophecy to realize that Nigel and I were on a 
collision course".(Fowler 1991:202). John Biffen, the Leader of the House of 
Commons, told a journalist at the time that he thought Lawson was "mad" wanting 
ongoing public spending cuts and everything put into tax cuts(Young and Trewin 
2009:193). 
Lawson’s battle with Fowler over the latter’s demands for tax-breaks to encourage 
people to opt-out of the State Earnings Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) was rooted 
in a firm belief that the tax system should be neutral, rather than attempt to steer 
individuals' or firms' behaviour. Tax cuts should be easier within a neutral system 
than within a complex regime, as there would be fewer losers from the removal of 
tax breaks, but widespread gainers. (Lawson 1992:335). A proposal that the system 
should, therefore, be used to provide new support to pensions would have been 
anathema to the Chancellor. Lawson blames Fowler for persuading him to provide 
"excessively favourable" tax breaks for those who contracted out of SERPS(Lawson 
1992:370), which lay at the root of a subsequent scandal involving the selling of 
private pensions to people who should have remained within SERPS.  
Policies 
Purchaser-Provider 
By appointing Griffiths for a second time in 1986 the Government would have once 
again been expecting a managerial solution to the problems of long-term care. By 
the time of the Griffiths Inquiry into community care Enthoven had already written 
his influential article proposing an internal market mechanism for the NHS(Enthoven 
1985), and the Conservatives were working on plans for a similar system for schools. 
The real challenge for Griffiths was to determine who should be the lead purchaser 
of community care. Thatcher's opposition to giving greater powers to local 
authorities is sometimes cited to explain the Government's slow response to 
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Griffiths(Raison 1990:180), but this would have been offset by restricting their role 
to that of an "enabling authority" and insisting that the bulk of the additional funding 
would be spent in the private sector(Glennerster 2007:208). The "enabling" role 
chimed with proposals made by the Environment Secretary, a close ally of Thatcher, 
in a timely (for Griffiths) pamphlet from the Centre for Policy Studies(Ridley 1988). 
By the time Griffiths was commissioned to investigate community care a mixed 
market of supply had been developed, with substantial growth in the private sector. 
Without this proposals for a purchaser-provider separation would not have been a 
viable option. Dorrell notes that this had "started as a way of relieving pressure in 
the social care sector" before developing later in the health sector81.  
A similar approach was taken with the introduction of community care "Direct 
Payments" in 1996; a voucher scheme through which those assessed as needing 
routine non-residential care could select and purchase this for themselves. The then 
health minister, John Bowis, told the House of Commons at its second reading: 
"One of the principal aims of community care is to enable people to cope 
with their problems of disability or frailty so that they can remain in their own 
homes whenever that is feasible and sensible, and they wish to do so. Making 
that possible is the challenge to families, informal and formal carers, local, 
private, voluntary and public organisations and agencies. Today, we are 
taking a further significant step down the road of responding to people's 
wishes and enabling them to lead as normal a life as possible. Direct 
payments are a natural progression in community care towards that aim, 
giving users more control and more choice. They put the people who need 
community care services in the driving seat and allow them to make 
important decisions about how their needs are met” (HC Deb 06 March 1996 
c372).  
The Minister made it clear that the restriction to people with disabilities aged under 
65 was just an initial step before the scheme was widened (ibid.c375). Again, this 
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could be seen as a move in a new direction, towards similar developments thereafter 
within the NHS, made possible by the introduction of a separation of purchasers and 
providers(Hockley 2007). Indeed, this was one of the concerns expressed  by Alan 
Milburn82 in the debate on the Bill, given that it was an "enabling" Bill whose 
coverage could be amended by ministers without primary legislation. He called on 
the Minister to:" make it clear that direct payments are to be used for social care 
services only, and will not be used as a substitute for health service responsibilities. 
That distinction is vital, since otherwise direct payments received by disabled people 
will be means-tested even if they have to be used to purchase services that they 
should be receiving free of charge" (ibid. c430). 
Supplementary Benefit Regulations 
Fowler may not have accurately forecast how successful the 1983 regulations would 
be in supporting the ailing voluntary and independent sectors, but he achieved his 
ambition of developing a diverse supply of care outside of the NHS and local 
government, and increasing overall capacity. In response to accusations of 
subsidising private sector care homes the Minister replied in 1984 that the 
Government desired "to encourage the voluntary sector" adding that if limits on 
boarding fees had not been raised: "we could not have found places for patients" 
(HC Deb 10 July 1984 c866). The existence of a policy to favour growth in the 
independent sector, and to allow the relative decline of local authority Part III 
accommodation is also suggested by the fact that in 1983 the capital disregard with 
respect to eligibility for Supplementary Benefit for those in independent care homes, 
at £2500 was more than double that for those in local authority accommodation 
despite representations calling for the Government to harmonise this differential (HC 
Deb 16 March 1983 c196W; HC Deb 16 November 1983 c496W). 
Bottomley argues that the changes that allowed Supplementary Benefit finance to 
flow into the private sector during the 1980s actually "created a new market, which 
was useful. It got people out of hospital at what seemed like no cost to 
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themselves"83. According to Dorrell, this move "effectively abolished" the waiting list 
for local authority Part III accommodation: "the Thatcher government introduced the 
principle that social services payments could be used to access private care 
providers" for people on the waiting list for Part-III accommodation, "that was a 
quite conscious act of policy, to meet a need, without expanding the local authority 
provider sector"84. Warwick Lightfoot, an economist and former political adviser to 
Lawson at the Treasury, is less positive, describing it as "the saga of care in the 
community" with a "perverse set of incentives that enabled local authorities to put 
people in private non-council care settings and all the bill would be picked up by the 
social security system, and there was no cap on it"85. 
Discussion  
This presents an interesting case, in which the relative roles of accident and 
intent are by no means clear. If the 1983 change to Supplementary Benefit 
availability was a blunder, it proved to be extremely fortuitous in terms of 
Conservative ambitions for the welfare state. As a direct result, not only was the 
longstanding problem of residential care capacity addressed, but the NHS was 
relieved of much of the expensive problem of needing to provide long-stay 
elderly wards , local authorities became purchasers rather than providers of 
care, and a vibrant private market was created. It is a blunder for which Norman 
Fowler, one of the most careful and technocratic politicians of  the Thatcher 
years, never appears to have been criticised. Superficially, however, the change 
soon put £1 billion of new costs onto the Supplementary Benefit (later “Income 
Support”)  system at a time of intense public spending control that had begun 
with Lawson’s 1983 “raid” on departmental budgets after the General Election. 
Indeed, Lawson does not discuss the rapidly rising costs of residential care in his 
autobiography, and simply states that social security was largely “demand 
driven” and that the elderly population was rising(Lawson 1992:301).   
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Taking a historical  view of  community care of the elderly it does appear to be  
plausible to argue that 1983 was an important turning point.  The inability of the 
public sector to invest in order to provide the capacity required had not been 
addressed. Once the public sector was transformed from a provider to a 
purchaser, however, the situation changed significantly and with lasting effect. 
Essentially it was the combination of two factors that appear to have generated 
this change.   
Firstly, the catalyst was a relatively small change in the Supplementary Benefit rules 
that was motivated by a desire to maintain a level playing field in the supply of care, 
between local authorities and private providers, so that there was a system of state 
support regardless of whether someone was put into a local authority home or an 
independent home. This was a 1980s equivalent to the 21st Century concept of "any 
willing provider" that was introduced in 2006 to underpin competition in the market 
for NHS-funded care.(Dept of Health 2006).  
Secondly, the Conservatives in the 1980s were strongly motivated to ensure that if 
any additional funds were to be spent they were not to be spent through local 
government. If residential care capacity was to expand then it would have to expand 
in the independent sector. Initially at least, recourse to Supplementary Benefit would 
provide the means to do this. 
It is intriguing, however, that this expansionary policy should be pursued within such 
a period of fiscal restraint. Lawson became Chancellor following the 1983 General 
Election determined to make tax cuts, and recalls: "The urgent difficulty I faced on 
entering Number 11 was a very worrying surge in public expenditure. If uncorrected 
it would have meant increases in taxation or borrowing – or both".(Lawson 
1992:282).   
The example of elderly care highlights the complex nature of boundary shifts under 
the Conservatives. Whilst boundaries clearly did shift between 1979 and 1997, as they 
have before and after, it is not immediately clear whether these shifts have all been 
examples of politicians working within an organised anarchy, just muddling through as 
problems arise or whether they were part of a more strategic agenda akin to 
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“muddling with a purpose”. It may be a mistake to analyse policymaking at this time 
as a coherent whole. There was clearly an underlying tension between Lawson and 
Fowler, not only with regard to the wholehearted pursuit of fiscal control above all 
else, but also over the boundaries between Treasury and DHSS responsibilities for 
social security spending.  
Analysts needs to be alert to what Tsebelis refers to as "nested games" or games-
within-games(Tsebelis 1990). For Lawson, social security formed an important part 
of his Medium Term Financial Strategy to reduce the burden of taxation. For Fowler 
it was part of an agenda to deliver reform of the supply side of the welfare state, and 
to raise the quality of care available. Wherever either saw an opportunity to pursue 
their agenda they would probably have taken it. Fowler was determined to create a 
system in which every worker would have an occupational pension to rely upon in 
old age, but was blocked in this ambition by Lawson. He did, however, create a 
system in which everyone could have access to residential care in old age should 
they need it. In 1980  his predecessor, Patrick Jenkin, had explained to the Social 
Services Committee that whilst NHS-provided health care should remain as it was, 
the provision of personal social services should transfer to voluntary, neighbourhood 
and self-care. The Committee was concerned that this "aspiration would be mistaken 
for achievement"(Social Services Committee 1980). During the 1980s Fowler ensured 
that for the first time there was sufficient capacity outside of the local authority 
sector to deliver on this aspiration. This is, perhaps, a good example of muddling 
with a purpose, in which the central player had an idea of the direction of travel, but 
prediction of what the next step would be depended very much upon the effect of 
the first. 
The boundary shift that took place under the Conservatives did, however, increase 
the political profile of the financial impact that long-term care costs were having on 
household finances, so that the political focus shifted onto the intractable problem 




10. Paying for Medicines 
Introduction 
NHS patients have contributed to the cost of the medicines they need since 1952. 
Apart from the short period between 1965 and 1968, when a Labour government 
abolished and then reintroduced86 the prescription charge, they have been a 
constant feature. In 1984, however, the Government suddenly announced a new 
approach to limiting the cost of prescribed medicines; the creation of a black list87 of 
items that could no longer be prescribed under the NHS. The black list was 
introduced alongside the new routine of annual increases in the prescription charge, 
and new encouragement for prescription only medicines to be switched to pharmacy 
(P) so that they would be available for direct purchase within the market for Over 
The Counter (OTC) remedies. Each of these measures would have the effect, at least 
partially, of shifting the costs of treatment onto patients. Whilst increasing 
prescription charges was by no means a new approach in the 1980s, annual 
increases were and this have become the norm since. The formal encouragement of 
self-medication by increasing the range of  OTC items was also a new direction, but it 
was the creation of a black list of items that the NHS would no longer pay for that 
was the most dramatic breach with the past. This combination of tactics has been 
described as "creeping privatisation"(Heath 1994). 
The Limited List 
In November 1984 the Government quite unexpectedly announced a change in 
general practitioners' terms of service; the creation of a "Limited List" of products 
that would be barred from NHS prescription. According to Klein this: "caught 
everyone by surprise"(Klein 2001;139). The list was "limited" inasmuch as it initially 
only covered a small number of therapeutic categories. This came just after the 
Greenfield Committee on Effective Prescribing(DHSS 1983b) had rejected the option 
                                                     
86 It was reintroduced with exemptions 
87 The Limited List is a negative "black" list of non-prescribable items. The situation has however, been 
slightly confused by the issuing of a positive "white" list for reference, listing those products which are 
prescribable within the groups covered by the negative listJohn O'grady, Medicines, Medical Devices and 
the Law (London: Greenwich Medical Media, 1999).:84. 
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of using a black list to control the NHS drugs bill. Both the British Medical Association 
(BMA) and the pharmaceutical industry had been reassured by ministers that this 
was not a policy that they were likely to pursue. In the event the BMA received just 
two hours advance notice of the policy announcement(Marks 2008:146). 
The Chairman of the BMA, John Marks, claimed that the Government had reneged 
on a commitment after the Greenfield Report not to adopt a limited list, and that 
rather than have the Government pursue this centralising path doctors would be 
willing to operate a voluntary system of "generic substitution". Under the BMA 
proposal doctors would choose whether to allow the generic equivalent of a branded 
medicine and mark each prescription accordingly.  
Marks claimed that the government's Limited List would force those who benefit 
from free prescriptions to pay for private prescriptions. He pointed out that: "The list 
as it stands is not a list of generic drugs; it is a restricted list of drugs from which 
many generic equivalents are excluded" (Marks 1984). In fact, the BMA Chairman 
even predicted "the end of the NHS", and the BMA Executive voted to boycott any 
discussions of the list with the DHSS(Marks 2008:150). Unsurprisingly the BMA 
received a degree of media ridicule for its extreme reaction to the proposals(Times 
1984). 
Before the list was finally introduced in April 1985 the Government consulted on  the 
medicines to be included, with medical participation, and established a new Advisory 
Committee on NHS Drugs to provide the basis of a new process to manage the list 
for the future(Klein 2001). Despite the opposition of the pharmaceutical industry, 
which made a strange alliance with Labour and the BMA, the Government expected 
pharmaceutical companies affected by the new Limited List to try, where 
appropriate, to maintain sales through over-the-counter sales directly to patients(HL 
Deb 20 February 1985 c638). The Labour Party had decided to oppose the Limited 
List because, they said, it would amount to privatisation by stealth, as medicines 
banned from NHS prescription would only be available on private prescription (HC 
Deb 18 March 1985 c738). 
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The Secretary of State for Social Services, Norman Fowler, has described the debate 
with the BMA, the pharmaceutical industry, and the Labour Party over introduction 
of a Limited List of  drugs as "the most intense of my health service battles of the 
mid-1980s". He says that: "For years ministers had been urged to cut the heavy 
drugs bill. By 1984 the bill had reached £1.4 billion and we were under political and 
professional pressure to reduce it". It is, perhaps, a measure of the significance of 
this change that Fowler should have found this particular battle so intense given the 
many in which he was involved. In establishing the Limited List, however, the 
Government had succeeded in making "the first statutory inroads into prescribing 
freedom"88 (O'Grady 1999:81), and it was to be a new road that proved popular with 
all ministers thereafter. The Limited List and POM-to-P switches added significantly 
to the existing tactics available to ministers to limit the growth of the NHS drugs bill, 
alongside the existing Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS)89.  
In 1992, for example, a new system to facilitate the switching of medicines from 
prescription only status to one of pharmacy availability coincided with the 
development of a new and  extensive list of non-prescribable items (Dept of Health 
1992: Schedule 10) and of another list restricting the use of several other medicines 
to specified groups of patients and conditions (ibid: Schedule 11).  
 
POM-P Switch 
Under the Medicines Act 1968 the United Kingdom separates medicines into three 
categories: Prescription Only Medicine (POM), Pharmacy (P), and General Sales List 
(GSL). This represents a more cautious approach than in many other countries which 
                                                     
88 In fact, a Joint Committee on Prescribing had been set up by the Ministry of Health in 1949, which 
later circulated a list to GPs of items thought appropriate for prescribing, without enforcementJohn 
Abraham, 'Partial Progress: Governing the Pharmaceutical Industry and the Nhs, 1948-2008', Journal of 
Health Politics, Policy and Law, 34/6 (December 2009 2009), 931-77. 
89 The PPRS is a scheme agreed in 1957 between the Government and the pharmaceutical industry, 
based on a limit to the rate of return on capital that companies can earn from sales to the NHS. It is 
designed to balance the interests of the NHS with those of an industry which plays a significant role in 
the UK economy. Ministers also decided in 1984 to reduce the maximum allowable rate of return 
within the PPRS. 
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split medicines solely between those for which a prescription is required and those 
which can be widely available on the high street. 
The reclassification of medicines was not a new phenomenon in 1983, although it 
had been a rarity. Paracetamol, for example, was "switched" from prescription only 
status in the 1950s. In 1983, however, the Government gave significant new 
momentum to the switching process. first ibuprofen (Nurofen)  and  loperamide 
(Imodium), and then terfenadine90 (Triludan) were "switched" from being available 
only on prescription to being available directly from a pharmacy, and a further nine 
medicines were switched between 1984 and 1991. In 1992 the system for switching 
was made faster and simpler, and five years later the European Union followed a 
similar route with the adoption of a "switch guideline"(Cranz 1999).  
In 1994 the health minister, Brian Mawhinney spoke of progress in liberalising access 
to medicines: 
"We are continuing to extend the range of medicines which may be supplied 
without prescription where this can be done safely. In January 1993, we 
introduced a new timetable to provide for reclassification within 12 months 
and an order—SI 1993 No. 3256—which will allow a number of medicines 
previously restricted to prescription control to be supplied as pharmacy 
medicines, was laid on 31 December 1993 and is due to come into effect on 
21 January. From July 1994, we shall be increasing the opportunities for 
reclassifying medicines by making two orders a year"(HC Deb 11 January 
1994 c118W) 
The promotion of self-medication appears to be a triple-win in terms of benefits to 
the NHS with less pressure on general practitioners for minor ailments and on the 
NHS drugs bill, easier access to medicines for patients, and new sales opportunities 
for the pharmaceutical industry. Some commentators, however, suspect that the 
                                                     
90 Terfenadine was switched back in 1997 following evidence that it carried higher risks than 
previously known Pagb, 'Pom-P Switches: Updated List 26 April 2012', in Proprietary Association of 
Great Britain (ed.), (London, 2012a). 
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latter has been the principle beneficiary, with more questionable impacts upon the 
NHS, the role of pharmacists, and patients(Prayle and Brazier 1998). 
 The pace of liberalisation increased significantly, with some 30 medicines being 
switched in the three years from 1992 (Rutter 2012). By 2011 the amount spent by 
UK households on OTC medicines had reached £2.3 billion. They bought 964 million 
packs of medicines, just slightly less in volume terms than the number of 
prescriptions (1,064 million)(PAGB 2012b). 
The Prescription Charge 
From 1979 the Conservatives pursued a policy of consistent, and initially dramatic, 
increases in the NHS charge for a prescription for the minority of users who did not 
benefit from an exemption. 
As Shadow social services minister in 1977 Patrick Jenkin said:  
"There is certainly little justification for Labour's continued refusal to increase 
prescription charges, which have remained unaltered since 1971–2. Even Mr 
Joel Barnett, Chief Secretary to the Treasury admitted that raising the 
prescription charge from 20p to 50p per item would produce an extra £45 
million a year (Blackpool, 4th November 1977). Many people may question 
the sense of priorities which leads a Government to reject this source of 
revenue when, as pointed out by Dr Vaughan, Conservative spokesman on 
Health, there are large numbers of patients not receiving kidney dialyses who 
should be, and 3,000 patients die annually owing to the lack of 
facilities"(Conservative Party 1978:156) 
Once in office the Conservatives introduced two dramatic increases in the 
prescription charge, firstly from 20 pence to 45 pence in 1979, and then to one 
pound in 1980. In response to the 1979 increase the number of NHS  prescriptions 
dispensed went from an average annual increase of nine million, to a fall in 1979 of 
three million. This was the largest fall since 1968, when charges were 
reintroduced(OHE 1980).  
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In January 1980 Thatcher's Treasury Private Secretary, Tim Lankester91, provided her 
with a calculation of the breakdown of the Treasury's proposed saving of £120 
million  in 1981/2 through planned changes to prescription and other charges from 
December 1980. These had been included in an earlier note to the Prime Minister 
from the Chancellor and Chief Secretary to the Treasury, and included more than 
doubling the charge again to one pound, and imposing a new 50p charge on groups 
of patients who were currently exempt(Howe and Biffen 1980). Lankester's note92 
says that doubling the standard charge to one pound would raise £29 million, 
imposing a 50 pence charge on people over state retirement age whose income 
meant that they did not qualify for Supplementary Benefit would raise £39 million. 
Thatcher wrote on the back of the note: "We have got to get economies", (Lankester 
1980) and the Government backed away from the controversial changes to 
exemptions from prescription and other charges. Howe duly announced the increase 
to one pound in his March 1980 Budget statement. In the 17 years of Conservative 
government that followed, whilst the prescription charge increased each and every 
year, there was no restriction on exemptions.  
In the context of an ageing population the exemption for people of state pension age 
or above would have an increasing effect on the value of the prescription charge, 
which by the 1990s was equivalent to less than one per cent of NHS spending (HL 
Deb 25 July 1997 c186WA). By 1996 this led the health minister, Gerald Malone, to 
question his officials whilst being briefed in advance of the latest announcement of 
an annual increase: "The guy came in saying 'good news Minister; 80 per cent of 
people don't pay it'. I said I suppose the ideal position would be if 100 per cent don't 
pay it? What's the point? This policy is so good that we've exempted 80 per cent of 
the population from its impact"93. In fact, whilst Malone was Minister for Health the 
proportion of free prescriptions increased to 85 per cent, following a decision to 
                                                     
91 A civil servant, Lankester had also served as a Private Secretary to the Labour Prime Minister, James 
Callaghan, having previously been a Treasury civil servant and World Bank economist. He was 
knighted in 1994. 
92 See Annexe 
93 Interview 15 June 2012 
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equalise the age of eligibility at 60 for both men and women94 (HC Deb 12 March 
1996  c777). 
Problem 
In the early 1980s the NHS drugs bill was rising by 5 percent a year, although over 
time the share of the drugs bill within total NHS spending had remained remarkably 
steady, and in fact had fallen from 11.1 per cent of the total in 1970 to 10.3 per cent 
in 1980(OHE 1980: Fig7). The growth of the drugs bill had been due to a rising 
number of prescriptions since the NHS was created, but from around 1980 its growth 
was also being driven by on-going increases in the average cost of the prescribed 
drugs(Abraham 2009:946). In 1983 the problem of the growing drugs bill, and 
particularly the increase in prices, was raised in a report from the House of 
Commons Public Accounts Committee(PAC 1984). Just before the introduction of the 
Limited List the health minister Kenneth Clarke told the House of Commons:  "I do 
not know whether anyone can contradict this, but I have not yet met a doctor or a 
pharmacist in practice who does not agree that something ought to be done to 
reduce the growth of the NHS drugs bill" (HC Deb 18 March 1985  c742).  In April 
1985 when the Limited List was introduced the Government also reduced the 
maximum return on capital that the pharmaceutical industry could earn under the 
Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (HC Deb 08 December 1983 c473). 
The problem for the Government was not a simple one. Whilst there was 
considerable pressure to contain the growth of the NHS drugs bill, and to be seen to 
do so following criticism from the Public Accounts Committee, the DHSS was also the 
sponsor Department for the pharmaceutical industry with a remit to maintain a 
successful research-based pharmaceutical industry. Policies would need to meet 
both objectives. 
People 
                                                     
94 In October 1995 the European Court of Justice upheld a complaint under Directive 79/7/EEC the 
UK could not discriminate so that men had access to free prescriptions at 65 years of age and women 
at 60. The UK government had argued that this was a matter of health policy that was not subject to 
the Directive (HC Deb 19 October 1995 vol 264 cc495-502) 
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Norman Fowler, Secretary of State for Social Services 1981-87 
Fowler had a very harsh three years at the beginning of his lengthy term as Secretary 
of State for Social Services, dominated by the industrial dispute of 1982, which he 
describes as "a baptism of fire" and which led him to need an armed police guard for 
public engagements (Fowler 1991:168). In 1983 he also faced a Chancellor who was 
determined to cut spending and taxation over the lifetime of the Parliament. Fowler, 
however, is widely regarded as a careful tactician. According to Raison: “At the DHSS, 
Norman Fowler did not have about him any special charisma, but he had a 
competence and attention to political detail, in particular, that generally kept his 
department out of trouble”(Raison 1990:124) 
Dr John Marks, Chairman, British Medical Association 1984-90 
When the Limited List was announced in November 1984 Marks had only just taken 
over as Chairman of the BMA, but described himself as a "BMA man" with a 
"medico-political career" already dating back more than twenty years. When the 
announcement was made he was in Singapore with his wife on a BMA trip. In his 
absence the Chairman of the BMA's General Medical Services Committee (GMSC) 
decided to launch a high profile and strident campaign against the Government's 
plans, which clearly irked Marks (Marks 2008:146), and which appears to have 
pushed him towards an even more extreme position, which ultimately undermined 
the doctors' case95.    
The Policies 
In terms of finding a means to curtail a growing drugs bill, the Department of 
Health's options were heavily circumscribed by two important considerations. Firstly, 
the British Medical Association would want to preserve doctors' clinical freedom to 
prescribe the drugs they felt most appropriate. Secondly, the Department of Health 
was also charged with sponsoring the research-based pharmaceutical industry, 
                                                     
95 They were to make a similar mistake in August 1989 in response to the White Paper "Working for 
Patients"; an expensive advertising campaign against the reforms was undermined when the BMA used 
posters that personally attacked the Health Secretary, upsetting some of its membersJohn Marks, The 
Nhs - Beginning, Middle and End? : The Autobiography of Dr John Marks (Oxford: Radcliffe Publishing Ltd, 
2008) x, 279 p.:206-7) 
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which was both an important employer in the United Kingdom and a crucial source 
of valuable exports(Fowler 1991:193) but, as the Public Accounts Committee had 
shown, the existing price regulation scheme alone was proving ineffective.  Any 
policy on the drugs bill would need to address both considerations. The focus, 
therefore, turned to means to encourage the use of generic96 rather than branded 
medicines, which would have limited impact on new drug discoveries. 
Generic substitution 
In several countries it is legal for pharmacists to substitute a generic medicine if a 
doctor prescribes the branded equivalent; in some cases this even extends to 
therapeutic substitution where the generic is an alternative medication within the 
same therapeutic class. Generic substitution had been recommended in 1983 by the 
Informal Working Group on Effective Prescribing, known as the Greenfield 
Committee(DHSS 1983b).It was not supported by the BMA. The Government 
estimated that this would save around £30 million (HC Deb 18 March 1985  c747). 
A Limited List 
A comprehensive Limited List, known as a "white list" of those medicines that are 
prescribable across all therapeutic categories was rejected because it would harm 
incentives for pharmaceutical research in important categories of medicine (HC Deb 
18 March 1985 c744). Nevertheless, the option did enjoy some support, given that it 
had been recommended by the The Royal Commission on the NHS on the basis that 
other countries operated such schemes(HMSO 1979). 
In 1980 the Health Minister, Dr Vaughan, wrote that: 
"Whilst I am continuing to study ways of encouraging effective and 
economical prescribing, I am not yet persuaded that a limited list would of 
itself achieve lasting economies in the cost of the National Health Service or 
                                                     
96 Prescription medicines for which the originator's patent has expired. Generics can be sub-divided 
between  those known by the generic name (e.g. Ibuprofen), often the International Non-Proprietary 
Name (INN) and branded generics (e.g. Nurofen), for which there is usually                                                                                                                                                      
a substantial price difference despite their essential similarity. 
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necessarily be in the best interests of patients. In the few countries which 
operate such an arrangement, there does not appear to be conclusive 
evidence whether such savings as it yields are commensurate with the 
practical difficulties that there would be in introducing and maintaining 
it,notably in reaching agreement on what drugs were essential" (HC Deb 13 
February 1980 c703W) 
Such a list would, of course, also limit the clinical freedom of doctors. When the 
Greenfield Committee's 1983 report to ministers rejected the use of such a list, the 
Minister for Health, Kenneth Clarke, expressed agreement (HC Deb 22 November 
1983 c144). But the Government’s eventual policy was for a more selective negative 
list of items that could not prescribed, simply listing those medicines to be controlled 
by central decisions. Fowler had seen such systems in Europe, in which: "certain 
branded drugs would not be prescribed at all when entirely adequate substitute 
generic drugs existed"(Fowler 1991:193). No drugs would be banned, only the 
branded equivalent of a generic.  
Announcing the consultation on the drugs to be black-listed Fowler described some 
of them as mostly for "minor conditions" that might not even warrant medical 
intervention, adding that many of these were widely available without prescription 
but costing the NHS £120 million a year. Another group on the proposed list 
comprised tranquillisers and sedatives, whose use was rising rapidly and costing £40 
million a year despite the presence of cheaper alternatives. He said: 
"I see no reason, however, why in the two groups that I have set out the NHS should 
not limit itself to providing only the cheaper generic alternatives which are available 
… If the patient still wishes to go for a particular brand name, he will have the 
alternative of buying it over the counter from his local chemist or else asking his 
doctor to prescribe it privately. This is the kind of system that applies in many other 




Tackling the drugs bill is a popular activity amongst health ministers. It seems that 
both doctors and the pubic greatly overestimate the share of NHS costs due to 
medicines(Taylor 1983b:20), a miscalculation that probably also applies to many 
policymakers. If so, then it makes "action" on the drugs bill a useful activity for 
health ministers in their funding negotiations with the Treasury. The challenge for 
the Department of Health is to provide a concession to the Treasury on the growing 
Drugs Bill, whilst doing least to harm access to treatment or to undermine the 
attractiveness of the United Kingdom as a base for the global pharmaceutical 
industry.  
The former health minister Gerald Malone describes a: "relentless process of 
negotiating the budget with the Treasury. You always had to give something, and 
quite often the something you gave didn't translate into the money the Treasury 
wanted. But it was all a shopping list of, 'well we'll put that up a bit and get a bit 
more money here'. It was just a negotiating process. I think quite often officials 
thought there was some ground they could concede that didn't matter very much". 
When it came to prescription charges: "They would know that 80 per cent of people 
aren't going to pay it, so what's the point? So it was a concession that was made 
without any thought to whether it had a policy objective. Just bargaining. The bazaar 
of the health care Treasury negotiations"97. 
In 1984 the DHSS was under intense strain in its management of the NHS. The 
industrial disputes of 1982-1983 had driven waiting lists back up after some success 
in reducing them since 1979; Ministers had been cutting NHS manpower for the first 
time in order to streamline the NHS bureaucracy; and the Griffiths Report heralded 
further administrative changes.  
The lack of consultation with the medical profession over the November 1984 
decision to create a limited list shows an interesting boldness on the part of the 
Government. As Klein notes, ideas to restrict prescribing "had been floating around a 
long time. Successive Governments had, however, flinched from the prospect of a 
head-on conflict with the BMA on this issue"(Klein 2001:139). Having won the 1983 
                                                     
97 Interview: 15 June 2012 
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election, and determined to make a quick start in delivering efficiency in the public 
sector, DHSS ministers clearly decided to cross the rubicon. In doing so they faced 
the combined opposition of the BMA, the pharmaceutical industry, and the Labour 
Party. 
Klein's analysis, however, is that  this was "an accidental rather than a deliberate trial 
of strength with the medical profession – the limited list episode proved to Ministers 
that it was possible  to take on the doctors without getting a bloody nose: a lesson 
Kenneth Clarke in particular was to remember when it came to implementing 
Working for Patients" (Klein 2001:140). Henceforth, a whole series of measures to 
control prescribing  became possible.  
In implementing the Limited List ministers balanced the interests of the NHS with 
those of the pharmaceutical industry, hence the decision to apply the restrictions to 
a small number of therapeutic areas, combined with new opportunities for direct 
sales of branded products to consumers. Furthermore, switches to pharmacy and 
general sales availability would help meet the rise of consumerism in health in the 
1980s(Taylor 1983a) and ease the rising pressure on general practitioners from 
minor ailments that could be self-medicated. Switching medicines became an 
increasingly popular solution for health ministers under financial pressure, with 
support from the pharmaceutical sector: In early 2002 the Department of Health 
published a Treasury-commissioned report showing dramatic future increases in the 
NHS cost of prescribing statins for heart disease, rising  from £700 million in 2002/3 
to £2.1 billion in 2010(Wanless 2002). To coincide with this  a  list of 50 medicines, 
including statins, thought suitable to be switched from POM to P was released by the 
Medicines Control Agency(Pulse 2002).  The switch process was further streamlined 
in 2002, and an NHS White Paper in 2003 "Building on the Best" (Dept of Health 
2003)set a 10 medicines per annum target for switching. In total, between 1983 and 
2012 there were some 80 POM to P and 50 POM to GSL switches.(Rutter 2012:807). 
In 2011 consumers spent £2.3 billion on over-The-Counter Medicines(PAGB 2012b).   
Prescription charges seem to be little more than a means of raising a relatively small 
amount of money for the NHS from a minority of its users. They remain something of 
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an anomaly within the NHS, as a core part of health treatment that is charged for. 
Whilst the combination of the Limited List, rising NHS charges, and switches to over-
the-counter availability shifted part of the increasing burden of the NHS drugs bill 
onto users, the increased ease of access to routine medicines has brought clear 
benefits. 
This example of change bears some similarities with the liberalisation of ophthalmic 
services. Once again, by making the product more accessible to consumers they 
were not only meeting rising expectations of accessibility, but also driving customers 
to the pharmacists’ shops where they would also be able to purchase other everyday 
items, which in turn might reduce pressure on NHS payments to pharmacists in the 
dispensing fee. Despite the heated battles in Parliament, therefore, there would be 
an eager market outside. As a strategic step the combination of the Limited List, to 
restrict NHS prescribing to exclude products deemed inappropriate or over-priced, 
and the beginnings of a process of switching medicines to pharmacy and general 
sales availability would have lasting effects. Although the pharmaceutical industry 
strongly opposed the Limited List, the new opportunities to continue to market their 
most important brands after patent expiry by switching them to over-the-counter 
availability would present a valuable new income stream. 
Whilst the institutions of the BMA and the pharmaceutical industry resisted change, 
in this case the financial pressure on the DHSS and the rise of consumerism and a 
broadening role for high-street pharmacies made a mid-term battle with these 




11.  Tax Relief on Private Medical Insurance 
(PMI)98 
Introduction 
The story of subsidies for private medical insurance (PMI) is one of an attempted 
boundary shift that did not happen. In fact the impact of government policies, 
whether to encourage or discourage growth in this sector, seems to be very limited 
in comparison to the impact of wider economic and social factors and debates over 
the quality of the NHS. This chapter investigates the factors involved in the decision 
to include PMI relief in the 1989 White Paper “Working for Patients”(Dept of Health 
1989a). This was at odds with the other proposals which were focused on making the 
NHS more efficient and more responsive to patients through the use of quasi-market 
mechanisms. Whilst incentives for self-reliance were a consistent theme for the 
Conservatives, the promotion of private medicine at a time when the NHS was in 
difficulty and deemed to be in need of fundamental reform might reinforce 
perceptions of a lack of commitment to the NHS on the part of the Government that 
could only make the reform process more difficult. The genesis of the decision is, 
therefore, worthy of analysis because, whatever the impact of the change, it 
suggests an intention to achieve a fundamental shift in health system funding. The 
analysis is, therefore, concentrated on the decision to include PMI relief within the 
NHS reforms, that was debated and taken between the 1987 General Election and 
the summer of 1988.  
 
Background 
Private medicine had grown strongly in the 1970s and the early1980s, but its growth 
then slowed, even following the introduction of tax relief on individually-purchased 
policies in 1990 (Emmerson et al. 2001). Despite  an apparent lack of government 
influence over individual decisions to use private medicine and to purchase PMI the 
                                                     
98 I have used the term Private Medical Insurance throughout, although this is taken to cover several 
forms of insurance for health-related risks.  
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political debates over the role of private healthcare within the health system and its 
relationship to the NHS have played a very prominent part in the history of the NHS.  
The roots of modern PMI lie in the welfare reforms that took place at the beginning 
of the twentieth century. Compulsory insurance for workers under the National 
Health Insurance Act 1911 proved to be extremely popular with both the public and 
the medical profession in the decades that followed its  1912 inception (Brackenbury 
1934). The scheme covered most employed workers, except those in  non-manual 
jobs earning more than £160 per annum(Int Lab Rev 1924). Whilst private insurance 
played an important role during the operation of the pre-war National Health 
Insurance System the creation in 1948 of the universal National Health Service, 
funded from taxation and National Insurance Contributions, led many of the 
insurance providers that had previously existed  to close down (W. Laing 1985). A 
few of those that continued combined to create the British United Provident 
Association (BUPA), which has thereafter dominated the United Kingdom market for 
medical insurance.  
Tax Relief 
The focal point for the discussion in this chapter is the introduction in 1990 of tax 
relief on personal subscriptions for medical insurance for people aged over 60 years. 
This was implemented alongside the "internal market" reforms of the 1990s, but 
abolished by Labour following the 1997 General Election. There has also, of course, 
been long-standing recourse to employer-provided medical insurance which, being 
one of many corporate "perks" has been less prone to political ideology99.   
Employer-provided cover played an important part in the growth of the medical 
insurance market, and replaced individual-purchased cover as the major component 
of the medical insurance market, in terms of numbers insured, from 1983 (G. Clark et 
al. 1995:10, Fig 4). By 2000 employer-paid insurance accounted for 69.5 percent of 
the United Kingdom market(Mossialos and Thomson 2004:73, Table 10). 
                                                     




Growth in PMI may be linked to perceptions of delays to treatment in the NHS, upon 
which insurers tend to capitalise in their marketing(Harley et al. 2011). There is, 
however, little evidence to suggest that NHS waiting  lists are positively associated 
with decisions to purchase PMI policies. In fact, Propper found evidence of the 
opposite effect for the period 1978-1996, but identified a time-lagged link with levels 
of spending on the NHS and with the availability of private doctors and hospital 
facilities (Propper et al. 2001). There is a logic to these findings, that low levels of 
NHS spending will only subsequently have an impact that makes private medicine a 
more attractive proposition, and that this may also lead doctors to engage in more 
private practice if the spending squeeze impacts upon their NHS workload and 
income. Furthermore, it is possible that specialist doctors may also encourage their 
patients to follow them into the private sector. Former health minister, Edwina 
Currie, put this rather bluntly when she said that: “When there is huge demand and 
when people are desperate, and where there are assets to be realised that could be 
used to pay for a service, you are bound to get the private sector interested; they 
will hold people over a barrel, and that’s always the fear, and it’s very clear to most 
people in the UK. People get very angry indeed at doctors who say: ‘Well, I can’t do 
this for three months, but if you pay me I can do it on Tuesday’”.100   
As in the case of dentistry, the clinicians themselves do appear to play an important 
role in shifts in the take-up of PMI, suggesting an element of supplier-induced 
demand101. Thus changes in NHS consultant contracts, which had been the subject of 
political debate in the 1970s,  along with the presence of NHS "pay beds", are 
relevant given that they impact upon the capacity of the private sector. The Labour 
Government of 1974-79 sought to use the renegotiation of the NHS consultants' 
contract as part of its political agenda to completely separate the NHS and private 
sectors, by reducing NHS consultants' freedom to also engage in private practice. 
Additionally, Barbara Castle's102 policy commitment to remove pay beds from the 
                                                     
100 Interview 24 May 2012 
101 For a discussion of supplier-induced demand in the agency relationship between doctors and 
patients, see the chapter by Evans  in Mark Perlman, The Economics of Health and Medical Care : 
Proceedings of a Conference Held by the International Economic Association at Tokyo (London: Macmillan, 
1974).. 
102 Secretary of State for Social Services 1974-76 
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NHS appears to have spurred the development of private capacity outside the NHS 
and growth in the take-up of PMI (Foubister et al. 2006; D. Robb and Brown 1984). In 
1979 BUPA faced the arrival of an important new product in PPP's103 "six-week plan"; 
this offerws comprehensive cover at a reduced premium for treatment if the NHS 
wait was more than six weeks. This opened comprehensive insurance coverage to a 
wider population than had previously been possible, when lower premiums were 
tied to lower cover (Health Insurance 2009). 
In stark contrast to the Labour Government's approach of the 1970s, and reflecting 
the large ideological divide between the main parties at the time, the Conservative 
Party had a strong commitment to private medicine at the time of the 1979 General 
Election. This included a pledge to reverse Labour's on-going abolition of pay-beds 
from NHS hospitals and the restoration of tax-relief on employer-provided insurance, 
which Labour had removed.  
Shortly after the General Election the new health minister Dr Gerard Vaughan told 
the House of Commons:  
"I believe strongly that the encouragement of private medicine is in the 
interests not of a select few people but of everybody, including those who 
rely—and who will probably always rely—on the National Health Service 
…We are clear that every penny spent in the private sector releases a penny 
in the National Health Service sector, which may then be spent on areas 
which need it desperately, such as children, the mentally sick and care of the 
elderly." (HC Deb 25 May 1979 vol c1449-50) 
The NHS Consultant Contract 
Negotiations over Labour's plans to revise the consultants contract, under which 
they intended to increase consultants' commitment to NHS were so prolonged that 
the new contract was not agreed by the time of the 1979 General Election(Klein 
1995:104). The negotiations had even pre-dated the Labour Government, having 
begun eight years previously under the Conservative Government led by Edward 
                                                     
103 Private Patients Plan 
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Heath. In 1979 it was the strong support of Patrick Jenkin, the Social Services 
Secretary, for private practice by NHS consultants that broke the deadlock.  
Firstly, the contract (proposed by the British  Medical Association in 1979) would 
reduce the salary penalty taken by those who chose a "maximum part-time" NHS 
contract; a contract option that had enabled consultants to also engage in private 
practice alongside their NHS work. Secondly, in order to maintain sufficient incentive 
for consultants to choose a "whole-time" NHS contract, those who did so would, for 
the first time, also be permitted to undertake private work up to a limit of earning 
the equivalent of ten per cent of their NHS salary104. Finally, the contract would 
reintroduce the provision that had been removed by Labour for a "part-time" NHS 
contract requiring just six NHS sessions105 per week.  
The response within government was mixed. The Secretaries of State for Scotland 
and Wales, where there was very little private practice, were deeply sceptical. The 
Scottish Secretary wrote to Patrick Jenkin saying that: "At best the NHS will be paying 
consultants who undertake private work more money for the same NHS 
contribution, at worst we will be paying them more money for less work"(Scottish 
Office 1979).  
In conceding to the medical profession's requests, however, the Government was 
able to ensure that they were finally placated after their serious disputes with the 
previous government, and at no additional cost to the NHS. As Timmins notes, the 
contract would give the doctors an important "safety-valve when the government … 
squeezed their NHS income"(Timmins 2001:384-5). Other than in easing the 
relationship between the Government and the consultants, the new contract was 
probably not beneficial to the NHS, particularly as the government had little means 
of policing consultants' NHS working time. This was to become a continuous cause 
for concern(Yates 1995). Rivett lays some of the blame for long NHS waiting lists, 
concentrated in certain specialties, in the 1980s with consultants private practice: 
                                                     
104 The option of private practice for full-time NHS consultants was, in fact, developed in 1974 by the 
health minister, David Owen, but was stopped by the DHSS Secretary of State, Barbara Castle 
(Barbara Castle, The Castle Diaries, 1964-1976 (London: Papermac, 1990).:500). 
105 A consultant clinic  "session" is a  clinic at which a consultant is scheduled  to attend, lasting up to a 
maximum of a notional half day. 
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"Private health care was particularly common in some surgical specialties, such as 
ophthalmology, heart disease and orthopaedics. Waiting times for an NHS outpatient 
appointment in these specialties were usually lengthy, and further time was spent 
waiting for admission … two-thirds of private work was undertaken by 20 per cent of 
NHS consultants" (Rivett 1998:297). 
Tax Incentives 
According to Klein the spread of private medical insurance coverage in the 1980s 
from 6.4 per cent of the population to 11.5 per cent was not due to any fiscal or 
other measures by the Conservatives to encourage it, but owed more to a general 
rise in economic prosperity and disposable incomes. The growth had taken place 
with little fiscal encouragement. The only specific step, he says, was in respect of 
employer-provided PMI: "to increase marginally (to £8500) the income limit below 
which tax concessions could be claimed for health insurance premiums". (Klein 
1995:132)  
This is not to say that the Conservatives were not interested in incentives for private 
medical insurance, which had long been a popular cause within the Party and the 
New Right think tanks. The Adam Smith Institute, for example, had long been 
demanding tax breaks to boost PMI take-up (Timmins 2001:386). Proposals for tax-
relief on private medical insurance for the over-65 year olds were finally included in 
the 1989 NHS White Paper "Working for Patients"(Dept of Health 1989b). This sat 
awkwardly within a policy document otherwise aimed at improving the NHS. Analysis 
on behalf of the House of Commons Health Select Committee described the proposal 
for tax relief as "perverse and the worst feature of the White Paper".(Barr et al. 1989) 
In mapping this particular case history using  Kingdon's three policy streams of 
problems, people, and policies it is clear that the Prime Minister plays a very central 
role. In this case, however, the debate is over a tax policy rather than a social 
services policy and the approach taken by the Chancellor of the Exchequer is 
inevitably of central relevance. The Chancellor can be expected to be a veto player 
whenever fiscal policy decisions are taken, and in this case the Chancellor had held 
165 
 
office, with some success, throughout the Conservatives' second term: By the time of 
the 1987 General Election the British economy combined strong growth with low 
inflation(Conservative Party 1987b).  
Problem 
Even before the 1987 General Election Mrs Thatcher was becoming concerned about 
policy for the NHS, and had requested radical ideas from both the Department of 
Health and the Centre for Policy Studies(Timmins 2001:457). But it is not evident that 
this provided support for her subsequent demands for tax relief for private medical 
insurance. The NHS crisis over the winter of 1987-88, discussed earlier, provided 
urgency in the search for reform ideas, and an opportunity for her to raise the idea 
of tax relief. In her memoirs Thatcher argues that her perception of the problem was 
that if growth in the private sector continued only at a slow pace this would increase 
pressure over the long term for additional increases in NHS spending: In the absence 
of faster growth in the capacity of the private sector, she argued: "all the additional 
demands would fail to be met by the NHS"(Thatcher 1993:613). Subsidising the 
private sector would help meet these demands.  
People 
Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister 
The Prime Minister had a long-standing concern to reward those who sought to look 
after themselves rather than rely on the state to do so. Furthermore, unlike the 
Treasury she attached importance to tax subsidies, particularly for the middle 
classes. Indeed, in August 1979 she engaged in a heated exchange with the then 
Chancellor, Geoffrey Howe, over his plans to remove tax breaks from company cars 
as the start of a campaign to reduce the use of "perks" to avoid tax. Thatcher told 
Howe in a private memorandum to the Treasury that she was "horrified" by his 
consultation paper on company cars, mainly because of the potential impact on 
"middle earners" if the company car perks were withdrawn106.  
                                                     
106 See Annexe 
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Nigel Lawson, Chancellor of the Exchequer 
"A good tax system should be broadly based, with low tax rates and few tax breaks" 
(Lawson 1992:341) 
The Chancellor's primary ambition was to reduce the burden of taxation, particularly 
income tax, which the Conservatives had failed to achieve in their first term. On 19th 
January 1984 Lawson explained his strategy for personal taxation in a memorandum 
to the Prime Minister. He was, he said, aiming to pursue a three-stranded approach: 
(i) to use a shift towards Value-Added Tax107 to increase the scope for income tax 
cuts, (ii) to improve incentives, and (iii) to remove or reduce distortions(Lawson 
1992:334). According to Harris: "Nigel Lawson was the most successful tax-reforming 
Chancellor Britain has had"108(Harris 2011:494) 
Lawson knew that the removal of special reliefs would not appeal to Thatcher. He 
says: "She was constantly proposing new tax breaks of one kind or another, usually 
arguing that this was preferable to higher public spending" and "in subsequent 
Budgets was against taking any further moves to reduce fiscal privilege"(Lawson 
1992:336).  
Willetts stresses the importance of the rising tensions between Lawson and Thatcher 
by 1987, at the time when she was also pressing for tax relief on PMI premiums109. 
Tensions began to mount in 1985 over Lawson's wish for Sterling to join the 
European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). Thatcher was taking informal advice 
from Alan Walters110 who was vehemently and publicly opposed to the ERM. Lawson 
raised the topic again after the 1987 General Election and began, without Thatcher's 
approval, to use interest rate policy to keep Sterling below three Deutschmark (DM3) 
                                                     
107 A sales tax, which the Conservatives increased significantly in their 1979 Budget. 
108 Harris also notes, however, that Lawson's reputation was eventually destroyed by macroeconomic 
mismanagement. 
109 Interview: 4 July 2006 
110 Professor of Political Economy, Johns Hopkins University, Economic Adviser to the Prime Minister 
1981-83. Knighted in 1983. His firm, public  advice against  Britain joining the ERM in 1988, led to an 
open dispute between the Prime Minister and her Chancellor.  In 1989 he was formally reappointed 
as Thatcher's economic adviser,  prompting the resignations of both Lawson and Walters. The 
following year Thatcher too was forced to resignTelegraph, 'Obituary: Sir Alan Walters', Daily 
Telegraph, 5th January 2009. 
167 
 
as a precursor to joining the ERM at that rate. The Prime Minister discovered this in 
November 1987 and the increasingly public dispute continued through the winter. 
Thatcher herself notes simply that: "In the early months of 1988 my relations with 
Nigel worsened"(Thatcher 1993:702). Nevertheless, Lawson was still in a strong 
position following the 1987 election victory, and in the Spring of 1988 delivered a 
populist tax-cutting budget. At this point the NHS Review was well underway. The 
Chief Secretary to the Treasury, John Major, also represented the Treasury on the 
Review, and would have had to steer a very careful course between Lawson and 
Thatcher111.  
John Moore, Secretary of State for Health and Social Services 1987-8 
Moore was an enthusiast for private health care and for insurance as a solution to 
the problems of the NHS in 1987-88. Indeed, when he became seriously ill whilst 
health minister he chose to be treated in a private hospital, for which the 
Conservative Party Treasurer, who himself used private medicine, described Moore 
as "a fool" for doing so  (Young and Trewin 2009:273). Moore had trained as a 
banker in America, and was married to an American. His transatlantic, free-market 
approach appealed to Thatcher. According to Libby, his special adviser, his views on 
the NHS were heavily influenced by his wife112. At the time the Prime Minister was, 
according to Edwina Currie, also heavily under American influence, in her case from 
President Reagan, and both Currie and  Libby (Moore’s special adviser) attach 
significance to the transatlantic influences on Thatcher at this time113.  
In 1987 Moore was popular with the Prime Minister. During the election campaign 
she had decided that he should be given a "higher billing" as a younger face of the 
party(Thatcher 1993:584); this was soon followed by his appointment to her Cabinet 
after the election. He was, she said, "a radical, anxious to reform the ossified system 
he had inheritied"(Thatcher 1993:589). At that time, however, housing and 
education, were set for radical reform, not the health service. According to both 
                                                     
111 John Major was promoted to the Cabinet in 1987, as Chief Secretary to the Treasury 
112 Interview: 3 june 2009 
113 Interviews: Libby 3 June 2009; Currie 24 May 2012 
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Willetts and Libby, Thatcher saw Moore as presentable and smooth; able to better 
present the Government's case on health and social services114. 
In early October 1987 Moore and his ministers held a political "thinking day" at 
Chevening House115, otherwise attended only by Moore's private secretary116 and 
two members of the Conservative Research Department. In addition to ideas for an 
NHS internal market, Edwina Currie's diary records that:  
"We agreed to seek tax relief on BUPA subscriptions for the over-75s, as they 
do have to pay extra – doubt if the Chancellor will agree, but worth trying"117. 
With the agreement of the entire ministerial team Moore would have been in a 
strong position to put the case to the Prime Minister, who would anyway be 
supportive. 
Policies 
If the "problem" was that growth in the private sector was worryingly slow, and 
unable to provide a large enough safety valve for health care demands, there 
appears to be no evidence that this problem was either discussed or evidence 
gathered on steps to boost private sector growth. As noted earlier, the discussion at 
this time had already focused on ideas for the separation of purchasers and 
providers, with little interest in reform of the financing of the health system.  
For the very specific issue of slow private sector growth it seems that there was a 
single policy prescription: A state subsidy to individual insurance subscribers. 
Thatcher later claimed that "I was not arguing for across the board tax relief for 
private health insurance premiums – though in principle that would be justified – but 
rather for a targetted measure. If we could encourage people over sixty to maintain 
                                                     
114 Interviews: Willetts 4 July 2006; Libby 3 June 2009 
115 Since 1956 Chevening House in Kent has been maintained by a trust, and its occupancy decided by 
the Prime Minister. In recent decades it has been occupied mainly by the Foreign Secretary. It is also 
used for government meetings, notably by Treasury ministers in advance of Budget statements. In 
1987 it was occupied  by Sir Geoffrey Howe QC MPChevening, 'Chevening House', 
<http://www.cheveninghouse.com/index.html>, accessed 12 September 2012.. 
116 Geoffrey Podger 
117 Edwina Currie. Unpublished diary entry for 5th October 1987 (Annexe) 
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the health insurance which they had subscribed to before their retirement, that 
would reduce the demand on the NHS from the limited group which put most 
pressure on its services" (Thatcher 1993:613) 
Lawson, however, recalls that during the 1988 NHS Review: "I came under heavy 
pressure from Margaret [Thatcher], strongly supported by John Moore118, with Roy 
Griffiths119 voicing his approval, to introduce tax relief for private health care. More 
precisely, what they wanted to do was to make all subscriptions to BUPA and similar 
private health insurance schemes tax-deductible, and to cease to tax as a benefit in 
kind the provision of private health care to employees under a company scheme – a 
rapidly growing perk". Lawson argued that capacity constraints meant that this 
would simply increase prices and health sector pay, and was concerned that it would 
also pave the way for demands for similar concessions for private education(Lawson 
1992:617).  
Discussion 
There is little evidence that tax relief is either efficient or effective within a mixed 
healthcare system. King and Mossialos found that once PMI relief was removed by 
Labour in 1997 the rate of withdrawal from coverage amongst the over-60s was not 
dissimilar to that for all age groups, although they do suggest that the removal of tax 
relief may thereafter affect the take-up rate amongst new subscribers aged over 60 
years(King and Mossialos 2005). 
The gradual but consistent growth of the private health sector, including PMI 
coverage, may have formed part of a more general shift towards a neo-liberal 
culture and away from an earlier social democratic culture; Harley et al., in a survey 
of Australian and United Kingdom providers of health insurance find a distinctly 
"neoliberal discourse" taking place, focusing on individual responsibility for health, 
and with private health insurers as partners in meeting this responsibility. They 
                                                     
118 Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Security 
119 Sir Roy Griffiths, Deputy Chairman and Managing Director of Sainsburys PLC, author of the 1983 
report of the NHS management inquiryRoy Griffiths, 'Nhs Management Inquiry: Report to the 
Secretary of State for Social Services', (London: Department of Health & Social Services, 1983)., and 
Deputy Chairman ,NHS Management Board and Health Policy Adviser to the Government 1986-89  
Clifford Graham, 'Obituary: Sir Roy Griffiths', The Independent, 29 March 1994 1994..  
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argue that the state is part of this modern discourse, which demonstrates a 
significant shift away from the social democratic tradition of health provision based 
on clinical need (Harley et al. 2011). If true, this gives insurance an important role in 
the wider cultural shift with regard to the welfare state. The presence of tax relief, as 
a form of state endorsement of private medicine, may have reinforced this cultural 
shift. Nevertheless, insurance is only one of the ways of paying for private care, and 
whilst growth in the insurance market levelled off from the end of the 1980s, the 
number of people paying on a fee-for-service basis experienced strong growth 
thereafter(Farrington-Douglas and Coelho 2008). From the evidence cited above the 
debate within the Cabinet over tax relief appears to have included little or no 
consideration of the private healthcare market, and was conducted purely on the 
grounds of ideology and Exchequer cost. 
Returning to Kingdon's model of policy streams; in the case of PMI tax relief there 
was not a clear and widely accepted "problem" to combine with the "people" and 
"policies" required to generate a window of opportunity for change. It seems that 
the Prime Minister envisaged a future problem of excessive demands upon the NHS 
from rising expectations as well as demographics. She had also, during the 1987 
General Election, repeated her strong belief in a "right" to private medicine, and that 
this amounts to an extra beneficial investment in healthcare. David Willetts recalls 
discussing this with the Prime Minister: "She said people should have a right to 
private health insurance. It was just a point of freedom"120. 
The Department of Health's Chief Economic Adviser, Clive Smee, said that for the 
Department of Health: "Officials produced the same arguments that they would 
make about charging. It wasn't the direction that we wanted to go in, plus the fact 
that it would benefit those who already had insurance. It probably wouldn't 
encourage any more to take out insurance. I think it was seen as something that was 
imposed by the Prime Minister … It was a fairly small concession to a fairly small 
group of people. It wasn't affecting the great majority of the population"121. But 
Keith Mans, then a Conservative Member of Parliament perhaps reflecting 
                                                     
120 Interview: 4 July 2006 
121 Interview: 7 June 2006 
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bankbench opinion, shared Thatcher's view: "if you're trying to reduce the pressure 
on the NHS in terms of waiting lists, [PMI relief] is an attempt … to get some 
partnership with individuals who are able to pay for the care they get … the fact that 
you are paying for your care twice is in addition"122.  
Warwick Lightfoot, a special adviser to Nigel Lawson as Chancellor at the time of  the 
NHS Review recalls that: "there was a feeling that we want to do something bigger, 
more radical. The big idea was to give de minimus insurance relief … The Treasury 
opposed that. They simply said that all this would do is give tax relief to people who 
have already got private insurance, and we would just have a deadweight cost. So 
the Treasury was very much against it, and also it was a tax expenditure that went 
against the broader feel in government of a more neutral tax system"123. In fact, 
Lawson had such a strong commitment to fiscal neutrality124 that the Prime Minister 
described him as "a convinced fiscal purist"(Thatcher 1993:612) 
According to Willetts the debate within government over tax relief was more 
politically charged than it mattered in policy terms, partly because it formed part of a 
wider battle between the Prime Minister and the Chancellor: "It just became an item 
on a list of grievances … What [the Prime Minister] said was that you needed 
mechanisms whereby you would help people with middle incomes, given sufficient 
money, to be able to opt out, and obviously tax relief helped to bridge that gap. The 
big problem was deadweight costs, and the reason we ended up with a compromise 
of only having it for older people is that not many older people had health 
insurance"125.  
The political concerns were that this tax relief might be taken as a demonstration of 
a limited commitment to the NHS. David Willetts repeatedly tried to convince the 
Prime Minister of the problems associated with providing tax relief for private 
medical insurance:  
                                                     
122 Interview: 13 April 2006 
123 Interview: 27 July 2011 
124 That the tax system should be simplified and  be neutral with regard to behaviour 
125 Interview: 4 July 2006 
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"A tax relief option sounds like Tories looking after their own. 'What about 
me? I'm on a modest income. I can't afford private health insurance. What 
help is there for me, and what are the Tories going to improve the health 
service for me?'". Willetts sought to explain to Thatcher: "The reason people 
are worried about this is not that they don't think they have a right to private 
health insurance; they think that if you're in favour of people having private 
health insurance, it shows you don't really care about the NHS, because you 
think people are going to be able to leave the NHS. What you have to do is to 
have a sense that you're fixing the car, not that you've got your eyes on a 
different car. Focus on what you do to improve the NHS rather than have 
people exit from it."126 
The tax relief was introduced alongside the NHS internal market reforms from 1990, 
but in 1994 the Conservatives under their new leader, John Major, restricted the 
relief to the basic rate of income tax127. It was removed completely by the Labour 
Government in 1997.  
With the benefit of hindsight Lawson regrets conceding the tax-break for the over 
60s. Within weeks of the decision and whilst the NHS Review was still underway 
Kenneth Clarke had replaced Moore as the Health minister on the review team, and 
would not have supported Thatcher's demands (Lawson 1992:617). Clarke has been 
described as "a true believer in public medicine"(Young 1990:549). Whilst Moore 
"pushed hard for tax reliefs, which Ken Clarke would not have done … Ken was a firm 
believer in state provision", according to the Prime Minister(Thatcher 1993:614).  
When Clarke became Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1993 he used his first Budget to 
restrict tax relief on private medical insurance to the basic rate of income tax128. The 
short experiment with PMI tax relief from 1990 to 1997 provides a demonstration of 
the power of a Prime Minister who had won three elections in a row. Over time her 
style had become increasingly presidential, and she seems to have relied as much on 
                                                     
126 Interview 4 July 2006 
127 Higher rate taxpayers had previously been able to claim relief from income tax at their marginal 
rate of tax. 
128 Announced in the November 1993 Budget and effective from April 1994 
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external advice in key areas of policy as on her own ministers and officials. Until July 
1988 she also had a brief period when she had a minister responsible for the health 
service who shared her desire to actively promote private healthcare as an 
alternative to the NHS. After obtaining the support of the other DHSS ministers at 
their Chevening House meeting in October 1987, as the NHS winter crisis began, 
Moore and Thatcher were able to put tax relief onto the agenda for the subsequent 
NHS Review. It does appear that by October 1987 Moore, and possibly Thatcher, had 
already agreed that the concession should be for the elderly only129, so that the NHS 
Review simply provided the opportunity to introduce the change amidst a wider 
debate over health policy.  
Between its first financial year of operation in 1990-91 and 1993-4 the costs of the 
relief doubled to £80 million, but the number of people covered rose by just 10 
percent to 550,000 (HD Debates 2 November 1995 c423W). By the time of its 
abolition in 1997 the Government estimated that the annual cost would be £140 
million by 1999-2000 (HC Debates 2 July 1997 c312). A 2001 study by the Institute 
for Fiscal Studies calculated that, despite the potential increase in demands for NHS 
care from abolition, the Treasury reaped a net benefit from its removal(Emmerson et 
al. 2001). 
Tax relief for PMI continued to feature in Conservative Party policy after it had been 
abolished by Labour in 1997, but was eventually omitted from the 2005 manifesto 
and replaced with proposals for a "Patient Passport" voucher scheme, perhaps in 
response to rapid growth in the market for self-funding private health care amongst 
the uninsured. In 2006, after the Conservative Party's third successive election 
defeat, its new leader set out a very different approach to health policy, saying that: 
"The right have spent too much time trying to get people out of the NHS and into the 
private sector"(Cameron 2006). Thus the debate over PMI tax relief was brought to 
an end 16 years after it had been introduced. 
  
                                                     
129 Currie's notes from the Chevening meeting (Annexe) record that a concession to the over-75s 
was proposed by Moore. Presumably this was impractical as other taxes and benefits relate to the 
state retirement age. The reduction to age 60 made the relief much more significant in cost terms. 
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12. Adult Dentistry 
 
Introduction 
The fundamental shift of adult dentistry began shortly after the agreement of a new 
NHS contract in 1990, when the Government’s response to increasing costs prompted 
a formal dispute with the dentists. This was not settled until 1996, when the new 
mixed public-private market was acknowledged in a revised contract that would make 
children’s dentistry the NHS priority and pave the way for a purchaser-provider system 
whereby General Dental Practitioners would contract locally with health authorities to 
provide specified NHS services. The 1990 contract came at the end of a decade in 
which NHS charges had increased dramatically, as had potential dental costs due to 
technical advances and socio-economic progress. This chapter, therefore, charts the 
path to the 1990 contract, as rising charges culminate in the removal of free dental 
checks, and dentists begin to opt out of providing NHS adult services. The analysis uses 
existing secondary material and primary research in interviews to investigate the 
approach pursued in this lasting boundary shift. 
  
Background 
Questions over the place of dentistry within the NHS go back to the origins of the 
Health Service(Rivett 1998:30). Upon the creation of the NHS in 1948 not only was 
there a shortage of dentists, but only about half of them joined the new scheme when 
it started (Timmins 2001:130).  Within two years of its creation, the removal of 
dentistry from NHS coverage was already under serious consideration within the 
Labour government, and the first recourse to charges was made. The commissioning 
of the Guillebaud Report in 1953 and the committee's report of 1956 (Ministry of 
Health. 1956) put an end to such radical retrenchment in the NHS through a 




In 1979 the Royal Commission on the NHS, established under the previous Labour 
administration, commented that the elements of its work that dealt with dentistry 
constituted “the first general review of the NHS dental service in twenty years” 
(Ericksen 1990:19). As with so  much of health policy, the operation of the NHS 
General Dental Service (GDS) was not fundamentally affected by the first two terms of 
Conservative government between the 1979 and 1987 general elections. Indeed, one 
leading representative of the profession commented that dentistry just “ticked 
along”130 for  more than a decade, until 1990131.. Policy had focused on limiting the 
rising costs to the Exchequer by increasing the patient contribution to NHS treatment. 
Until 1985 this was achieved by gradually increasing the maximum patient payment, 
largely at a pace that reflected price inflation. But in 1985 patients were faced for the 
first time with paying not only the first £17 of any treatment cost but also 40 per cent 
of any costs above this threshold. In 1989 this was changed to 75 per cent of all costs 
(except dentures) and the universal right to free examinations was removed.  
According to independent estimates this latest policy change represented an 
immediate increase of 14.8 per cent in the cost actually faced by patients(Health 
Committee 1993). It had the effect of arresting the rising costs that the NHS was 
experiencing for the provision of crowns and dentures, albeit with an increase in the 
fees claimed for extractions(Laing & Buisson 1999:38, Fig 5.1). 
In 1986 two dentists created a 'payment plan' system to enable patients to choose 
private dentistry without the financial concerns associated with a fee-for-service 
arrangement, and encouraging preventative care. This was called Denplan. By 1988 
some 30,000 patients had already enrolled in Denplan, and the provider saw 
enrolment growth rates averaging 70 per cent per annum over the subsequent five 
years (Laing and Buisson 1990: 74, Table 7.3). Private dental insurance and payment 
plans continued to grow rapidly thereafter, peaking at around 50 per cent of revenues 
in the private dental market in 2006/7 (Denplan 2012; Laing & Buisson 2011).  
                                                     
130 Michael Watson, British Dental Association special adviser since 1990, and previously at the 




In the 1980s dental caries declined dramatically as a result of the increased use of 
fluoride toothpastes (S. Jones et al. 2005). This meant that the NHS dental  contract 
would need to shift towards preventative care and maintenance and away from a fee-
for-service system for removals, fillings, other restorative treatments and the provision 
of dentures. The incentives within the fee-for-service system were proving to be no 
longer appropriate, and its adverse effects on dental practice were becoming a cause 
for concern. In 1986, for example, a Committee of Inquiry published its report into 
“Unnecessary Dental Treatment”(Schanschieff 1986).  
These concerns led eventually to a new NHS General Dental Services (GDS) Contract, 
agreed between the Department of Health and the British Dental Association in 1990. 
The new contract introduced monthly capitation payments for the care of children 
registered with an NHS dentist, in order to shift funding from treatment to prevention, 
and “continuing care” payments for adult registrations. Following the new contract 
dentists derived about 20 percent of their income from capitation and continuing care 
payments rather than treatment(Bloomfield 1992:8). 
The policy up to this point had simply been to minimise the cost to the NHS as much as 
seemed possible by gradually increasing the amount taken in charges. According to 
Smee, the Department of Health's economic adviser, there was no concerted strategy 
to shift boundaries, but pressures in negotiations with the Treasury dictated that 
charges needed to be used:  
"Once the resource implications of the things that ministers want to do have been 
properly worked out, there wasn't enough money to go round to fund things like 
dentistry … there are higher priorities … dental services have fallen out of the public 
sector in virtually every country in the Western world. I cannot think of a country where 
adult dental services are not market led. Internal markets have been very popular, but 
nothing like as universal as private dental services". (Smee 2006) 
Willetts, however, stressed that whilst the Conservatives were committed to 
maintaining NHS dentistry the relative boundary shift that took place in the faster 
growth of the private sector: "wasn't completely an accident. There was a conscious 
177 
 
view that for certain adults it would be legitimate for them to go and pay privately for 
their dentistry. So there was an alternative route available, and we would expect that 
route to grow". (Willetts 2006) 
Problem 
The 1992 "Clawback" 
Almost immediately after the 1990 contract was implemented in 1991 it became 
apparent that dentists were “doing better than expected”132. The stated intention of 
the new contract had been to shift the focus of NHS dentistry from treatment to 
prevention, with the introduction of a system of capitation-based payment as part of 
the dentists’ NHS remuneration.  
 
Table 4 Dental Registrations 1990-92 
This had  led to a notable increase 
in both registrations and activity, 
and thus an “overspend” on NHS 
dentistry. The repercussions of 
this were set to strain relations 
between the profession and the 
Government for the remainder of 
the Conservative years. The 
remuneration system relied on 
accurately forecasting the amount that would be spent, based on a Target Average Net 
Income (TANI) per dentist after provision of an allowance for practice expenses. The 
target and expenses allowance were established by the independent Doctors and 
Dentists Review Body (DDRB). In the first year of the new contract the overspend 
amounted to some £12,500 per dentist, or £200 million overall(Dept of Health 
1994a:9). 
                                                     
132 Interview: Michael Watson, 27 October 2004 
Impact of Continuing Care & Capitation 
Payments on NHS patient registrations  
England Adults Children 
1990-91 10,234,160 3,847,454 
1991-92 19,203,525 6,207,294 
Source: HC Deb 25 Jun 1992  c302W 
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The unexpected surge in NHS registrations with General Dental Practitioners, and 
therefore an unexpected surge in costs to the NHS, led to drastic action by the 
Government in 1992-1993. In fact, gross payments in 1991-92 exceeded the target by 
more than 15 per cent(Bloomfield 1992:23). A 7 per cent fee cut was imposed on the 
profession and more stringent requirements on costly courses of treatment were 
introduced, so that dentists would need to obtain prior approval from the Dental 
Practice Board (DPB) for “costly” treatment, with the threshold cut from £600 to £200.  
After securing widespread agreement to the 1990 contract, the Government’s actions 
two years later severely soured its relations with the profession. Robinson et al., have 
argued that this policy intervention: “gave rise to widespread disillusionment among 
the profession and to a gradual shift from NHS provision to private work”(Robinson et 
al. 2004:23). In a British Dental Association ballot of its members following the fee cut, 
some 60 percent stated that they would be unwilling to accept any new NHS patients 
whether adult or child registrations, and 80 percent said that they would be unwilling 
to accept new adult patients(K. Wright 1997b). The Government's initial response was 
to attempt to boost the number of salaried dentists employed by health authorities, 
although it only had 55 such dentists in 1992(O'Sullivan and Brown 1992).  
Throughout the decade from 1992 the number of patients registered with NHS 
dentists and the number of NHS dentists fell consistently, except that child 
registrations increased for a time from 1996 (Audit Commission 2002:15). Whereas 
NHS treatment fees grew by as much as 40 per cent (in real terms) between 1982 and 
1988s, funded by increasing NHS patient charges, thereafter they began to fall, and fell 
by as much as 20 per cent between 1988 and 1994(Laing & Buisson 1999:46). 
In July 1992 alongside the fee cut and tighter prior approval requirements the Minister 
of State for Health, Dr Brian Mawhinney, had also set up a fundamental review of NHS 
dentists’ remuneration, led by Sir Kenneth Bloomfield, who had just retired from his 
post as Head of the Northern Ireland Civil Service133. The review was asked to provide 
the Minister of Health with specific options for change, and Sir Kenneth determined 
that any such options should avoid any further “rude shocks” in the relationship 
                                                     
133 Dr Mawhinney was a Northern Ireland Minister from 1988-1992 
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between the Department of Health and the profession(Bloomfield 1992:23), such as 
occurred in 1991-92.  
The problems of 1991-92 came at a time when dentists operating costs were also 
rising, thus increasing the attractiveness of pursuing higher fees (and reduced 
workload) from private practice. The property boom of the late 1980s and high 
interest rates thereafter will have significantly raised the operating costs of many 
practices. 
The 7 per cent reduction in dentists' fees for the following year (1992-3) that was 
included in the Government's “clawback” of  the overspend played a critical part in 
damaging its relations with the profession and attitudes to the NHS after both sides 
had agreed a new contract so shortly beforehand. (Health Committee 2001: para 
13)The dentists' reaction to the proposed clawback meant that it did not follow the 
usual practice of attempting to retrieve the overspend within a single year. 
Nevertheless, the profession demanded an independent inquiry, as did the DDRB, 
rather than continue with a system that set a target for an average dentist that did not 
exist in practice.(Dept of Health 1994a:10)  
Lack of NHS dentists 
Lack of NHS dentists proved to be a particular problem for the Conservative Party, as 
it seemed that dentists were most likely to opt out of providing NHS care, 
particularly for adults, in the most affluent areas due to the local capacity to pay for 
private treatment. This vulnerability was being exploited by the Liberal Democrats, 
who campaigned on the abolition of sight tests and dental checks, and the shortage 
of NHS dentists in these areas of England. The decline of NHS dentistry in the English 
shires was reflected in significant geographical variations in the financial demands it 
placed on the NHS: Spending in Cleveland, Greater Manchester, and Merseyside was 
at least one-third more than in Gloucestershire, Wiltshire, and Oxfordshire(Laing & 
Buisson 1999:53, Table 5.5). The decline in NHS provision most affected the affluent, 
semi-rural areas of Britain that were typical political battlegrounds between the 
Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives. Cornwall was a classic case. The local 
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Conservative MPs had small majorities over their rivals, mostly Liberal Democrats. In 
1992, David Harris the MP for St Ives had a 2.88 per cent majority, Sebastian Coe in 
Falmouth and Cambourne 5.7 per cent, and Robert Hicks in Cornwall South East 12.8 
per cent134. Paul Tyler and Matthew Taylor for the Liberal Democrats had won the 
Cornwall North and Truro parliamentary seats respectively from the Conservatives at 
the 1992 General Election(Vachers 1993), and maintained the pressure on ministers 
over NHS dentistry between the 1992 and 1997 elections. The frustration of the 
remaining Conservatives was very clear. In November 1992 Robert Hicks MP asked 
Mawhinney:  
“Is my hon. Friend aware that over half the dentists in Cornwall are refusing 
to take new NHS patients? Does he agree that that is both confusing and 
annoying? When can we expect tangible evidence to correct that 
unsatisfactory situation and not have to depend on temporary expedients 
such as the employment of mobile dentistry facilities?” (HC Deb 10 November 
1992 c732) 
This was the one boundary shift that most adversely affected the Conservatives’ own 
supporters. Edwina Currie has described it as a “disaster”135. The former 
Conservative MP, and aide to the Secretary of State for Health, Virginia  Bottomley, 
Keith Mans, described the situation in dentistry as "probably … the most 
unsatisfactory" of the areas in which the boundaries of NHS coverage shifted under 
the Conservatives: "If you could say that there is a two-tier system, it is in dentistry. 
There is a big difference between having an NHS dentist and not having one, and that 
can be purely chance" (Mans 2006). The irony was that this was a "two tier" NHS in 
which the better-off fared worst. 
The 1992-96 dispute between the dentists and the Government was often blamed 
for lack of availability of NHS dentists, and until the dispute was resolved the 
Government could only turn to health authorities to employ salaried dentists as a 
                                                     
134 At the 1997 General Election the Conservatives lost Falmouth and Cambourne to Labour, and St 
Ives to the Liberal Democrats Bryn Morgan, 'Research Paper 01/38: General Election Results 1 May 
1997', (London: House of Commons Library, 2001). 
135 Interview 24 May 2012 
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means to tackle the problem, but they were few in number and often difficult to 
recruit. In 1992 the whole of Cornwall was served by just two mobile salaried 
dentists. (HC Deb 10 November 1992  cc732-3). A poll by the British Dental 
Association in 1996 found that 35 percent of people claimed it was difficult to find an 
NHS dentist "In this survey those living in the South East of England claimed much 
greater difficulty, with over half of respondents saying it was a problem."  
According to Bottomley, amongst policymakers "no-one took dentistry seriously"136. 
It nevertheless proved politically significant as the 1997 General Election 
approached, primarily because the changing situation in dentistry mostly affected 
the middle-classes, who faced rising dental costs and loss of NHS provision.  
People 
For the most part dental policy was left to the Minister of Health, whilst the 
Secretary of State concentrated on the major issues and crises. Between 1992 and 
1997 these included the political battles over the internal market and NHS waiting 
lists, and discovery of a possible link between bovine BSE and human CJD137. The 
focus here is therefore, on the roles played by the ministers of state responsible for 
dental policy. 
The early stages of the dispute with dentists fell within a time when the Secretary of 
State for Health was William Waldegrave, and the Minister of State for Health was 
Virginia  Bottomley. Developing policies in response to the dispute, both to deal with 
the immediate problem and establish a longer-term plan, came after the April 1992 
General Election. Waldegrave was replaced by Bottomley as Secretary of State for 
Health and Dr Brian Mawhinney became Minister of State.  
Mawhinney was then replaced in July 1994 by Gerald Malone when John Major 
conducted a Cabinet reshuffle after Tony Blair became Leader of the Labour Party 
and the Conservatives' suffered a terrible result in the elections to the European 
Parliament; they achieved their "lowest share of the vote since the advent of 
                                                     
136 Interview 20 March 2006 
137 Bovine Spongiform Encepalopathy and a new variant of Creutzveld-Jacob Disease 
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universal suffrage"(Bale 2010:48) at 28 per cent. A year later John Major resigned as 
Conservative Party Leader and stood for re-election, in a bid to end the widespread 
dissent within the Party that was threatening the Government's majority in the 
House of Commons. Following his  re-election he held another reshuffle in which 
Bottomley, after seven years in the Department of Health, was replaced as Health 
Secretary by Stephen Dorrell. 
Virginia Bottomley,  
Bottomley describes  ministers as either "window breakers" or "glaziers", putting 
herself into the latter category138, at least initially in her time as Secretary of State for 
Health(Bottomley 2006). When appointed she protested to the Prime Minister that 
she was not yet ready for a Cabinet post (Major 1999:392). After the battle of 
introducing  the internal market as discussed in Chapter 6  her main task was to drive 
the new system to raise quality. Coming from a public sector background in social 
work she saw herself as a "non-executive chairman" so that "mostly I forgot I was in 
politics" (Bottomley 2006). When she became Secretary of State, she was almost 
immediately immersed into the political consequences of the Tomlinson Report on the 
future of London hospitals (Tomlinson 1992), the policy decisions with which she is 
most often associated and on which she was accused of "failing to appreciate the 
politics of the situation"(Warden 1995). As the internal market began to operate it 
began to expose the longstanding flaws in the historic pattern of London hospital 
provision. The Secretary of State, William Waldegrave was able to put off decisions by 
the creation of the Tomlinson review, to report after the 1992 General Election. 
In addition to the problems of decisions over the reconfiguration of London hospitals 
Bottomley was also responsible for the new Health of the Nation strategy(Dept. of 
Health. 1992) and the 1991 Patients Charter (Dept. of Health 1991), part of John 
Major's flagship "Citizens Charter" initiative which, for the first time, set clear 
standards to be achieved by the public services, backed by new complaints systems. 
For the NHS this forced the Secretary of State to focus on achieving significant 
                                                     
138 i.e. someone who prefers to settle disputes rather than create them 
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improvements in long waits for elective surgery. Other costly targets included the 
elimination of mixed-sex wards in NHS hospitals. 
Stephen Dorrell 
Dorrell returned to the Department of Health in July 1995 with limited experience of 
NHS primary and secondary care policy, having previously served within the 
Department (1990-92) as the minister responsible for social services and community 
care, and no specific prior interest in the topic(Vachers 1993). Recognising the 
impossibility of fulfilling the "Maples memorandum"139 desire to keep the health 
service out of the news, and to raise his own profile in the Conservative Party140, 
Dorrell's mission was to reduce the temperature of the debate, entrench support for 
the health reforms amongst the professions, and go on the "front foot" against the 
Labour Party141. Settling disputes with the doctors and dentists was high on the 
agenda, and professional aspirations were gathered in a "listening exercise" and 
reflected in two white papers(Dept of Health 1996a, 1996b).  
Dorrell largely left the negotiations with the health professions and rapid development 
of the primary care white paper and subsequent Bill to the Minister for Health, Gerald 
Malone (HC Deb 11 Feb 1997: Col 149). According to Malone the Secretary of State 
was preoccupied "with the big politics of health and persuading the public that we 
weren't destroying the system, whereas [the Minister] got on with the nuts and bolts 
of actually delivering change, but change that wouldn't cause a crisis … we sorted out 
the dentists, we sorted out the out of hours [dispute with GPs]" (Malone 2012) 
 Dr Brian Mawhinney 
Mawhinney's reputation as a hard negotiator may well have played a part in John 
Major's decision to appoint him Transport Secretary at the time of the railway 
signalmen's pay dispute in 1994. Major knew him very well. At the time of his move 
                                                     
139 This is discussed later. It was a Conservative Party internal strategy document that leaked to the 
press. It argued that the Conservatives should aim to achieve “zero coverage” of the NHS in the 
media. 
140 The author was special adviser to Stephen Dorrell at this time. His ambitions to succeed John 
Major after the election were well known. 
141 The author was Special Adviser to the Secretary of State at this time 
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from the Department of Health one colleague predicted: "He will be very unpopular 
and make lots of noise in a short time" (Brown 1994). In the health sector he had 
earned a reputation for his "abrasive style"(Drugscope 1994), which was an attribute 
in which he took some pride142. He describes his behaviour as a minister saying: "Even 
my closest friends say that I do not suffer fools gladly … some people were hurt or 
made angry, though that was never my intention"(Mawhinney 1999:164). Mawhinney 
however, with his background as an academic scientist (in radiology) also worked 
methodically as a policy broker, and is credited with achieving a policy watershed by 
transforming the established "car culture" of the Department of Transport in 1994-
5(Dudley and Richardson 2000:171).  
After Major forced and won the leadership election in 1995 in order to face down 
disloyalty in the Party, Mawhinney was appointed Party Chairman. Major comments: 
"Every Prime Minister needs a Party Chairman who is tough as old boots and with a 
sharp intellect to kick things into shape for them. Brian … did sterling work as a 
Downing Street henchman … he could be brutal with those he thought were wasting 
his time".(Major 1999:694) 
The Conservative Party was certainly in great difficulty in 1994. Internal divisions over 
Europe meant that the Government could not be certain of its majority in the House of 
Commons, and the Party had reached an historic low point in the opinion polls after 
Blair's election as Labour leader(Fowler 2008:174). Furthermore, the Party's election 
analysis was made public when the "Maples143 Memorandum" containing focus group 
findings was leaked to the media. On the health service the memorandum said: "the 
Tories' NHS reforms had gone down like a lead balloon and [t]he best result for the 
next 12 months would be zero media coverage of the National Health Service" (Bale 
2010:50-51). Mawhinney was probably not the right man for this particular job in 
1994. 
 
                                                     
142 In 1994 the author, then an economist at the Civil Aviation Authority,  met with Mawhinney 
shortly after he joined the Department of Transport in relation to Mawhinney's need to appoint a 
Special Adviser. One of Mawhinney's demands was the ability to cope with a "Minister who can make 
civil servants cry". 




By the time Malone was appointed to the Department of Health he had gained 
extensive political experience. He was a lawyer, and  had been the Conservative 
candidate in the high profile 1982 Glasgow Hillhead by-election, when the SDP's Roy 
Jenkins took this previously Conservative seat. As Member of Parliament for Aberdeen 
South during the second Thatcher term (1983-87) he had been Parliamentary Private 
Secretary to the Trade and Industry Secretary, Leon Brittan, at the time of the 1985-86 
Westland Affair144, and then a Government Whip.  
At the Party Conference in 1987 as a protracted battle was being fought within the 
Cabinet over whether or not to retain the policy of introducing the Community Charge 
slowly alongside the system of local rates Malone led calls for an immediate switch. 
According to Lawson the Prime Minister was impressed, and leant over to the 
Environment Secretary and said: "We shall have to look at this again…" (1992:579). 
The earlier decision to have a five-year transition period was subsequently reversed.  
Outside of Parliament between 1987 and 1992 Malone worked as a journalist at the 
Sunday Times, and upon his return became Deputy Chairman of the Conservative 
Party. In contrast to Bottomley, Malone was clearly very much a politician. He was also 
married to an NHS consultant, so was well-briefed on the health service. 
When appointed Minister for Health in 1994 Malone asked the Prime Minister what 
approach he would like taken to the "bushfires" around the health system, which 
included the disputes with dentists over pay and the general practitioners over over-
of-hours responsibilities: "Are we in the business of fighting these to the end or do you 
want me to put them out?" and was given the answer that "it would be infinitely 
preferable to put them out" (Malone 2012). Thus the search  for solutions to the long-
term needs of NHS doctors and dentists began in earnest, and Malone managed to 
                                                     
144 The proposed sale in December 1985 of Britain's only helicopter manufacturer, Westland to the 
US firm Sikorsky was opposed by the Defence Secretary, Michael Heseltine who sought to find a 
European altermative.. In January 1986 Leon Brittan leaked a warning letter from the Attorney 
General to  Heseltine, who subsequently resigned, leading also to Brittan's resignation, and questions 
regarding the Prime Minister's honesty. On the way to an emergency  Commons debate on 27th 
January Thatcher said: "I may not be Prime Minister by 6pm tonight". (Hugo Young, One of Us : A 
Biography of Margaret Thatcher (Rev. edn.; London: Pan in association with Macmillan, 1990) 
xv,589p,(24)p of plates.:431-456) 
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settle both the GPs dispute over the provision of out-of-hours cover and the dentists 
dispute that followed the 1990 contract, with a little assistance from the Treasury. 
Policies 
Bloomfield, the Health Select Committee and the Department of Health all found in 
their separate discussions with dentists that whilst there was widespread 
dissatisfaction, there was no consensus on a solution. A survey of dentists by its 
negotiating body, the General Dental Services Committee, "found divided opinions 
(with a small balance of opinion in favour) on redefinition of GDS dentistry as a "core 
service" confined to certain treatments" but positive opposition to the idea of GDS 
dentistry as a "core service restricted to certain categories of patients"(Bloomfield 
1992:60). In fact, the only professional consensus was in dissatisfaction with the 
current system of remuneration for NHS work. 
Similarly, the Government also lacked a plan of its own. Bloomfield said that the 
Department of Health did not indicate a preference for any specific option, "Nor did I 
receive any formal evidence from HM Treasury, although it was very clear to me that it 
would be unrealistic to think in terms of unlimited resources or open-ended 
commitments. I should look for a system which would be efficient and cost-effective, 
and the costs of which would be under proper financial control." (Bloomfield 1992:64) 
Although the Bloomfield Review reported very quickly, it took a further two years 
before the Government was able to present its proposals(Dept of Health 1994b) for 
consultation and a further year before final proposals were set out. 
In its 1994 Green Paper (Dept of Health 1994a)the Government proposed that 
dentistry should move to a purchaser-provider system, as now existed for NHS hospital 
and community health services (HCHS) following the internal market reforms. This, it 
hoped, would provide a more decentralised system that could better meet variations 
in local needs than a system based on a national average income. Thus the Target 
Average Net Income (TANI) would be abolished to be replaced with a system using 
fixed annual increases in fees proposed by the profession’s official pay review body the 
Doctors and Dentists Remuneration Board (DDRB).Unlike the HCHS internal market, 
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however, the new purchaser-provider system for dentistry would be piloted before 
being used more widely. 
But the Green Paper also argued that: 
"Any reform introduced will need to include some mechanism for dealing with 
the large sums of money owed by the profession to the Government under the 
current balancing mechanism."(Dept of Health 1994a:18) 
The dentists rejected the Government's proposals, and negotiations to settle the 
dispute and agree a way forward continued. The Government's "final proposals" 
(Wright 1997a)were set out in April 1995 (HC Deb 5 Apr 1995 cc1211-3W), and an 
agreement with the profession was announced by Malone on 12th June 1996, less than 
a year before the latest possible date for a General Election. For the short-term it 
shifted the focus of NHS dentistry to children’s oral health and created a fund to target 
areas in which there were a lack of dentists providing NHS services. Notably it 
shortened the registration period for adult continuing care payments, from two years 
to 15 months; adults who fail to visit a dentist within this shorter time would fall from 
registration.  
The Minister also announced new restrictions on the provision of expensive crowns for 
back teeth from December 1996. For the longer term there would be legislation to 
enable pilot schemes of local contracting for NHS dentistry. Notably, in order to end 
the formal dispute between the Government and the dentists  Malone also announced 
a total waiver of the overpayment now amounting to £16,500 per dentist.(HC Deb 12 
Jun 1996, Col 311-312) 
Discussion 
The 1992 General Election evidently affected the Government’s policy responses to 
the rising cost of NHS dentistry. This came not only at a time of recession, when the 
Conservatives were not expected, and not themselves expecting, to be re-elected, but 
also followed the dramatic demise of Mrs Thatcher as the Party’s leader, to be 
replaced by John Major with a strong commitment to the NHS. 
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Prior to the general election John Major was already struggling with the problem of 
calming the political battle over the NHS “internal market” reforms, and could ill afford 
to impose significant cuts in NHS dentistry. It is notable that the most significant 
increases in the maximum charge faced by patients for NHS treatment were imposed 
in the post-election years of 1984 and 1988, raising the probability of further cost-
containment following the 1992 election. However, it seemed that the situation on 
charges had reached a limit by the 1990s. 
The continual increases during the 1980s in NHS charges to be paid by patients, not 
only reduced the large differential between NHS and private charges, but also reduced 
dentists’ own ideological commitment to the NHS by requiring them to seek 
substantial contributions from their NHS patients. The paperwork associated with the 
NHS charging regime and the restrictions on dental practice, particularly the need to 
obtain prior approval for relatively expensive work, also enhanced the attractiveness 
of private practice. 
The problems with access to NHS dentistry, as dentists decided not to take new adult 
registrations, proved to be most severe in the more affluent areas of southern 
England, mostly represented in Parliament by Conservative MPs.  Although dentists 
responded to local market conditions and chose to concentrate on private practice in 
areas where local demand would make this viable, a Conservative government that 
was ideologically supportive of market-based reform would nonetheless need to take 
steps to ensure nationwide access to NHS dentistry in response to its MPs’ 
constituency pressures. In the 1990s these same areas also represented the main 
target for the Liberal Democrat Party, which naturally adopted the availability of NHS 
dentistry as a campaigning tool  
In the case of dentistry it is unclear whether the use of policy streams to map this 
particular change is pertinent as it is no easy task to identify a particular window of 
opportunity for change. The 1990 contract was agreed by the profession. It was the 
subsequent attempt to claw back the overpayment after a surge in registrations that 
prompted the long-running dispute and prompted an exodus of dentists from the NHS 
adult care. The balancing mechanism in the dentists pay system had existed for many 
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years, but the scale of the mistake in 1991 was unprecedented and even though the 
Government did not attempt to regain all of the overspend in a single year the 7 per 
cent fee cut was sufficient to generate a dispute that led to significant changes in the 
coverage of NHS dentistry.  
The net result, however, was an agreement between the Government and the 
profession in favour of focusing NHS funds on children's dentistry, allied with a political 
decision to create an access fund for areas with problems of access to NHS dentistry. 
For the longer term both sides agreed to experiment with a system of local contracting 
for NHS dentistry, that was incorporated into the Primary Care Act (1997) that also 
provided for local experimentation in other aspect of primary care. The 1992 claw back 
may have been a minor act, but with major consequences over a period of years. Thus 
1996 was undoubtedly a turning point for NHS dentistry; the private option for adult 
dentistry had clearly been incorporated into the 1996 contract, whilst a small access 
fund was deployed to deal with localised problems in affluent areas, and a plan to 
legislate to enable a localised purchaser-provider system in the future was agreed.  
Dentistry does not fit a neat template of a window of opportunity for a change of path. 
A change was underway and the Government sought to accommodate it rather than 
stop  it. Over time private dentistry grew in value to equal the size of NHS dentistry. If 
dentistry ever was locked on a path within the NHS, as soon as a more lucrative path 





In order to investigate the process of United Kingdom health policy change this 
thesis has brought together data on the origins of the "internal market" reforms 
announced in 1989 and five case studies of change that began between 1979 and 
1997.  The selection of this period for analysis, which  fell entirely within 18 years of 
Conservative Party government, allows us to examine a sustained period in which a 
change in party government does not drive change. It was a period in which there 
was an underlying predisposition towards welfare state retrenchment.  
For the analysis of this period data from the relevant literature was supplemented 
with interviews with selected individuals from the policy arena at the time.  A 
significant effort was made to ensure a spread of perspectives and roles in the 
interviewees. This balanced the extensive use of autobiographical material in the 
research. Interviewees therefore included not only former ministers, but also 
political and policy advisers, policy academics, and independent policy experts, as 
well as key civil servants. 
The aim was to develop an account that allowed not only for the role that individual 
personalities in the policy elite might play in incidents of change, using an adaptation 
of the "politics" stream in Kingdon's model of agenda-setting(Kingdon 1995), but also 
that took account of influences over policy from the wider political, economic and 
cultural environment. These were examined in each case. 
The research sought an improved understanding of the factors that led over time to 
the 1989 NHS White Paper "Working for Patients" (Dept of Health 1989b)  which set 
out the internal market policies, and which is often portrayed as a significant change 
of path for the NHS. Whether or not this was indeed the key point of change remains 
debateable; it can be argued that a new path had been selected in response to fiscal 
austerity in 1976 when cash limits were imposed on health authorities for the first 
time(Thunhurst), or in commissioning the Griffiths Report on NHS management in 
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1983. This research highlights the fact that change is constant and cumulative, and 
that the search for a large critical juncture provides a somewhat limited role in policy 
analysis. 
The five case studies cover areas in which there was a notable shift or attempted 
shift in the  boundary between the relative roles of the individual and the state in 
funding care, in pursuit of policies to limit demands on public spending. These came 
amidst demographic changes and cultural changes that would otherwise increase 
these demands. The five cases are heterogeneous in nature, although they are often 
linked both in time and by associated legislation. In the case of the introduction in 
1990 of tax relief on private medical insurance a boundary shift may have been 
intended, but this did not materialise. This case provides a useful comparison with 
the other four, as the one which was most clearly driven by political ideology rather 
than other factors. 
The Case Studies 
The conceptual framework of the thesis discusses Mahoney and Thalen (2010) 
depiction of four modes of change and the five case studies provide a useful 
opportunity to assess how relevant these four modes are to the experience of 
boundary shifts affecting  National Health Service coverage. 
 
It will be recalled that ‘displacement’ involves the complete or large scale removal of 
old rules. As Mahoney and Thalen point out, this type of change may be abrupt and 
radical(2010:15). The 1946 National Health Service Act would be an example. The old 
local and occupation based approved societies, the national insurance system of 
contributions and the voluntary hospitals were all essentially swept away. In contrast 
the steady incremental changes to the contractual basis on which GPs have been 
employed have added new payment systems and duties but not removed the 
independent status of GPs or the capitation basis of their funding. This may be 
thought of as ‘layering’ as the new rules are laid on top of the old.  ‘Drift’ could be 
said to have occurred in the treatment of work requirements in the social security 
system. The neglect of old work search rules grew in the period of high 
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unemployment in the 1980s and was indeed unofficially encouraged. The return to 
more rigorous interpretations and elaborations of these rules returned in the late 
1990s and subsequently ‘conversion’ took place as they were implemented in new 
ways. This is the framework that will now be applied to the case studies. 
Ophthalmics 
In this case the rules were signficantly changed. Since the 1950s the General Optical 
Council had regulated the profession not only to protect its monopoly in sight testing 
but also in the supply of spectacles. In a very deliberate step the Government 
decided  to open the market to other retailers of spectacles. In order to meet 
concerns raised by the Office of Fair Trading and others the Government could have 
limited the change to this issue, but went further to introduce a voucher scheme to 
channel NHS funding for the purchase of spectacles. If it had not been for the 
restriction of rights to NHS spectacles and the removal of free sight tests then the 
case might have been one of layering, but with these changes then it conforms more 
closely to the Mahoney and Thelen concept of displacement. 
Elderly care 
The 1983 change that led to widespread recourse to Supplementary Benefit to fund 
residential care was additional to the existing regulations for community care. 
Indeed, changes to the existing regime were not made until after the rapid growth in 
the private provision of residential care had already taken place, and in response to 
the way in which this growth had highlighted the inadequacies of the community 
care system in ensuring the provision of appropriate and efficient care. The 
experience of community care, therefore, fits best with the description of  layering, 
as a simple new rule was added to the funding of care in 1983. However, it led to a 





A boundary shift in medicines was achieved by two complementary policies. Firstly, 
the Government sought to make it simpler and faster for a pharmaceutical company 
to switch a prescription medicine to over-the-counter availability for private 
purchase in pharmacies. Secondly, the introduction of a Limited List of medicines 
that would no longer be available on NHS  prescription ensured that these products 
would  have to be purchased from pharmacies or obtained by private prescriptions.  
Switching medicines had always been possible, but with no clear or easy route to do 
so this was a rare event. In order to introduce controls on what could be prescribed 
it was essential in terms of supporting the pharmaceutical industry that produced 
branded medicines to ensure that a viable market existed. Whilst the creation of a  
process for switching was not "a new rule" inasmuch as it did not change existing 
policy it was "a new rule" in terms that it made switching a more realistic possibility.  
No old rules were removed, so the experience of medicines falls clearly within the 
scope of layering. 
Tax relief on private medical insurance 
The introduction of tax relief of individually-purchased private medical insurance 
alongside the internal market reforms of 1990 was a simple concession, requiring  
just a minor change in tax regulations . Nonetheless it was also significant in 
conveying strong support for private medicine just at the time when the 
Government was embarking upon controversial changes to the NHS.  Again, this was 
an instance of layering according to the Mahoney and Thalen model for change. 
Dentistry 
The rise of private dentistry took place with little initial encouragement from the 
Government, following the creation of the Denplan scheme. The surge in 
registrations that followed  the agreement of the 1990 contract in response to a 
remuneration shift towards capitation continuing care, led to a serious and lasting 
dispute between the Government and dentists that was not settled until 1996. The 
focal point of the dispute, and the key to its eventual settlement, was the 
Government's claim to recoup an "overpayment" against a target average income for 
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dentists. This subsequent loss of faith and morale, combined with a newly viable 
market in private dentistry, led to a shift towards private care that has never been 
reversed. The Government, in seeking to claim back the overspend, was using a 
longstanding balancing mechanism in the remuneration system, albeit to a scale that 
had not been necessary previously.  This process puts the experience of dentistry in 
the 1990s into the category of a conversion, in which the application of old rules 
creates a change without the need for new rules.  
Discussion 
Whilst the Mahoney and Thalen  categories provide useful terminology for a  
moment of change, each case shows a tendency to move between categories over 
time.  In dentistry, for example, change  by  conversion during the first half of the 
1990s created a situation within which new rules were clearly required. The outcome 
was a new contract that made children's oral health the priority for NHS funding  and 
broadly accepted that adult NHS dentistry should be a safety-net service with a small 
Access Fund to provide coverage where gaps in the net appeared. Dentistry between 
1990 and 1996 underwent a process of change by conversion which in 1996 became 
a system of displacement. Similarly long-term care of the elderly, whilst initially a 
process of layering, underwent a more extensive programme of displacement as old 
rules were removed and replaced in the 1990 NHS and Community Care Act.  
Applied to the wider context of health policy a similar picture emerges. The 
introduction of general management to the NHS might be portrayed as layering, as 
the new managerial rules applied largely within the existing framework of  the NHS, 
although this cultural change was to play an important part in the changes that 
would  follow. The internal market reforms were a signicant political gamble, indeed 
the Prime Minister came very close to abandoning the reforms at a late 
stage(Timmins 2001:470). The gamble, however, would probably have been 
impossible without the earlier introduction of general management. The internal 
market reforms displaced many of the old rules of British health policy, and 
established an enduring new model in the ensuing decades, which has seen a 
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process of incremental conversion as the basic rules of the internal market are 
adapted and extended. 
As discussed in Chapter 2 (p28) Mahoney and Thelen categorise the contextual and 
institutional sources of change according to the degree of discretion in 
implementation that lies within the institution subject to change and veto 
possibilities exerted by the political context. 
In my assessment above I describe three of the case studies and the Griffiths NHS 
management reforms as fitting with Mahoney and Thalen's description of layering, 
which would suggest that this is the most common mode of change in health policy, 
within which  change is produced by the simple addition of new rules rather than by 
the revised application, neglect or removal of old rules. According to Mahoney and 
Thalen this mode is typical of an environment within which strong veto opportunities 
exist. In each of the cases that I put into this category it appears from the evidence 
that it is the Treasury that carries the most obvious power of veto, as all relate to 
aspects of care within which  spending had become a major concern.  The creation of 
a Limited List of prescribed products that the NHS would no longer fund was 
somewhat different, it was a change strongly supported, or even inspired,  by the 
Treasury.    
Layering and Strong Veto Possibilities 
The 1983 change to Supplementary Benefit regulations that produced a growth in 
recourse to this benefit for private residential care appears to have been the 
Treasury's preferred course of action in order to meet the serious problems related 
to long-term care within the NHS and local authority social services.  The 
Government was unlikely to countenance additional resources for local authorities, 
whose spending it was committed by its 1983 manifesto to control. Using the 
benefits system to manage the situation had the twin advantages that the Treasury 
would retain control through its ability to adjust benefit limits, and that the funding 




In the case of giving tax relief on private medical insurance it is clear that the 
Treasury was understandably reluctant, but this policy was clearly a personal 
demand from the Prime Minister with strong support from John Moore, the 
Secretary of State for Health and Social Security.  It seems that this combination 
made it impossible for the Chancellor to veto the policy, although he suggests that 
he would have done so if he had known that Moore would soon be replaced on the 
NHS review team in 1988 by Kenneth Clarke, who would have also opposed the new 
tax relief and been willing to argue the case with the Prime Minister. As it was, the 
Prime Minister was not isolated when the policy decision was taken. 
A similar situation arose in the context of the Griffiths NHS management reforms. 
Griffiths, the Managing Director of Sainsburys,  was personally recommended to the 
Prime Minister by John Sainsbury, and the Permanent Secretary at the Department 
of Health and Social Security had to make a significant effort to convince Griffiths to 
take on the task. Whilst in normal circumstances a large and untested investment in 
management in the public services would face the strong possibility of a Treasury 
veto, the circumstances involved in the appointment of Griffiths meant that this 
became highly unlikely once Griffiths had agreed to the project. 
The sudden announcement of a Limited List would have had the strong support of 
the Treasury. The idea of a black list of medicines that would be banned from NHS 
prescription had existed for many years, but the Government had set itself against 
such a control. Not only would such a list present a major incursion into clinical 
freedom, and thus face strong professional opposition from doctors whose 
independence the Conservatives had fought for in opposing the legislation creating 
the NHS, but it would also risk damaging Britain industrial success as a base for 
global pharmaceutical companies.  The Government appears to have calculated that 
doctors would find it difficult to justify a veto of the policy, although they came very 
close in their strident opposition. They also designed a minimal scheme, that would 
have little initial effect on the research-based pharmaceutical industry, particularly 
when combined with new steps to facilitate the switch of medicines from 
prescription-only status to pharmacy availability. Thus ministers judgement about 
the power of potential veto holders is crucial. 
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The low levels of institutional discretion in the interpretation and implementation of 
changes that Mahoney and Thalen give institutions in cases where change takes 
place by layering seems pertinent to these cases. Indeed, with  regard to the new tax 
relief on medical insurance and to the use of Supplementary Benefit for private 
residential care home fees implementation was in the hands of the consumer. The 
Limited List was imposed by ministers, and although an Advisory Committee on NHS 
Drugs was established to manage the list, decisions on additions to the list remained 
with ministers, so that any discretion in its implementation was very low. Although 
the Griffiths report on the management of the NHS was short, at just 24 pages, it 
nonetheless established a clear structure for the introduction of general 
management, with which the NHS had little option but to comply. 
 Displacement  and the general ophthalmic  service 
The introduction of competition into general ophthalmic services was a dramatic and 
rapid change. By 1983 the opticians' ban on advertising was at odds with the political 
context of the country and with developments in the sector. The Office of Fair 
Trading Report gave ministers the opportunity to act.  Alongside the introduction of 
price competition, by ending the restriction on advertising, the change also 
presented an opportunity to limit access to NHS-provided spectacles.  As would be 
the case with dentistry, implementation was largely in the hands of consumers, and 
their demand for higher quality spectacles brought major new entrants into the 
market. Competition rules and consumer demand meant that the opticians had little 
realistic capacity to either veto the change or to manage its impact. 
Conversion and Dentistry 
The privatisation of much adult dentistry from 1990 differs from the other cases as it 
was, at least initially, driven by dentists and consumers rather than by government. 
The arrival of Denplan provided a new means of paying for private dentistry, and 
technical advance, and improving dental health were shifting the focus of adult care. 
The repercussions of the surge of registrations following the introduction of 
capitation payments in the 1990 contract, led to cost-control efforts that simply 
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accelerated the dentists' shift towards private care. In this case, of course, the 
dentists had considerable discretion in the implementation of the 1990 policy that 
moved NHS funding partially towards the maintenance of oral health and away from 
restorative treatment. Their response to the Government's intention to use the usual 
"balancing mechanism" to claw back the 1990-91 overspend was entirely voluntary. 
It is notable that the shift towards private care continued after the 1996 settlement 
of the dispute with the Government, which included the abandonment of the claw 
back and an overt acceptance that NHS dentistry would be focused on children's oral 
health. 
 
These cases show the importance of the external environment on exerting veto or 
directional power, whether this is economic, technological or consumer power. This 
point will be discussed further at the conclusion of this chapter.  
 
Mapping by policy streams 
In order to bring structure to largely narrative accounts the case studies and the 
history of the internal market were mapped using an adaptation of Kingdon's three 
policy streams of problems, policies and politics that combine to put an item on the 
agenda for change in a "policy window".  Taking an approach based on the actions of 
the policy elite I have reduced the politics stream to the individuals involved, 
described simply as "people". The policy entrepreneurs who, in the Kingdon model, 
lie in wait for the three streams to converge in order to seize a window of 
opportunity may often be part of the politics stream themselves. If not, they are 
unlikely to be in a position to put a policy on the agenda. In my cases, for example, 
David Willetts plays an important role, both as a policy entrepreneur and as a 
policymaker. Roy Griffiths was initially simply an external consultant, but became an 
influential adviser to the Prime Minister and ministers and hence very much part of 
the politics stream, and it is interesting that in the course of the research his 
contribution to Government deliberations is evident in many aspects of health policy 
and not just the management and community care reforms with which he is most 
associated and in which he played a central role.   
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This mapping process produces some common observations across the different 
arenas. The wider economic environment plays a consistently important role in 
incidents of change. This is unsurprising given the costs to the Exchequer of health 
and social care, and the relevance to this of any boundary shift that limits future 
state liabilities for funding. These wider influences do not, however, fit neatly within 
the three streams, often playing a part not only in the formation of a problem, but 
also in the policies to address these. This is certainly the case in both dentistry and 
ophthalmics, where increasing affluence, changing consumer aspirations, and 
technological improvements created serious problems for the NHS, but were also 
central elements of policies that would take these services in a new direction. This 
may be symptomatic of the societal changes brought about by the Conservatives; so 
that problems of affordability in welfare would no longer be answered with policies 
to simply control demand, but with wider responses that share demand. As far as the 
analysis of welfare policy is concerned this significant shift may generate problems 
for the Kingdon model as it removes the clear division between two of the three 
streams. This analytical problem is, of course, avoided if problems are narrowly 
defined, without the inclusion of cultural factors. If, for example, the problem in NHS 
medicines in the 1980s is simply defined as one of price, and not also of 
consumerism and self-reliance, then the appropriate policy responses would be 
similarly narrow and focused on reducing prices, either directly or through generic 
substitution. A broader definition of the problem, also generates a broader policy 
response, as seen in most of the cases covered here. Far from restricting demand, 
the policy responses tend to feed demand. This was the case in elderly care, 
ophthalmics, dentistry, and medicines.      
The “people” stream that has been used as a replacement for Kingdon’s ‘politics’ 
stream due to a focus on the policy elite in this analysis demonstrates that there may 
be value in taking such approach, at least in certain contexts, for  policy analysis. 
With funding a routine feature amongst the problems that produce episodes of 
changes there is a degree of inevitability that Treasury ministers and the Prime 
Minister, as First Lord of the Treasury, should play a significant role. More interesting 
is the strategic role played by health ministers, in seeking to obtain the best from this 
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situation. In particular, it seems that Fowler played a very tactical game in the case of 
long-term care for the elderly; he achieved a shift to Supplementary Benefit funding 
for an expansion in private bed capacity, which fell outside of his department's 
controlled spending limit and  onto a demand-led area145 of social security spending. 
This supported significant growth in the private sector provision of residential care, 
making fundamental reform both possible and necessary. 
The policies stream produces interesting results. These also raise questions as to 
how broad this stream might be, as technological change and concepts of quality 
appear to be important in policy development. Most particularly, looking at these 
cases it is clear that the development of the state's role as a purchaser of care, and 
perhaps not the sole provider, pre-dates the NHS internal market that was 
developed by the Government during 1988. Indeed, the changes in long-term 
residential care from 1983 and the spectacle vouchers scheme from 1986 show this 
approach being put into practice.  
As discussed above an analysis that is wholly focused on Kingdon's three streams 
however lacks adequate breadth to capture the environmental factors that can 
underlie new policies. The rise of a consumer agenda in the 1980s played an 
important part in the changes that took place in each of the case studies. New 
possibilities in spectacle frames and lenses, rising expectations in old age, and the 
rise of cosmetic treatments in dentistry all provide examples of where external 
factors would also be increasing the opportunities for change. Others who have used 
the streams approach to map case studies have found similar shortcomings in 
providing a complete explanation of why policy windows open. An analysis of 
Professor Darzi's role as a "policy entrepreneur" for changes to London's health 
system found that although he developed  and promoted policies for change, he did 
not conform  to Kingdon's description of a policy entrepreneur, waiting  for policies 
to come along when a political opportunity arises. In the Darzi case there was no 
policy "readiness", and Darzi himself redefined the problem that he would 
address(Oborn et al. 2011). Roberts and King subdivide policy entrepreneurs into 
                                                     




four groups: "political entrepreneurs", "executive entrepreneurs" (leaders in official 
roles), "bureaucratic entrepreneurs" (others in the official system), and "policy 
entrepreneurs" outside officialdom(Roberts and King 1991). This research emphasis 
the role of political entrepreneurs within the selected cases of change. As Willetts 
remarked on the internal market reforms: "We didn't need Alain Enthoven coming 
over to develop an internal market model, but having an American expert coming in 
saying it was better than just having a Policy Unit saying it"146. Several of the policies 
studied were very vague when legislated, and the policy entrepreneurs associated 
with them played an important role in their subsequent development.  
The role of clan disloyalty 
The research highlights the important role played by a very small number of people 
within the health policy elite. This is a  feature of the health policy arena noted by 
Kingdon who comments that, even in a country the size of the United States, within 
this arena: "there is a fair amount of interaction among the admittedly diverse 
elements"(Kingdon 1995:118).  
Additionally, evidence from several cases emphasises the way in which external 
financial and cultural circumstances drive change. It reveals little to suggest that 
health policy is subject to self-reinforcing processes that limit the scope for this 
change, other than a very general resistance to change. In some of the cases the 
level of institutional resistance is extremely high: In 1987 the Conservatives came 
close to losing Parliamentary votes on ophthalmic and dental reforms within months 
of a successful re-election campaign that had produced a parliamentary majority of 
102 seats. 
The actions of the policy elite and external change alone cannot account for lasting 
policy change. In the case of tax relief for private medical insurance the change did 
not persist and spread. Importantly, in four of the five cases, and in the account of 
the internal market reforms, changes soon became entrenched because there was a 
small grass-roots movement to support them, sufficiently disloyal to the earlier 
                                                     
146 Interview 4 July 2006 
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arrangement. This is very similar to the game-theoretic account given by Greif and 
Laitin of the divergent histories of Venice and Genoa; in the case of Venice they 
argue that the "quasi-parameters" within that society suppressed inter-clan rivalry in 
Venice even after the uniting effects of external threats to the City disappeared, but 
these factors were not present in Genoa in the same circumstances, so that the 
latter city's institutions collapsed amidst clan disloyalty. They did not act to bring 
about a collapse of the old order, but were motivated by the endogenous "quasi-
parameters" of the institutional arrangements. In Venice endogenous factors within 
its complex political system meant that the clans still had an underlying interest in 
maintaining the old order after the external environment changed. Those involved in 
both cities may well have failed to understand why they reacted as they did, but they 
responded to the incentives that were present  (Greif and Laitin 2004).  A similar 
effect is seen in the case studies if a change in the external environment enables a 
sufficient degree of disloyalty within at least one clan, then a policy of institutional 
change becomes a realistic proposition. Whilst the disloyal actors within the health 
policy arena may not have perceived themselves as playing a game-changing role, or 
desired such a role, their responses to external changes, whether by policymakers or 
amongst their customers, played a significant part in establishing a change of path: 
Within healthcare, for example, if a sufficient group of doctors or dentists opt-in to 
new arrangements against the wishes of their representative organisations, as 
happened in 1948, this may be sufficient for decisive change to become established. 
Acting upon their own motivations rather than those of policymakers, their disloyalty 
has a profound effect.     
In some areas the external change that leads eventually to disloyalty arises from 
technical or social change. In ophthalmics, dentistry, long-term care of the elderly, 
and making medicines available in pharmacies technical change made improved 
standards of care possible, for which there was a degree of effective demand in the 
private market. Individual consumers and providers seized the opportunities to act 
once they were able to do so. Government action to change the parameters of the 
game  followed. 
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The purchaser-provider separation that was first developed in long-term care of the 
elderly and later in the NHS internal market became entrenched because there was a 
sufficient number of eager purchasers to make the new system work. In long-term 
care this was driven by a new incentive from 1983 that enabled local authorities, as 
purchasers, to shift costs from their own budgets and onto centrally-funded 
Supplementary Benefit. In the NHS internal market, the voluntary general 
practitioner fundholding scheme, saw sufficient numbers of GPs opt in to holding 
budgets by the time of the election of a Labour government in 1997 to have 
established both the decentralised purchasing of care in particular, and the internal 
market more generally147. In the case of tax relief for private medical insurance, by 
1997 there was both an insufficient number of people who would be harmed or 
complain upon its removal, and an increasing cost to the public purse. The policy to 
give tax relief on private medical insurance did not provoke disloyalty. Neither the 
insurance sector nor consumers demonstrated sufficient  enthusiasm that this 
concession could become entrenched and, perhaps, extended.   
Set within the context of health policy since the Second World War, and the debate 
over the creation of the NHS, this research suggests that the path taken has been 
changed substantially. This has not come about at a critical juncture resulting from 
an external shock, but by piecemeal, incremental changes most of which took place 
between 1983 and 1996.   
Between the 1944 coalition white paper and Bevan's 1947 NHS Act the debate 
focused on the independence of hospitals and doctors within the health system, and 
decentralised administration. The similarities between the Conservatives' ambitions 
in 1944 and in 2010 are striking (Dept of Health 2010a; Min of Health 1944). The 
major difference is that in 1944 the Coalition Government argued for local 
authorities to be responsible for local health services, whereas in 2010 this role 
would be taken by local "GP commissioning consortia , working in partnership with 
local authorities" and with local "Health Watch" organisations funded by local 
authorities. 
                                                     
147 This conflicts with the political rhetoric of 1997 in which the NHS internal market and GP 
fundholding were abolished.  
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This study set out to address three research questions relating to the processes of 
health policy continuity and change. It has taken a novel approach looking 
specifically at examples of change which, taken together and over time, challenge 
assumption of continuity.  Through a combination of micro and macro levels of 
investigation it sheds some light on the factors involved.   
Does path dependency adequately explain health policy under Conservative 
governments? 
The most fundamental aspect of the NHS remained unchanged by 18 years of 
Conservative government motivated by a "New Right" philosophy. In 1997 the NHS 
could still be described as a comprehensive, universal service largely free at the point 
of use. This is the same description as could have been applied in 1952 after charges 
for some services were introduced, if not in 1948 when the NHS was created. 
This does not necessarily imply that the NHS experiences the self-reinforcing 
processes that are central to the existence of path dependency. The changes that 
took place in the case studies, and in the wider internal market reforms, took place 
despite strong pressures for the status quo, and arguably the reforms of the 1980s 
changed the culture of the NHS. Taken together the changes that have occurred 
amount to a cultural shift that has transformed both the language of discourse on 
health policy, and redefined the boundaries of state provision.  
The fact that the NHS remains largely tax-funded may not be the result of self-
reinforcing processes, but the result of a rational calculation that this is the cheapest 
and most controllable means of ensuring the basic, universal health coverage to 
which all countries aspire. The debate within Government over the question of tax 
relief for private medical insurance presented a situation in which this rational 
concern to control public spending was confronted with a political concern to reward 
those who assume a degree of personal responsibility for their own health. This is a 
rational choice rather than a constraint  imposed by any self-reinforcing processes. 
The counterfactual in this case would be that if tax-funding was more expensive than 
an alternative funding system would the NHS funding system have been retained 
due to the institutional or other constraints on change associated with it? With the 
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constant questioning of the NHS, and the dominance of the Treasury in 
decisionmaking, it seems doubtful that it would.  
It is clearly the case that the NHS has been a very  economic solution to fulfilling a 
common ambition.  This does, of course, also raise the question as to why other 
countries have not adopted a tax-funded model. This is particularly pertinent for 
those countries of Central and Eastern Europe which  needed to create new health 
systems following the collapse of communism after 1989. Tax-funding is not the only 
means of establishing a single insurance pool in order to avoid the risk-selection 
problems associated with health insurance schemes, but it is the one that gives the 
Treasury the most direct control over spending.    
Turning to the question of charges for NHS care. Again, as the case studies 
demonstrate the peripheral role of charges within the NHS owes more to economic 
logic than to self-reinforcing processes created by the NHS. There are limited aspects 
of care in which charges could serve a useful role. The risk of deterring early 
treatment and preventative care, leading to delayed intervention is high.  Where 
charges are unlikely to lead to these effects they have been used. This is particularly 
true of dentistry, as oral health and technical advances produced a shift from fillings, 
removals and denture fitting to routine care and cosmetic treatments. Other charges 
are simply a means of raising money, and a useful tool in spending negotiations 
within government.  
The case studies and the discussion of the internal market demonstrate a very 
limited role for institutions in processes of change.  In most of the cases change 
occurred despite strong opposition from the main institutions associated with the 
case. In the case of long-term care of the elderly the initial change was such a small, 
technical change that it faced no apparent opposition. Indeed, the perverse 
incentives then in the care system presented widespread intrinsic support given that 
the change produced an inflow of new finance to a system confronted with  excess 
demand and typified by poor standards of care.  
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The most significant barriers to change came from within government. The Treasury 
was a longstanding opponent of tax "perks", but the Prime Minister's concerns to 
show support for self-reliance amongst people on "middle incomes"  and her 
demands for limited  tax relief on private medical insurance in 1988 was too forceful 
to resist, and too limited to be a serious cause for Treasury concern given the much 
wider debates between the Chancellor and Prime Minister in 1988.  The financial 
pressure would be the same whatever the core system used for state-funded care. In 
ophthalmics and dentistry, the personal and constituency interests of Conservative 
members of parliament made the process of change rather uncertain. Even shortly 
after a third decisive election victory in 1987,  the Conservative rebellions in 
parliamentary votes over the removal of free sight tests and dental checks  reduced 
the Government's majority to single figures.  
Bevan and Robinson take issue with Tuohy's claim that path dependency within the 
NHS is generated by its state-hierarchical structure, which ensured that pre-existing 
relationships were maintained across the new purchaser-provider divide in the 
1990s(Tuohy 1999b). Instead, they argue that economic logics account for limitations 
on poiicymakers in moving the NHS away from the suboptimal balance of cost-
control, equity and efficiency generated in 1948(Bevan and Robinson 2005). Neither 
of these accounts, however, seem to claim that health systems experience increasing 
returns to a particular path, so that the longer a path is kept the stronger the self-
reinforcing effect. Path dependence without increasing returns is not path 
dependence. That there are strong forces against change is not unusual, but to 
assert path dependence without a requirement of increasing returns is not a  
falsifiable theory of continuity.  Neither Tuohy  nor Bevan and Robinson demonstrate 
increasing returns if change is avoided.  
Furthermore, the evidence of change is substantial. The level of parliamentary 
opposition to the cases presented, including opposition from Conservatives, does 
not suggest that the changes would have occurred if a different government, with 
different leaders, had been in power from 1979. The Royal Commission on the NHS 
in 1979(HMSO 1979) strongly endorsed the status quo, which would have had a 
similar effect as the Guillebaud Report(Guillebaud 1956) in limiting the options for 
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radical change had the Government not possessed a very strong ideological drive for 
change. All these examples throw more doubt on the path dependency model of 
health policy that is so dominant in the literature, as discussed in Chapter 2.   
 
What are the common factors in the processes of change? 
problems 
In reviewing the case studies and the origins of the internal market reforms it is clear 
that in most cases there was a very clear problem to be addressed.  
Table 5 Factors in the Case Studies 
The exception was tax relief for private medical insurance. Whilst the Prime Minister 
may have felt that it was unfair that some people were "paying twice" for 
Change Factors in the Case Studies 
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healthcare, with no recognition, this was by no means a pressing political problem. 
The take-up of private health insurance had grown rapidly from the late 1970s, and 
although the rate of growth was slowing by the time of the 1988 Ministerial Review 
of the NHS, growth continued nonetheless. Two specific arguments were made by 
ministers in support of a tax relief solely for the elderly; that these people had 
previously enjoyed private insurance under employer-provided schemes, which they 
would lose on retirement; and that they would fall back on the NHS at the stage in 
life when their care needs would be rising, which was the source of most pressure on 
the NHS. These, however, were arguments made by ministers in support of the 
policy change, rather than problems that were in the policy arena before the change. 
This lack of a clear "problem" may well account for the fact that this change was 
reversed in 1997. 
people 
In each case there was at least one person within the policy arena whose actions 
ensured that change occurred.  Ironically, in the case of the Limited List for 
medicines and the internal market reforms it seems that the Chairman of the British 
Medical Association (BMA) may have played a role in ensuring that the changes were 
completed. The political structures of the BMA mean that it is prone to very strong 
reactions to policy, given the level of internal competition between its leading 
figures. This may be a longstanding issue for the BMA, as the account of the creation 
of the NHS reveals a similarly extreme reaction to Bevan's proposals, with the 
Conservative Party giving its support to the BMA even after the Bill had received 
Royal Assent. Contrary to some accounts of health policy, this research suggests not 
only that the BMA and other interest groups are unable to block change, but also 
that they can in certain cases actually reinforce change. In the case of the 1988 
review that led to the internal market reforms a high profile intervention by the 
medical royal colleges appears to have been an important factor in convincing the 
Prime Minister of the need for a fundamental review as they demanded(Edwards 





The case studies demonstrate a weakness in Kingdon's depiction of the policy stream 
in agenda-setting. It was actually rarely the case that there were well prepared 
policies, with their own policy entrepreneurs lying in wait, at the initiation of change. 
In the case of the Limited List it seems that a policy for generic substitution was 
better prepared and more widely advocated than one for a limited list of 
prescribable medicines. Similarly, in the funding of long-term care of the elderly, this 
had been debated for many years with no obvious solution when ministers took 
steps to boost private sector residential capacity. In the case of ophthalmics the 
initial step of lifting the sector's self-imposed ban on optician advertising was a small 
step with significant consequences, that did not require policy entrepreneurs to 
press a case. The privatisation process of adult dentistry was well underway by the 
time the Government and the profession developed a bilateral policy response in 
1996. Even then, the residual problem of access to NHS dentistry was to be 
addressed by local contracting, which would be developed in pilot projects following  
the 1996 Primary Care Act. This was by no means a well-developed policy waiting for 
problems and politics to present its opportunity to join the agenda. These instances 
required an astute politician with some political vision to see an opening and to 
pursue it.   
Environmental change 
A common theme throughout the cases is the shift towards a system that is more 
consumer-focused, whether through a separation of purchasers and providers, so 
that purchasers take on an agency relationship, or through the direct empowerment 
of users through enhanced choices or voucher schemes. 
Issues of technical and  cultural change play a prominent role.  The Griffiths 
management reforms introduced new functions to the NHS, including information 
technology systems, without which the internal market would have been a technical 
impossibility. The advent of fluoride toothpaste and, to a very limited extent, water 
fluoridation, made a shift in the role of dentists inevitable, indeed the remuneration 
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system failed to keep pace with the improvements in oral health seen during the 
1980s.  
It can be argued that technical advances combined with a new focus on public 
spending restraint from 1976 lay behind each of the changes discussed in this paper. 
Pharmaceutical advance, for example, has been significant in increasing life-
expectancy, particularly in the context of cardiovascular disease, with improving 
treatment of hypertension and blood  lipid levels. As the blockbuster medicines 
produced by the pharmaceutical industry since the 1960s began to go off patent, a 
system would be required both to provide the developers with an ongoing income 
stream and to ensure the use of generic versions within the tax-funded health 
system. 
Cultural changes during the 1980s were dramatic, and one of the lasting memories 
of the Thatcher years. The health system was not exempt from the rise of 
consumerism. In 1972 Geoffrey Howe was appointed to Heath's Cabinet as the first 
Minister for Consumer Affairs and told the National Council for Social Services that 
they should see their clients as "essentially no different in their needs and desires, in 
terms of service, from the customers of shops and garages"(Howe 1994:71). This was 
a sentiment that was not to be fully pursued for some time.  
How can theory better explain the NHS policy process? 
This research has focused on change rather than continuity in health policy, and by 
doing so it has revealed the rational processes that may lie behind a change of 
direction. The substantive changes that have been studied, whilst they demonstrate 
distinctive changes of path, have taken place in a systematic way outside of events 
that would qualify as critical junctures. In economic terms they better reflect the 
common processes of incremental innovation in which old technologies experience 
diminishing or constant returns, than processes of path dependency with increasing 
returns and requiring a substantial external shock to generate a shift from a sub-
optimal technology. Harrison & Wood's theory that there has been a  recent change 
from health policy reforms based on a developed "blueprint", as in the 1974 NHS 
reorganisation, to reforms around a basic "bright idea" (S. Harrison and Wood 1999) 
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is challenged by the most recent reforms set out by the Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat Coalition government in 2010, with a new administrative model for the 
NHS.  This conformed much more to the model of a blueprint than a bright idea, and 
suggests that Harrison’s attempt to explain the 21st century policy process as 
different to what went before does not offer a robust basis for analysis, at least at 
the health system level, although reforms by occasional "bright ideas" might be said  
to feature in some of the case studies discussed: GP budgets might be a good 
example. 
Mahoney and Thalen's four modes of change, however, does appear to provide a 
flexible model for analysis and assists in developing a theory of policy continuity and 
change. The inclusion of strong and weak veto possibilities appears to fit well with 
the data from the case studies in this research. 
Theory of the policy process must, however, incorporate the role of change in the 
external environment. The Conservatives used these changes in a strategic way to 
create a new base of support that often confounded the opposition to reform. 
According to Clive Smee, in the early years of the Conservative governments from 
1979  civil servants in the DHSS were resistant to the Conservative policies and were, 
therefore, sidelined by ministers because "they seemed unable to move with the 
times148".   
Clan disloyalty 
The cases covered in this paper show the importance in policy change of a cohort of 
actors who prove disloyal to the old regime. Their disloyalty may be shaped by the 
                                                     
148 Interview: 7 June 2006. Smee adds that this contrasted significantly with the situation in 1997: "I 
think civil servants were much more conscious of the fact when Blair came in …political advisers" 
(interview) and later added: "this understates the contrast between the Department's reaction to 
Blair and to Thatcher. In 1996 I was sent on a three month round the world tour by my Perm Sec in 
large part to collect ideas that might interest an  incoming Labour Government. Several ideas in the 
first Labour Government White Paper, "The New NHS, Modern, Dependable" came directly out of 
that tour, including NHS Direct and regular patient experience surveys. (Blair's memoirs say NHS 
Direct was invented by Robert Hill, his health political adviser, but it was not. The title and the idea 
came from one of my senior Operational Research colleagues - I still have the minute in which the 





obscure "quasi parameters" of the game in which they are actors, or incorporated 
into reformers' policy design. The most obvious example is that of fundholding 
general practitioners in the internal market. Whilst Tuohy describes resilience within 
the internal market due to the persistence of past relationships between purchasers 
and providers, it was the fundholding experiment that broke these relationships 
sufficiently to entrench the purchaser-provider model in the NHS. The fundholding 
scheme only took off because of the enthusiastic involvement of the pioneering GPs 
who took it up in its first year despite the vigorous opposition of the BMA. The 
Secretary of State for Health, Kenneth Clarke, claims to have invented the concept of  
fundholding whilst on holiday in Galicia(Ham 2000:7). Whilst ideas for GP budgets 
had been in the policy arena over the preceding few years (Teeling-Smith 1984) and 
advocated by one particular civil servant who had himself been a GP(Glennerster and 
Lieberman 2011). It was undoubtedly Clarke who introduced this into the ministerial 
review of the NHS in 1988 after his summer holiday (Timmins 2001:462).  
The level of clan disloyalty when the NHS reforms were introduced in 1990 appears 
to have been greater than ministers anticipated. The earlier Griffiths reforms had 
created  a new group of managers who were not tied to the old system, and the 
fundholding scheme presented new opportunities for some GPs. But with regard to 
the latter Clarke says; "the object was to get them going and then make them the 
envy of the service". The internal market began with 57 hospitals opting for 
independent "Trust" status and some 1700 GPs in fundholding practices(Timmins 
2001:467-9). Ophthalmic liberalisation from 1983 created new opportunities for an 
increasingly-wealthy population to shop around for designer spectacles and 
sunglasses. The introduction in 1986 of a voucher scheme extended this privilege to 
those who still qualified for NHS support, and they opted in rapidly increasing 
number to top-up their vouchers in order to trade-up in spectacles. At the same time 
companies including Boots (a pharmacy) seized the new opportunities to enter the 
opticians market. These breaks from loyalty to the status quo that had persisted 
within the ophthalmic service since the 1950s mitigated the effects of changes to the 
NHS charging regime and shifted the culture of the market for ophthalmic services.  
Similar processes were witnessed in long-term care of the elderly, dentistry and 
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medicines. The clans of  providers and consumers who were content to break with 
the old system made the changes viable and sustainable. 
Contemporary application 
In each of the cases where boundaries shifted and lasting change emerged the new 
approach addressed a specific problem. In 1983 there was clearly frustrated demand 
in the market for spectacles that NHS funding would be unable to satisfy and a 
shortage of capacity in the market for care of the elderly, and worrying growth in the 
NHS drugs bill. In 1987 the health system was gripped by a financial crisis that had 
not be averted by constant growth in spending. In the 1990s dentists were opting 
out of adult NHS care creating gaps in NHS coverage.    
Heclo in an historical analysis of the failed Clinton health reforms identifies the lack 
of a clearly defined and conveyed  purpose as an important factor in the proposals' 
failure (Heclo 1995). This may also, of course, be relevant to recent efforts at reform. 
The Coalition government's 2010 blueprint for health reform had a poorly-defined 
purpose, and when its Bill was published they "struggled to explain the logic" 
(Timmins 2012:84) particularly as the preceding message to the electorate from both 
parties in the coalition was that structural reform was not required. Launching his 
2010 White Paper the Health Secretary claimed that: "People  voted for 
change"(Dept of Health 2010b) and told Parliament that: 
"The NHS today faces great challenges: it must respond to the demands of an 
increasing and ageing population, advances in medical technology and rising 
expectations; it remains stifled by a culture of top-down bureaucracy, which 
blocks the creativity and innovation of its staff; and it does not deliver 
outcomes in line with the best health services internationally-many of our 
survival rates for disease are worse than those of our neighbours. The NHS 
must be equipped to meet those challenges. We believe it can do much better 
for patients, so today I am publishing the White Paper, "Equity and 
Excellence: Liberating the NHS", so that we can put patients right at the heart 
of decisions made about their care, put clinicians in the driving seat on 
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decisions about services, and focus the NHS on delivering health outcomes 
that are comparable with, or even better than, those of our international 
neighbours." (HC Deb, 12 Jul 2010, Vol. 513, Col 661) 
His statement appeared to include eight or more purposes for the reforms, with no 
particular focus. By being confusing, however, it was also  (initially) also less 
controversial than it became. For all the debate that ensued later, just one Liberal 
Democrat, John Pugh, intervened during the discussion of the Ministerial statement 
on the White Paper, and then only to question the degree of direct local 
accountability within the new system. The opposition came from outside the House 
of Commons. In November 2010 the leadership of the Royal College of GPs changed, 
and a new hostile approach to the plans was launched(Timmins 2012:71).  
The Health Secretary appears to have decided to present the reforms as 
revolutionary rather than an evolution of what Labour had done since 2001, in order 
to avoid giving any credit to his political opponents. In the context of a coalition 
government this seems to have been a mistake. Lansley lacked the foot soldiers of 
change that were present in other reforms. It was unclear who would benefit. The 
contrast with the case studies in this research is clear. In each successful case of 
change there would be a group who ready to defend the new regime by their actions 
whilst the major institutions were still fighting over the old regime. 
The relevance of a role for disloyal clans in policy change can be seen in these most 
recent reform measures. As well as a lack of clarity over the problem to be 
addressed by the 2010 health proposals it was  also unclear who might benefit from 
them: The commissioning  of care was to be devolved  to "GP commissioning 
consortia", involving not only GPs, but local authorities and others. This is unlikely to 
be an attractive proposition for either. Managers would  lose their posts in Primary 
Care Trusts and Strategic Health Authorities, with the abolition of these agencies. All 
hospitals would be forced into independent operation as "Foundation Trusts" 
subject to market forces within a health system facing unprecedented financial 
constraints. Users of the service were told simply that the changes would somehow 
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meet the challenges of demographic change. The possibilities for a disloyal clan to 
play a part in entrenching the changes was very limited. 
In contrast to this, education policies were being simultaneously pursued that were 
following the GP fundholding approach of encouraging bottom-up support for 
change. This was despite professional and political hostility.  In September 2011, less 
than 18 months after taking office the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition 
government had already established the first "Free Schools". The change had 





This research questions the value of models based on path dependency for the 
analysis of welfare reform. The case studies of change demonstrate no evidence of 
the increasing returns that would  be accrued if a change of path is avoided. Indeed, 
the changes that took place appear if anything to have been partly in response to 
decreasing returns from the existing  path, whether measured financially or in 
political capital.  
Following Krasner's branching model(Krasner 1984), in each of the case studies 
policy made a decisive turn onto a new branch, and when taken together these 
appear to have also slowly pulled the overall health system in the new direction 
within a cultural shift for healthcare. In most of these cases the individuals involved 
within the policy  elite played a crucial role. Within the internal market reforms, for 
example, the replacement of Kenneth Clarke for John Moore made a dramatic 
difference, not because Clarke was more trusted on health policy, but because he 
understood the tactics required to defeat the British Medical Association having 
faced them over the Limited List five years earlier. Clarke indirectly enlisted a disloyal 
clan of GPs and managers to support the change. The research demonstrates that 
the presence of potential disloyalty to the established pattern of service and 
professional leadership amongst those affected by change  can be a crucial factor in 
the process.  
The research demonstrates the value of setting social policy within its wider context 
in order to understand the process of change and the quasi-parameters that might 
be at work in the policy arena. Whilst some of these might be visible, which would 
include the electoral cycle, others in the socio-economic environment may be less 
so. The rise of a consumer culture, which formed a core part of Thatcherism, played 
an important part in many policy arenas, becoming a new parameter for policy 
making and affecting actors' responses. 
Whilst Kingdon's policy streams provide a useful template for mapping episodes of 
change,  the three streams struggle to allow for the important role played by cultural 
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and technical change in agenda setting, unless a broad definition of problems and 
politics is used, which then generates overlap and confusion between these streams. 
Excessive focus on the micro-picture in a streams-based analysis can lead to the 
neglect of the effects of changes at the macro level.  Whilst the confluence of the 
three streams at a point in time provides a robust explanation of change in many 
cases, it appears not to do so in every case.  To stretch Kingdon's metaphor a stage 
further, the streams may converge, but their banks may also be on the move. These 
larger forces may, if anything, have the greater effect on agenda setting. 
Originality 
The research uses a novel design to investigate health policy  under the 
Conservatives between 1979 and 1997, combining the traditional literature with grey 
material, particularly biographical material, and a small number of interviews to 
investigate change. The researcher's own role within the policy arena enabled the 
identification of several interviewees whose influence and role would be relatively 
unknown. Indeed, some had never before been interviewed on the subject. These 
interviews provided valuable insights into the policy process at crucial points for the 
research. 
Drawing on  explanations  of endogenous change based in game theory  (Greif and 
Laitin 2004) the research identifies a critical role for clan disloyalty in achieving a 
change of direction. These agents of change might be both unwitting with regard to 
their role and unprepared, but are able to seize new opportunities when 
endogenous features of the "old" system give  little disincentive against this. It is the 
challenge for the policymaker to identify the potential for clan disloyalty and act 
when this potential can be realised.  
Research Limitations and Proposals for Future Research 
The concept of clan disloyalty as a factor for change within the policy process 
requires further investigation. It is unclear from this research whether policymakers 
were aware of the potential for such disloyalty in advance of each change, or 
whether the emergence of clan disloyalty was simply a fortuitous outcome. The case 
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studies do not reveal evidence of any prior analysis, for example, of the potential for 
new entrants into the markets for spectacles, dentistry, or residential care, or how 
many GPs might have been willing to take up the opportunity to hold their own 
budget. Some degree of estimation of clan disloyalty should be possible, but it is as 
yet unknown  whether this was intrinsic to the policymaking process and the 
decision to embark on a change of direction. Further research into the case studies 
using a game theoretic approach, and the motivations of those who displayed 
disloyalty to the status quo may reveal new insights into the processes of change. 
Additionally, it would be worthwhile pursuing a similar approach in other policy 
arenas, to investigate whether branching occurs, in which a small change is used to 
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Annexe 1: Chronology of relevant events 1979-97 
 
1979 General Election: Conservative majority 43 
Conservative Party Health Study Group advocates charges and compulsory health insurance. 
Prescription charge increased from 20p to 45p (and annually henceforth) 
1980 New NHS consultant contract eases restrictions on private practice. 
Tax concession to employers providing private medical insurance to employees earning less 
than £8,500pa (effective 1982) 
DHSS Guidance HC(80)10: Health Services Development. Health Services Act 1980: Private 
Practice in Health Service Hospitals and Control of Private Hospital Developments 
Health Service Bill proposes abolition of free sight tests and dental check – withdrawn 
1981 DHSS Guidance HC(81)1: Health Services Management: Contractual Arrangements with 
Independent Hospitals and Nursing Homes 
“Care in Action” Handbook for new District Health Authority chairmen emphasises mixed 
market opportunities 
Department of Health review of international experience with alternative health funding 
systems 
1982 Leak of CPRS report proposing a private insurance system to replace the NHS  
Mrs Thatcher: “The NHS is safe with us” 
Office of Fair Trading report on opticians 
NHS industrial dispute 
 
1983 Griffiths Report NHS Management Inquiry  
Supplementary Benefit Regulations endorse use for private residential care home fees 
Three popular medicines switched to Pharmacy status 
Falkands War 
General Election: Conservative majority 144 
1984 Health & Social Security Act ends opticians monopoly on spectacle sales  
 “Limited List” of products excluded from NHS prescription announced 
1985 Provision of NHS spectacles ended, except for special groups. 
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Opticians monopoly on sale of spectacles ended. 
1986 Voucher scheme for spectacles introduced, for children and low income groups 
NHS supply of spectacles ended 
1987 General Election: Conservative majority 102. 
“Black Monday” Stock Market Crash (October) 
Presidents of the medical Royal Colleges issue joint statement on NHS crisis 
Treasury provides £100m extra to NHS 
1988 Prime Minister announces NHS ministerial review. 
DHSS split: Kenneth Clarke appointed Health Secretary 
Griffiths Report Community Care: An Agenda for Action 
Spectacle voucher scheme extended to contact lenses 
Free sight tests and dental checks ended 
1989 “Working for Patients” White Paper proposed NHS internal market, and tax relief on private 
medical insurance premiums for people aged more than 60 years. (NHS & Community Care 
Act 1990) 
Removal of universal free dental examinations and sight tests 
1990 John Major becomes Conservative Leader & Prime Minister 
NHS & Community Care Act 
Tax Relief on Private Medical Insurance for over-60s announced 
Revised Dental contract includes partial shift to capitation payments 
1991 NHS internal market introduced, including first wave of GP fundholders 
First medicines “switch” guidelines issued 
1992 General Election: Conservative majority 21 
1993 Community Care reforms implemented 
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1994 Guidance on Operation of the Internal Market 
Tax Relief on Private Medical Insurance for over-60s restricted to basic rate 
Types of medicines eligible for POM-P switch extended 
1995 Use of Private Finance Initiative to build hospitals announced 
1996 Community Care (Direct Payments) Act 
Partnership scheme for long-term care insurance proposed 
Dental contract shifts focus to children’s dentistry 
1997 Primary Care Act allows piloting on new primary care services and local contracting for NHS 
dentistry.  
General Election: Labour majority 179 







Annexe 2 : Health Ministers & Special Advisers 1979-97 
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Clarke (Mar 82 -) 
Hugh Rossi 
Lynda Chalker/Tony 
Newton (Mar 82-) 
Lord Elton/Lord 
Trefgarne (Apr 82-) 
Geoffrey Finsberg 
Nicholas True 
1983 General Election 




(Sep 85-)/John Major 
(Sep 86-) 
Rhodes Boyson/Tony 
Newton (Sep 85-) 
Tony Newton/Ray 
Whitney (Sep 84-) 
John Patten/John Major 
(Sep 85-) 
Lord Glenarthur/Bns 





1987 General Election 












































Malone (Jul 94) 
Tim Yeo/John Bowis & Tom 










Gerald Malone Tom Sackville/John Horam 
(Nov 95) 







Background knowledge, supplemented by 
Special Advisers: Hansard, House of Commons, Written Answers 15 November 1991; 27 July 1990 
(Col 424); 1 December 1994 (Col 832); 17 May 1995 (Col 243); 20 March 1995 (Col 723). 
Additional information from Richard Marsh. & Charles Hendry MP 
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Geoffrey Howe John Biffen/Leon Brittan (Jan 81) Adam Ridley 
George Cardona 
1983 General Election 
June 
1983 






1987 General Election 
June 
1987 












Norman Lamont David Mellor Alastair Ross-Goobey 
Warwick Lightfoot 
1992 General Election 
April 
1992 
Norman Lamont Michael Portillo Bill Robinson 
P.W. Robinson 
David Cameron (May 92) 





Kenneth Clarke Michael Portillo/Jonathan Aitken (Jul 








Background knowledge supplemented by: Hansard, House of Commons, Written Answers, 15 





















Source: Thatcher Foundation Archive  
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Annexe 6 – Edwina Currie diary August- November 1987 
These extracts include previously unpublished material149  
 
John Moore and the National Health Service. 
 
See also; (Currie 2002). 
31 August 1987 
What do we think of them all? Moore is Kennedy. Clean looking and (apparently) 
clean living; clever, pretty, ambitious wife. He is keen to have team work, which 
suits me – Fowler sucked people dry  + then discarded them (Wardle, Heyhoe, 
Whitney, Newton and others) but JM asked for opinions on Social Fund from all 
Ministers and got them. But his political judgement is hasty – he tried to ditch 
Social Fund after all those hours  we put in (200+) on Bill, and all the 
commitments given by Willie Whitelaw et al. He wrote letter to John  Major (who 
put Bill through) saying SF was politically indefensible!! Then he found himself 
opposed in Cabinet by Major, Fowler (ditto) and Whitelaw amongst others. If he 
had thought twice he would not have tried it on, but he’s angry at NF for leaving 
so many blank cheques  (promises to Treasury about savings, which are (a) 
vague and (b) difficult, especially with AIDS problems) and he wants to show he’s 
smarter. I’m not sure he is. Portillo, who has worked with him before, says he’s 
‘sold as seen’ – there is no secret man. In that case, Moore is also intolerant and 
somewhat arrogant, despite the carefully offered charm; but he’s also insecure, 
and surrounds himself with evidence of his already achieved high office, eg the 
toys we are presented with on official occasions – his office is full of them (mine 
are languishing in a box in the kitchen!). 
9 September 1987   
Found  myself wondering about Tony Newton – most of the stuff in boxes has 
been through his hands + he seems to find it increasingly difficult to take a 
decision. He will have completed 7 years in DHSS by the next reshuffle: maybe all 
I have to do is sit tight150. But we need his brains. So far I doubt if John Moore has 
the same quantity. Last week he made a speech on privatisation in the USA which 
caused a stir here, leading articles etc, partly because he claimed to be sole 
begetter of this jewel in Margaret’s crown (“I” everywhere, not “we”) and partly 
because it’s seen as bid for the leadership when there’s a vacancy. But: he’s got 
probably 4 yrs at DHSS and he’s not going to be able to privatise it. A real thinker 
would be looking ahead, not claiming the past. Ken Baker is brainier I think and 
has greater vision and so far still has my preference.  
27th September 1987 
                                                     
149 Member of Parliament, Derbyshire South 1983-97.  Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for 
Health 1987-88. Councillor, Birmingham City Council 1975-86 
150 Until promotion 
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Someone with his eye firmly on the leadership is J Moore who made a strong 
speech on social security and getting away from the welfare state this week – it 
did cause a stir! It isn’t original and he will find it difficult. There’s a naivety 
about him, and an arrogant intolerance, that comes from a man of not excessive 
ability in a hurry. One adjective I should not use to describe him is “wily,” but 
Baker is, + so is John Major. Hurd wants it too but he’s so boring.  
Moore will come up against what Boyson called the “dog and bone” syndrome – 
you can’t take a bone from a dog that’s already eating. There are only 3 
groups/benefits Moore can tackle: pensioners (but they paid, and there are 10 
million of them), child benefit (but the Tory ladies like it – I don’t, but they are 
powerful) and the disabled (he hasn’t met them yet. Just watch!!).  
Let it be recorded that the origin of his thinking is Charles Murray’s “Losing 
Ground,”(Murray 1984) but it was sent to him after the election by Keith Joseph. 
If Moore were the brains he thinks he is he’d have read it before – it was 
published in ’84 in the USA. The same goes for me too, of course! It is fascinating, 
and devastatingly accurate in its view of why more welfare makes things worse, 
particularly in its destruction of the status rewards of being respectable, law-
abiding etc. Chilling reading. Where it’s hopeless is what to do about it!! Just 
abolishing the system won’t work - and in a democracy it requires a vote or two 
in a free Parliament to do it. Well, we shall see.” 
5th October 1987 
Quite a week! “Thinking Day” (actually 2pm Thurs –2pm Fri) at Chevening was 
quite something. Firstly it’s an extraordinary place: looks imposing from the 
outside but is stunning inside, beautifully kept, original furniture etc – just as old 
country houses used to be, I imagine, in the days of plenty of servants. And there 
were servants too – in striped pants and arrogantly obsequious, talking as if they 
were Sir Geoffrey’s151 personal staff + as if he was paying for the place! I don’t 
really like being served all the time – I find formality oppressive, especially when 
they insist on putting the cheese plate in front of me when I don’t want it. The 
rooms, ceilings etc are fabulous. We did most of our work in the ‘Tapestry Room’ 
ablaze with 18thc tapestries barely faded, with peacocks and lions leaping out at 
us. Out of a window, beyond the lake, was a hayfield, lazily dusty on a sunny 
afternoon, with a combine harvester making golden cylinders as the shadows 
lengthened. Best of all: the library with an unbelievable, priceless collection – 
texts of Aristotle from the 16thc, Thomas More’s Utopia, first editions of Isaac 
Newton and Adam Smith (signed!), original prints of Warren Hastings’ and 
Queen Charlotte’s trials etc. That was worth the visit alone. John Moore has been 
there several times as the Treasury team go in January for the first budget 
discussions. He wants to go again next year and we concur! 
 
The team was: 6 Ministers, JM’s Private Sec Geoffrey Podger (who listened – no 
notes), Andrew Turner and Paul Godfrey from CCO. We talked first about social 
security, about “doing a Murray” on the benefits system. There are 4 possibilities: 
enforce regs (eg insisting an availability to work), changing them to make them 
                                                     
151 Sir Geoffrey Howe MP 
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tighter (eg no dole for under 21s if training available), cutting value of benefits or 
cutting out a benefit. We fudged the latter two. It appears that Norman Fowler 
promised in a previous PES round that Child Benefit will be frozen anyway from 
next year – Moore v angry at the pre-emption of his decision-making power – but 
manifesto promised it would stay more or less as present. We decided that 
looking after elderly pensioners better was, however, a “non-Murray” event, i.e. 
there was no disincentive effect to giving more money to those who can’t get 
SERPS (roughly over-75s). We talked about equality of age of retirement and 
decided on 65 for both152 (more money to Treasury of course. And 
unemployment is less of a problem, while unfavourable changes in the ratio of 
earners to elderly dependents is more esp. as we head towards 2000 AD). 
Broadly speaking I think the social security proposals are good + will be welcome 
in the country. I’m more concerned about health: we thought the ideas were 
John’s own but it’s clear from today’s Independent that they come from Margaret 
and they don’t really answer the problem, which is, how to match increased 
demand for health? She/he wants to ‘meld’ the state and the private sector by 
getting the NHS to behave more like a private operator (or rather a collection of 
geographically sparkling operators). If one has spare capacity, the DHA can “sell” 
it to others or to the private sector. They’re thinking of Bart’s which is planning 
to lease a whole wing to the private sector. (She also wants medical audit as to 
why waiting lists and cost per operation are higher in some patches than others, 
but that didn’t come up at Chevening). The problems are, that the private sector 
won’t like it – they’d like NHS pay beds abolished not increased; the staff won’t 
like it, they are already resentful of doctors making money out of sickness etc; it 
will take a lot of management time and effort, with the main result of increasing 
output without increasing input which is already a problem (since it pushes up 
costs sharply). The only reason any NHS facility has spare capacity is because 
they haven’t the conventional finance to run it (“the cuts”) and there isn’t a DHA 
in the country with spare cash. Most of all it’s a solution which doesn’t address 
itself to the main problem namely how to dig out a steady and substantial 
increase in resources to keep up with the growth in demand! We’ve seen 5-7% 
jumps in numbers of patients treated in many HAs in the last 12 months. If this 
keeps up, the total spend on health will have to rise from its current £21bn 
(+£¾bn private) to (say) a total of £30bn by the next election. And just swapping 
resources around through some limited, primitive and (probably) arbitrary 
pricing system won’t generate an extra £8bn. In any case there is an assumption 
that the present allocation is necessarily inefficient and I don’t agree; whereas 
any internal market will respond to the energy and initiative of the big London 
teaching hospitals and will drain money down from the midlands and the 
north.  That will suit Bart’s and Guy’s down to the ground of course but it negates 
RAWP and is quite simply not what we’ve been trying to do.  (It is not inefficient 
to allocate money instead to Sheffield and Newcastle, in my view). 
My feeling is that we can fund limited growth in NHS – say up to £27-28bn – and 
expect the rest from private sector (say, → £2½bn). Now that implies v rapid 
growth of private, but I don’t see why not – the essential prerequisite, a large 
number of fairly well off people, is being met. We agreed to seek tax relief on 
BUPA subscriptions for the over 75s as they do have to pay extra – doubt if the 
                                                     
152 Announced in the 1991 Budget 
245 
 
Chancellor will agree, but worth trying153. And to explore a voucher system (as 
with specs) for hearing aids, wheelchairs154, and possibly selected ops like hip 
replacements. I pointed out the problem Keith Joseph had with universal 
vouchers for education – the admin complexity – but you could do it for certain 
types of shortage, priority surgery easily enough. There are precedents in 
housing eg sheltered housing owned by council. Any further changes require 
modification of 1977 NHS Act which forbids charging – will be looked at, but it 
could paradoxically cost us a fortune as the DHAs will start charging their MH 
and Mill patients for staying in hostels + the income will come from DHSS! So the 
Treasury may have a view.  
8 November 1987 
 
Only seen John Moore briefly this week: no meeting on Monday as he was 
preparing for the 2nd Reading of the Social Security Bill that day, and no meeting 
Wednesday – no reason given. But as I see his comments on policy papers he 
goes down in my estimation – I don’t think he understands the NHS, its scale, its 
problems. He failed to get enough capital for the breast cancer programme and 
has been sending out petulant memos saying that with a £1billion capital 
programme it should be easy for the RHAs to find the money needed. But all that 
£1billion is committed and something would have to be cancelled (it’s over-
committed and they are already postponing projects eg in Burton on Trent). But 
it’s more the principle – we should have learned something from the cervical 
cancer shambles when health authorities were told what to do but given no 
money. Well, I learned, and the officials learned, and Sir Roy Griffiths (who is 
sending round cross memos about it) learned, but JM has nothing to learn, he 
knows it all. It’s the same with hospitals charging for paybeds. The PAC criticised 
us last year for undercharging, which our friends in AMI don’t like either, - they 
accuse us of undercutting them and after 10 years in the UK they are only just 
starting to make a profit. Now JM wants the NHS actively to compete with the 
private sector  (why? seems illogical to me) and is quite keen on loss leaders. 
Tony and I have both pointed out that will bring criticism from enemies and 
friends,  but in another petulant little note he says it’s the scheme he wants. So 
much for working as a team. Perhaps like many people from a very difficult 
background he is so insecure that praise and glory are all he wants to hear. B155 
is very critical of him too and gave me to understand JM could have had more 
money in the recent PES round if he’d boxed cleverer. In the end we got £700 
million extra which will only be enough if the pay rounds in the spring are very 
mean; otherwise, if they are around 8% for nurses, which seems likely, we are 
£150m adrift. That works out at nearly £1million per DHA, and that is nasty. 
There’s a big contingency reserve so maybe we will be rescued but the figures 
already have a secret pay assumption built in. I think it will be tight till the run-
up to the next election, and I was suggesting to Tony that, if we must introduce 
Project 2000 (which will take nurses off the wards and make them students, and 
                                                     
153 Introduced in 1990 
154 Partly introduced in the Community Care (Direct Payments) Act 1996 
155 John Major, Chief Secretary to the Treasury 
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which will cost a packet) we should introduce the legislation soon, with 
implementation after the next election! 
29 November 1987 
For the govt on the NHS it has been a ghastly week. The DHAs have done their 
sums, the RHA chairmen met us in Cambridge the previous Wednesday and we 
outlined PES to them and everyone is feeling very pessimistic. We’ve been given 
£700millions next year, which is 1.7% in real terms and it’s nowhere enough. We 
now spend 5.2% of GDP (net) on the NHS, 5.9% if private care is counted, and 
that’s one of the lowest % in the developed world. When I was preparing a 
speech 10 days ago for the Healthcare Financial Management Association 
(erstwhile Treasurers) I naturally assumed the % was rising; to my amazement 
no, it’s due to go down to 5.1% by 1990. So I thought, sod it, I bet Moore intended 
that, and everyone should know: so I said it, and it was picked up by Nick 
Timmins, the bright lad who writes for the Independent, and now they do. On 
Thursday during the debate I was checking with officials in the box (the Press 
office had backed off and said the remarks were “unscripted” which is crap. I 
wish they would stop apologising for me). I asked them, wouldn’t it be possible 
to negotiate PES the other way round? Instead of starting with this year’s budget 
and then hassling over additions, why not start with the figure we thought we 
should be aiming at, eg 5.5% of GDP, and make comparisons with other 
countries? Yes, they said, we did suggest that to S/S but… How very interesting. 
We are very stuck with the NHS. We want to boast about how better we fund it 
than everyone else; yet S/S wants to be macho by not pleading for more money. 
At the same time demand for health care has had a hefty hike recently, as 
transplantation is so successful, as new anaesthesia makes surgery safe even for 
the frail and as we head for 4½ million people over 75. I know (and said it in 
debate) that there’s no cash figure which is ‘enough’ but I suspect there are some 
years eg 1985-87 when it is closer to ‘enough’ and others like now when the gap 
is widening. The crux of the row this week was over a hole in the heart baby in 
Birmingham who had his op cancelled 5 times, because of lack of nurses to 
operate the ITU. Fortunately some came back off sick leave and he was done on 
Wednesday, but it’s an old story at Birmingham, and Leeds and many other 
places – they don’t train enough specialised nurses, then they don’t manage them 
properly, so they get tired and disillusioned and clear off. They had the same 
problem at Birmingham 10 years ago of children being refused admission: then 
the ITU was full of kids with whooping cough, dying. In 10 years’ time it could be 
AIDS or God know what: but it will be something. I suggested to Tony that we 
should have a central fund to help with the training of specialist nurses, as it is 
beyond DHAs’ means (they not only have to pay training costs, but costs of cover 
too) and the RHAs have been very dozy about it. If we give a 50% training grant, 
and expect the RHAs to give the other 50% we may get somewhere. And we have 
to pay them better but there are discussions under way about that. And the PM 
suggested on Monday that we should move to a 2 or 3 year agreement for staff 
which would be wonderful – get them out of our hair for a while – but it would 
have to be generous to be acceptable. We shall see.  
And so to the PM of whom I’ve seen a lot this week. Lunch at No 10 Monday (23 
Nov 87): 5 Cabinet Ministers (Whitelaw, Young, Wakeham, PM and Waddington, 
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with Peter Brooke) and 1 M/S (Ian Stewart, Defence who hardly got a word in) 
and 4 PUSs (Richard Needham, N. Ireland, Colin Moynihan, Sport, John Lee, 
Employment – also fairly silent) and me. Archie Hamilton her PPS was at the far 
end of the table. Mostly she went on about the NHS and how we are going to have 
to reform it quicker than expected, in the Parliament. She did not specify what 
she had in mind but she’s wide open to the ideas of people like John Peet, John 
Redmond, David Willetts, all young, fit, wealthy and ignorant, and where they’re 
not wealthy yet, at least trying to forget their poor past. Some of the ideas are 
inconsistent, eg, why not pay hospitals per operations and then they’ll have to be 
efficient? (this is like the Diagnostic system in the USA which has resulted in the 
wholesale sacking of nurses). But Prime Minister, I ventured, we do that with 
dentists now; it does not guarantee efficiency, it discourages prevention and it 
conflicts with the cash limit controls. I thinks she’s after a ‘money follows the 
patient’ idea; certainly you could use a voucher system for a few limited things, 
but God help the bureaucracy if we did it on a grand scale. Anyway it doesn’t by 
itself create more resources and if we’re not careful it just means a drain of NHS 
money into the private sector where they offer us loss leaders. She also told me 
gaily that you can’t prevent a heart attack to which I said, “Well, they did in the 
USA, and strokes,” so she changed the subject. Maybe she realised she was 
talking nonsense. She also said rather gaily at lunch that all the world leaders 
have low blood pressure, she herself has low BP. I said those with high BP keeled 
over years ago. Can you imagine her discussing BP with Reagan or Gorbachev? 
The mind boggles. As it happens she felt faint herself the following eve at 
Buckingham Palace and had to go home early; why do people like her and Moore 
think they are such supermen! 
Meanwhile there are genuine souls like Tony Newton, slaving away, teeth gritted, 
on proposals to charge everyone through the nose for their teeth and defending 
the govt’s handling of the NHS against the screaming mob which is the modern 
House of Commons (doesn’t bother me, I just shout back).  
